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ABSTRACT

TRADING TECHNOLOGY WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE
U.S.S.R.:
POWER, INTRESTS, INSTITUTIONS,
AND DISCOURSE AMONG ALLIES
SEPTEMBER, 1991
J.

TIMOTHY CLOYD, B.A., EMORY AND HENRY COLLEGE
M.A.

,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by:

Professor James Der Derian

This dissertation analyses export control programs in

the Western state system.

The main focus is Western

alliance collaboration on East-West technology transfer
controls through COCOM.

It examines post-1945 intra-

alliance and intra-national perspectives on the relationship

between East-West trade and Western security.

Within four

historical periods (1949-1964, 1965-1979, 1979-1989, 19891991)

four questions are addressed:

a)

How dees the

structural distribution of power and the nature of United
States leadership affect collaboration on the form, the
nature, and the enforcement of controls?;

b)

How does the

nature of global economic competition affect Western

alliance states' collaboration on and Western firms'

compliance with export controls?;

c)

How does the nature and

the distribution of power in intra-national politics on this
issue affect United States policy and multilateral
vii

collaboration?;

d)

How does the nature of changing images

and representations of security and threats to security

affect United States policy and the nature of collaboration?
The project thesis is that a multi-factor analysis is

necessary for an appropriate understanding of the dynamics
of discord and consensus over the terms of the Western

alliance export control program. To conduct such an analysis
the project draws on four theoretical frameworks:

modified

structural realism, a market explanation, institutionalism
and discourse analysis.
The study is a contribution to the literature on

international relations theory, particularly the role of
ideas in international policy collaboration.

It draws on

work in theories of language and discourse and microeconomic theories of contested exchange.
The dissertaton concludes that emerging opportunities

regarding overall global security will result in a
transformation of Western collaboration from East-West
export control to a multi-directional technology transfer

management system.

The problems with this transformation

and issues that must be addressed in a broader-based program
(such as:

the proliferation of missile, nuclear, and

chemical weapons and environmental management) are
considered.
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INTRODUCTION

Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology,
whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are
delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we
regard it as something neutral; for this conception of
it, to which today we particularly like to do homage,
makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology
Martin Heidegger

"The Question Concerning Technology"

Collaboration on Export Controls
Since 1949 the United States and its NATO partners

have regulated East-West trade through an institution called
The Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM).

1

COCOM has served four main functions in coordinating Western
export control efforts.

It has been the organization

through which criteria are established for export controls.
Secondly, COCOM working groups have compiled detailed lists
of items and technologies subject to control.

late 1950s this included three lists:

atomic list (IAL)

,

Since the

the international

the international munitions list (IML)

and the international industrial list (IIL)

.

Thirdly, COCOM

has been the forum in which enforcement efforts have been

coordinated between states.

Finally, COCOM has been the

body responsible for evaluating member states applications
for particular exceptions to the agreed upon controls.

COCOM includes all NATO countries except Iceland, plus
Japan and Australia.
1

l

2

United States-Western European collaboration on

multilateral export controls in COCOM has been
mixed currents.

Over the past forty five years

a sea of
a

general

consensus existed on the need to maintain some form of
strategic controls on the transfer of technology to the
East.

Historically, however, there have been recurrent

conflicts over the appropriate nature and function of export

controls and, more particularly, over the specification of
items subject to regulation.

generally maintained

a

Western European governments

minimalist position on the extent of

technology transfer regulations and on the substance of such
controls.

The United States government, the leader in the

founding of COCOM, generally pursued

a

maximalist strategy

on these issues, embodied in its complex unilateral export

control administration.

Conflicts over this issue have been recurrent at the

domestic as well as inter-allied level.

In the United

States, protracted domestic disputes surrounded passage of

the 1979 and 1985 revisions of the Export Administration
Act,

and the "battle of the branches" over implementation of

export controls in the 1980s has been particularly intense.

While less visible, tensions have also appeared at times in
some Western European states.

At the inter-allied level

there have been numerous disputes over specific transfers of

high technology by COCOM member states to the Eastern Bloc.

3

The United States has used several means in its
occasional

attempts to halt some of these transfers.

United States has turned at points from

a

since 1949 the

preferred

diplomatic persuasion strategy to an economic coercion
strategy to try to bring alliance states and firms into line
with

a

more restrictive policy.

strategy has depended on

a

This economic coercion

surveillance system including an

array of intelligence networks that monitor global high

technology transfers and that gauge compliance by states and
firms with export control agreements.

includes

a

The system also

broader arrangement of institutionalized and

standardized practices, such as the United States export
licensing program, that have helped to maintain vigilance on

East-West technology trade.
There are several reasons why an inquiry into the past
and present dynamics of Western alliance collaboration in

this area is justified.

First, as the radical

transformations in the Eastern bloc since 1989 altered the

terrain and the horizons of the East-West strategic balance,
and Western states and firms scrambled to take advantage of

new economic opportunities, the United States found itself
in a precarious position.

The United States, seeing itself

as the main guardian of Western security, has been the

leader of the COCOM program.

The United States has led in

maintaining the integrity of the multilateral program by

4

establishing criteria, parameters, and procedures
of
control, by attempting to get member states to
enforce
effectively controls; and by obtaining control
compliance
from firms in both COCOM and non-COCOM states.

in the midst

of allied governments' demands for broad and immediate
cuts
in the list of items subject to control and for a

restructuring of COCOM, the United States faced the problem
of finding a balance between responding to these demands and

maintaining an effective strategic embargo in the interest
of Western security.

In an attempt to reconcile these

cross-cutting and conflicting demands, policy makers and
policy analysts in the United States and Western Europe
began to examine the strategic, economic, and political
aspects of this issue.

The difficulty and complexity of

finding acceptable compromises and

a

stable ground for

consensus on this issue has been exacerbated by the fluidity
of the situation in the East.

Secondly,

in the mid 1980s this issue had already

acquired significant economic and political salience in the

United States.

Business interest groups and some members of

Congress became increasingly concerned with the cost of the

United States more restrictive unilateral export control
program, particularly in West-West trade.

In 1986 and 1988

Congress commissioned the National Academy of Sciences to
conduct extensive studies of both the United States

5

unilateral and COCOM export control systems.

The studies of

the unilateral program involved an assessment of the

administrative and competitive costs to United States firms,
the bureaucratic costs to the government, and the

inter-allied political costs.
Third, the history of United States-Western European

collaboration in the multilateral export control program
offers

a

rich case study of cooperation.

This cooperation

occurs at an intersection between security, economic, and

diplomatic issues in international relations.

Assessing

this history will enrich our understanding of the dynamics
of collaboration in the international political economy.

Finally, there are also broader reasons for such an

inquiry.

The regulation and control of the diffusion of

technology through institutionalized state mechanisms,
administrative codes, licensing programs, monitoring
organizations, surveillance systems, and legal statutes for

rewards and punishments has

a

lineage in the state system.

This state practice, however, has experienced shifts and

transformations.

The objects of control, the methods of

categorizing items and classes of goods subject to control,
the techniques used for surveillance, and the magnitude of
the apparatuses of enforcement have changed over time.

These past efforts at regulating the diffusion of items and

technology that were seen to offer advantages in rivalry

6

between states provide the material for an interpretive

history of the present raison d'etre of the multilateral
export control program.

In placing the present case in

historical context we can examine the differences between
eras.

That is, such an investigation will expose

discontinuities by contrasting structures of power and
knowledge that helped give rise to, maintain, and transform
this practice at particular points in history.

I

will

compare and contrast the rationale and administrative

structure of the nineteenth century British export control

system with the post-1945 multilateral export control
system.

In that sense this inguiry into the dynamics of

United States-Western European collaboration on technology
transfer controls allows for a reconsideration of the

history of

a

state practice.

A reconsideration of this

practice is significant because it demonstrates the

difficulty of establishing and maintaining

a

collaborative

program of export controls between states with divergent
administrative histories and political cultures.
The Questions
In light of these issues this project examines the

following sets of general guestions:

First, what have been

the goals and the structure of post-1945 multilateral export

control collaboration?

How do they differ in rationale and

the
form from past examples of export control programs in

7

Western state system?

Secondly, what specific factors

account for the historical periods of greater, or
lesser,

conflict and consensus in United States-Western European

collaborative policy in this area?

What have been the

significant factors in determining the policy stands of
alliance states on this issue?

Thirdly, what effect will

transformations in the Eastern bloc have on this area of
alliance collaboration?

How will intensified international

economic competition affect the fragile consensus that has

supported post-1945 policy coordination on East-West
strategic technology transfer controls?
In order to address the broader guestions this project

contrasts the post-1945 control program with past examples
of systematic efforts by governments to regulate the

diffusion of particular technologies.

The project includes

an analysis of the nineteenth century British export control

program and then examines the past dynamics of United
States-Western European collaboration in COCOM.
done from the vantage points of

a

This is

variety of theoretical

perspectives that have been used in other studies to explain
the sources of conflict and cooperation in the international

political economy.
Chapter one defines key terms of reference for the
project, reviews the literature on the topic and demarcates
the scope of the project.

This chapter lays out four

8

theoretical perspectives and explains how each can be
used
to interpret the history of the post-1945 multilateral

export control program.
Chapter two investigates the question of whether or
not, governments have attempted to maintain military,

strategic, or economic advantage by controlling the

diffusion of particular items and technologies.

One of the

central issues that is analyzed deals with the factors that

determine the nature and scope of such programs.

This

includes an assessment of how such programs have been shaped
by both the material basis of these states' preponderance

and by the understandings and representations of the sources
of power accepted by these states' policy elites.

The main

historical analysis in this chapter is a comparison and

contrast of nineteenth century British regulations on the

transfer of certain technologies with the post-1945 United
States control system.

The last part of the chapter is an

analysis of the elements in technology transfer regulations
unique to the post-1945 period.
Chapters three through six are a periodized analysis
of the history of the COCOM multilateral control program.

The periodization used in these chapters corresponds to
shifts in United States-Western European collaboration in
this area.

This analysis focuses primarily on interactions

among the United States, Great Britain, France, and West

9

Germany.
1963,

Within each of these historical periods (1949-

1964-1979,

1979-1989,

1989-1991) the project addresses

the following specific questions:
a)

How does the structural distribution of power
among allied states and the nature of United

States leadership affect collaboration?
b)

How does the nature of global economic

competition

— particularly

among firms and within

sectors most affected by controls

— affect

collaboration?
c)

How does the nature, structure, and distribution
of power in domestic intra-governmental politics
on this issue affect collaboration?

d)

How does the power, authority, and nature of

representations of the Soviet threat and of the
role of strategically significant technology in

guarding Western security accepted by allied

government officials, affect policy and

collaboration within the alliance?

Chapter three runs from the formation of COCOM through
the transformations in the program during the 1950s.

The

chapter explores the roots of the East-West export control
program and analyzes the factors behind changes and
conflicts in the program within the United States, within

Western European states, and at the inter-allied level.

10

Chapter four runs from 1964 to 1979.

it analyzes

changes in the multilateral program in the context of

intensified West-West economic competition and in the

context of detente.

Chapter five runs from 1979-1989.

It

assesses domestic level and inter-allied factors in the move
to fortify the multilateral export control program after the

invasion of Afghanistan.

Chapter six provides

a

history of

the transformation of COCOM during 1989, assesses the

outcome of the June 1990 COCOM talks, and then considers the

challenges to the future of COCOM given the transformations
in the East bloc.

The concluding chapter offers, first,

a re-

consideration of the contrast between the post-1945

technology transfer control program and past examples of
such practices.

Secondly, the chapter offers an overall

assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of various
approaches to explaining the dynamics of inter-allied
conflict and consensus in this area.

One goal of this study

then is to refine some theoretical perspectives by testing
the strength of a variety of approaches to account for the

dynamics of United States-Western European collaboration on

multilateral export controls.

I

will argue, however, that

no one theoretical perspective is sufficient to account for

the diverse array of factors that have given rise to

conflict or that have helped to produce cooperation in this

11

area of alliance policy collaboration.

multi-factor analysis provides

a

My thesis is that a

full and adequate

understanding of the complex dynamics of alliance
collaboration in this area.

I

conduct such an analysis by

drawing on four theoretical perspectives:
structural realism,

a

modified

market explanation, institutionalism,

and discourse analysis.

Taken together these perspectives

allow us to assess the factors that interact to produce

cooperation and discord over multilateral export control
policy.

CHAPTER

I

THE DYNAMICS OF WESTERN ALLIANCE COLLABORATION
ON EXPORT CONTROLS:
FOUR MODES OF
INTERPRETATION

Introducing th e Concepts and the Theories

There have been

a

number of recent efforts to bring

theoretical considerations and analytical paradigms to bear
on the history of West-West collaboration on East-West

export control policy (Bertsch and Mclntyre, 1983; Crawford
and Lenway, 1985; Rode and Jacobsen, 1985; Parrot, 1985;

Mastanduno, 1985, 1988, and 1989; Jentleson, 1986;
Lowenfeld, 1987; Bertsch et. al., 1988; Long, 1989).

This

area of alliance collaboration lies at a point of

intersection between security, economic, and diplomatic
questions.

It has thus attracted the attention of

scholars from divergent backgrounds, who often "speak

different languages."

The state of attempts to theorize

about or to explain the history of collaboration in this
area mirrors the complexity of the multiple factors that

have produced both cooperation and discord in the Western

alliance over East-West trade policy.

Recent work has

thus directed our attention to the conditions under

which collaboration has been created and transformed
by assessing economic, political, and perceptual

12
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factors and by evaluating the role of system
and domestic
influences.

This chapter will review some commonly accepted

approaches and explanations. It will also introduce some

previously under utilized theoretical perspectives as
potentially powerful approaches to interpreting the dynamics
of United States-Western European post-1945 collaboration on

East-West trade policy.
The Scope of the Project

This project does not attempt to analyze the impact of

access to Western technology in general on Soviet or Eastern

European industrial and military development; nor does it
assess the impact of COCOM controls on Eastern Bloc military

capability or on Western strategic technology advantage
(U.S.

DOD,

1981 and 1985; Perle,

1987; Vorona,

1987).

While

answers to such questions influence policy and thus must be

considered in broad terms, the focus of this project is more
narrowly on the political, economic, and perceptual factors
in inter-allied multilateral collaboration and in the United

States unilateral export control program.

In that sense

then the project's central concern is with factors that form
the context and determine the direction of United

States-Western European negotiations on export control
collaboration.

The aim of the project is to contribute to

the work that has been done in the study of cooperation and

conflict in the international political economy.

In

14

particular, the project aim is to complement
recent efforts
by Gray Bertsch (1983, 1985, and 1988), Michael
Mastanduno
(1985,

1988,

and 1989), Bruce Jentleson (1986) and Beverly

Crawford (1985 and 1988) to bring theoretical considerations
and analytical paradigms to bear on collaboration in this
area.

It is designed to shed light on the broader issue of

the conditions under which collaboration in international

relations is created and maintained.

Before turning to

review past literature on this topic, however,

I

lay out key

definitions and points of reference for the project.
Terminology
"Cooperation,

11

"discord," and "collaboration" have

often attained the status of shibboleths in the study of
international institutions.

contested terms.

All three, however, are

The notion of collaboration is used here

to characterize a situation in which the actions of states

are brought into conformity with one another through some

form of joint policy determination.

Within the context of

collaboration, however, conflict, disagreement, and

divergence of perception persist at various levels.
these conflicts might not result in discord

(a

While

situation in

which one state's policies actually hinder the realization
of other states' goals), collaboration as a concept is

intended to accentuate the tension present between those

elements that produce cooperation and those that produce
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discord in any coordinate policy endeavor.

Collaboration,

then allows us to avoid conceiving of cooperation
and

discord as

a

binary opposition.

The central focus of the export control collaboration

has been on restricting the export of strategically

significant technology.

As we will see, the designation of

items as militarily or strategically significant technology
has been controversial.

However, one of the more intriguing

elements in the control program is the place and role that
the image of technology has assumed in relation to

conceptions of strategic and economic advantage.
The etymological roots of the word technology are only

obliquely reflected in contemporary connotations and
significations of the word. "Techno," from the Greek tekhne

meaning a craft or an art, has become an omnibus prefix
connoting all that has to do with
industrialized society.

a

scientifically advanced

The first edition of the Oxford

English Dictionary (1888) lists seven words with the prefix
"techno."

The second edition (1988) lists twenty-seven and

no doubt the list could be expanded given the industry of

proliferating "technologisms.
"technopolis,

"

For example, we live in a

or a "technosociety" inhabited by

11

"technocentric" "technomaniacs" who communicate in
"technospeak.

This has lead to "technophobia" and

"

"technostress.

"

The point of this word game is that
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contemporary Western society has often been
defined in terms
of a notion of a technology.
There has been disagreement not only over the

consequences of this development, but also over the
actual

definition of technology.

This means by stepping out to

define "technology" one quickly finds oneself in
mine-field.

a

For now let us define technology as applied

science, or the design and manufacturing know-how required
to produce advanced industrialized goods (Mastanduno, 1985)

.

This know-how or technology exists in "disembodied" form as
data (e.g., blueprints, operating manuals) and in "embodied"
form as items, equipment, and machinery.

Technology

transfer is the acquisition by one country from another of
embodied or disembodied technology that directly or
indirectly allows

a

qualitative or quantitative upgrading of

industrial or military systems.

technology can take

a

The transfer of disembodied

number of forms including sales of

licenses, subscriptions to technical periodicals, word of
mouth, and industrial espionage.

The transfer of embodied

technology involves imports of actual products, particularly
capital goods.

There is also a distinction between active

and passive technology transfer.

Active transfers involve

ongoing interactions between the seller and the buyer in the
form of training personnel and upgrading systems.

transfers are one-time exchange transactions.

Passive
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Technologies can also be classified by end-use,
that
is, actual application.
It is common to use a threefold

classification of civilian, military and dual-use
technology.

A dual-use technology can be employed in both

the civilian and the military sector.

The notion of

military significance refers to the effect of
on the military balance between states.

a

technology

Usually

technologies with military significance are considered to be
"strategic technologies" designed especially or used

principally and directly for the development, production,
and utilization of arms, ammunition, and military systems.
In the broadest sense the transfer of any technology can be

said to be militarily significant because economic or

industrial gains can be used to increase military power
(Mastanduno,

1985; Schaffer,

Science, 1987)

.

1985; National Academy of

The narrower definition of military

significance refers to technologies with specific and direct

military applications.

The question of what constitutes a

militarily significant technology, particularly in the
dual-use area and concerning items that might make an
"indirect contribution" to

a

military system, has been

a

major issue in United States-Western European debates over
the scope of technology transfer controls.

The United

States policy position on export controls has historically

incorporated

a

broader definition of military significance,

.
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while Western European states, in varying degrees, have

advocated narrower definitions.
Review of Past Literature
Until recently works on the post-1945 Western alliance

and unilateral United States export control programs lacked
a

theoretical framework of analysis.

The existence of COCOM

was initially kept highly secret and multilateral

negotiations are still conducted under much stealth.

This

has been due to the informal nature of the organization and
to the fact that Western alliance leaders have always been

cautious about raising the profile of the organization

because of the conflicts it would generate.

As a result

most early works on this topic were noble attempts, in the
face of sparse information, to document the history of the

Western multilateral and United States unilateral export
control programs.

In addition some works have attempted to

assess the role of Western technology in Soviet industrial
and military development or to assess the impact of export

controls

1

Work that has been done on the role of Western
technology in Soviet and Eastern European economic development
and on the contribution of Western technology to Eastern Bloc
military capability is important, while at the same time
complex and controversial. Evaluating the precise impact of
Western technology on Eastern bloc states industrial or
the
economic development is difficult and doing so for
to
only
military sector is almost impossible. This is due not of the
the difficulties of obtaining data, but because
detail its
difficulties of constructing methods to measure in
1
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When scholars have turned to analytical frameworks and

theoretical considerations, the focus has usually been on
the characteristics of and the debates over forms of what

impact. This holds true for the West as well as the East.
Nevertheless, there have been some noteworthy attempts.
Anthony Sutton's three volume study Western Technology and
Soviet Economic Development traces the impact of Western
technology in industrial development from 1917 to 1965. Sutton
argues that Western technology was a decisive factor in Soviet
economic development from 1917 to 1930 (Sutton, 1968-1973). In
an attempt to assess the impact of Western technology on
Soviet economic development and in assessing the ability of
the Soviet Union to integrate this technology scholars have
also used case-study approaches mostly tracing the development
of a single sector. Philip Hanson's work Trade and Technology
in Soviet-Western Relations and his analysis of the Soviet
mineral fertilizer industry, S.E. Goodman's analysis of the
Soviet computer industry, Robert W. Campbell's study of the
Soviet energy sector, George D. Holliday's work on the Soviet
automotive industry, and Elizabeth Ann Goldstein's study of
the Soviet ferrous metal industry are all examples of the case
study approach (Hanson, 1981; Goldstein, 1984; Goodman, 1985;
Campbell, 1985; Holliday, 1985). Most of the compiled volumes
on East-West trade and technology transfer incorporate such
case studies (Becker, 1983; B'ergson and Levine, 1983 Smith,
1984; Parrot, 1985; Schaffer, 1985; Perry and Pfaltzgraff,
These case studies are important for showing the
1987)
the
and
technology
indigenous
between
relationship
assimilation and diffusion of transferred Western technology.
In many instances these studies have shown the difficulty
and
applying
with
had
have
states
Bloc
Eastern
operationalizing Western technology (Gustafson, 1981) There
have also been some creative econometric studies of the impact
of Western technology on Soviet industrial output (Green and
Levine, 1977; Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne, 1977; Weitzman,
Determining the effectiveness of technology transfer
1979)
regulations and export controls in preserving Western alliance
lead time over the Eastern Bloc in the application of
technology to military systems is also beyond the scope of
this project (Costick, 1978). Even if sufficient data were
available to show a technology gap across a number of weapon
systems over time, the effectiveness of the multilateral
export control program would not thereby be proven to be
this
effective. Nor would it be proven to be ineffective if
others
gap grew smaller. As Julian Cooper, David Holloway, and
;

.

.

.
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David Baldwin calls economic statecraft (Baldwin,
1985).
Adler-Karlsson's (1968) excellent work on the early
period
of Western alliance export controls and on the
formation of

COCOM includes an analysis of the objectives of the Western

alliance economic statecraft.

Drawing inspiration from

Albert Hirschman's National Power and the Structure of
Foreign Trade (1945) Adler-Karlsson showed the relationship

between the economic warfare and the economic defense
objectives in the early cold-war Western alliance export
control program. Economic warfare is an offensive imposition
of sanctions in an attempt to inflict disruption and harm on
a

target state's economy.

Economic defense sanctions,

usually called strategic embargoes or national security
export controls, are imposed with the goal of limiting
exports that have a direct military significance so as not
to enhance a rival state's military capability (Jentleson,
1986)

The use of economic statecraft in inter-state

relations is quite old.

Pericles

's

Megarian Decree, which

excluded a Spartan ally from access to ports in the Athenian
have shown, factors such as the Soviet Union's ability to
absorb and diffuse Western technology, Soviet indigenous
technological capability and the ability to apply it, and
the efficiency of the United States weapons procurement
system must be considered in assessing lead time in the
application of technology to military systems (Amann,
Cooper, and Davies, 1977; Amann and Cooper, 1982; Bertsch
and Maclntyre, 1983; Cooper, 1985; Holloway, 1987).
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empire and to the market of Athens is an early
example of
economic statecraft (Baldwin, 1985). Contemporary
literature on this instrument of politics has clarified
the

characteristics and analyzed the effectiveness of economic
statecraft.

In this regard an important distinction has

been made between foreign policy export controls and narrow

strategic export controls (Hirschman, 1945; Baldwin, 1985).
Foreign policy export controls can be broken down into

policies of economic warfare, policies with particular
instrumental objectives, and policies with

symbolic-expressive objectives (Galtung, 1967)

An economic

.

warfare strategy as outlined above is designed to inflict

maximum cost on and to disrupt the economy of
state.

a

target

The goals of foreign policy export controls with

instrumental objectives, sometimes referred to as

a

tactical-linkage export control strategy (trade denial or
trade inducement)

,

include the following:

forcing a state to change
policy;

b)

a

a)

compellence,

particular domestic or foreign

deterrence, discouraging future aggressive

actions by a rival state by signaling resolve; and

c)

containment, limiting potential economic and political

influence by isolating

a

economic interaction; and

state through restrictions on
d)

inducement, offering

concessions in exchange for desired actions (Schelling,
1966; Baldwin,

1985; Mastanduno,

1985; Jentleson,

1986).
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Foreign policy export controls with
instrumental objectives
can also be designed to affect the
allocation of resources
in a "target state" (Mastanduno,
1985).
The difficulties of

operationalizing foreign policy export controls with
these
sorts of instrumental objectives has been demonstrated
in

both the theoretical literature (Baldwin, 1985; Mastanduno,
1985)

and in particular case studies (e.g., Knorr, 1975;

Lake,

1977).

of controls,

a.

Irrespective of the actual substantive impact
foreign policy export controls can also be used

for symbolic and expressive purposes.

Such controls can be

used to express disapproval of an action of

a

and,

they can be used

in the tradition of American idealism,

target state

as symbols of moral sanction in the society of states

(Galtung,

1967; Jentleson,

1986).

These types of controls

can be distinguished from narrow strategic export controls

where the sole purpose is to deny or delay improvements in
the military capabilities of an adversary. Such controls

prohibit the export of items that make

a

direct and specific

contribution to a target states' military capabilities.
Debates over issues such as the conceptual

distinction, characteristics, substance, and legitimacy of

foreign policy export controls and strategic export controls
are germane to this project.

As we will see these issues

are important for understanding the lines of disagreement

over export controls and over technology transfer
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regulations on both the inter-allied and
domestic levels.
Some scholars have argued that the alliance
collaborative

policy program has taken various forms over time from
foreign policy controls to strategic controls.

Some of

these scholars have done work explaining the rise and

decline of these various forms of export control policy and

contrasting the policy strategy advocated by each of the
allied states (Mastanduno, 1985)

.

The Lacuna

Recent research has attempted to explain and assess
the political, economic, and perceptual factors influencing

Western alliance collaboration on export control policy.
While this past work can be categorized in

a

number of ways,

for the present purposes of analytical clarity,

I

that three theoretical approaches are articulated.

will argue

The

first approach is a modified structuralist explanation.

To

account for the dynamics of collaboration, this approach
focuses mainly on the distribution of power in the

international system.

This approach also assesses the

factors in the structural distribution of power that

determine the United States policy preference and analyzes
the willingness of the United States to exercise leadership
in the multilateral export control program (Mastanduno,

and 1988; Crawford and Lenway, 1985).

1985
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The second approach is

a

market explanation.

This

approach focuses on Western competition for Eastern European

markets as the main explanatory factor of the dynamics of
conflict on multilateral export controls.

It is a type of

interest group theory approach in that it accounts for

policy formation and change and alliance cooperation and

discord in reference to the role and interests of particular
societal groups in domestic level power games (Vernon, 1979;
Bertsch,

1985 and 1988; Jentleson,

1986).

The third approach is an institutionalist explanation.

This view focuses on the interests, position, and role of

players in intra-governmental and transgovernmental power
games to account for the dynamics of policy formation and

change and inter-allied collaboration (Bertsch, 1983, 1985
and 1988; Crawford, 1982 and 1988; Mclntyre, 1988; Elliott,
1988; Long,

1988 and 1989).

Some of the work done on alliance collaboration on

this issue and recent developments in international

relations theory offer evidence to support the use of

a

fourth approach: discourse analysis (Adler-Karlsson, 1968;

Bertsch and Mclntyre, 1984; Jentleson, 1986; National

Academy of Sciences, 1987; Nau, 1987; Hillenbrand, 1988).
Discourse analysis allows us to analyze the impact of what

Martin Hillenbrand calls the "cultural lag" that has lead

t

its
conflicts over this issue between the United States and
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European allies.

Discourse analysis is an examination of

the production, circulation, and acceptance of

representations

-

symbols, language, images

-

that

constitute meaning and that frame policy makers'

understandings of international relations (Foucault, 1972,
1979,

1980; Ashley,

Shapiro,

1989; Der Derian,

1989; Lapid,

1987; Der Derian and

1989). The approach focuses on the

role of contrasting meaning-constitutive representations of
the Soviet Union, of technology, and of the relationship

between technology and security among policymakers at the

domestic and alliance level (Yergin, 1978; Hoffmann, 1981;
Bertsch and Mclntyre 1984

;

Jentleson, 1986; Nau, 1987;

Hillenbrand, 1988; Root, 1988).

Yet the relative lack of

attention to the insights of discourse analysis,

a

branch of

what Robert Keohane calls the "reflective" approach, has

meant ignoring significant factors in United States-Western
European collaboration over export controls (Keohane, 1988;
Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989)

.

This view assesses United

States-Western European collaboration on technology transfer
controls in terms of how shared understandings, reigning
ideas, and meaning-constitutive representations have framed

the possibilities and the limits of collaboration.
The vast majority of studies that have been done on

post-194 5 United States-Western European technology transfer

regulations have also failed to consider the history of such
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practices in the Western state system.

An investigation of

the history of such practices and the
discourses that
sustained such practices will allow us to analyze
the

relationship between technology transfer control
practices
and how policy makers have conceptualized and
represented
the relationship between technology, regulations on its
diffusion, and advantage in the state system.

In addition,

tracing the history of practices designed to control the

diffusion of technology uncovers the background on which
present cooperation and conflict occurs.
Each of the four approaches, in various forms, have

been drawn upon in isolated studies.

This is, however, the

first attempt to consider simultaneously and systematically
the merits of the modified structuralist, market,

institutionalist

,

and discourse analysis explanations of

Western alliance collaboration on technology transfer
regulations.

A comparison of these perspectives on this

issue will advance our knowledge of elements that underlie

collaboration in this, and possibly other, policy areas

within the Western alliance.
Secondly, this study represents an attempt to employ

discourse analysis in an empirical case study of
international political economy (Keohane, 1987; Biersteker,
1989)

.

The goal is not to delineate a concrete discourse

analysis research program that can in turn be placed

.
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alongside rationalist research programs
for the purpose of
definitive adjudication.
Discourse analysis

a

is not offered

as a powerful new theory that can
surpass all others in its

ability to answer questions about cases of
international
collaboration.

As Richard Ashley points out, this

perspective in fact eschews such

problematizes the search for such

a

promise and in that sense
a theory.

Discourse

analysis shows the problems with explanations of
international collaboration "that arrest ambiguity and

control the proliferation of meaning by imposing

a

standard

and standpoint of interpretation that is taken to be fixed
and independent of the time it represents" (Ashley, 1989)

This approach should be seen then as

a

mode of

interpretation that resists the move to arrest ambiguity in
the name of parsimony.

Discourse analysis acknowledges the

complexity of accounting for the factors that have given
rise to conflict and cooperation in this area of

international relations.

One of the aims of this project is

to contrast this approach, informed by recent work in

continental philosophy and literary theory, with some

research programs that have dominated the field of
international political economy.

Comparing these approaches

will test their relative merit in explaining and elucidating

significant elements in United States-Western European
interactions on export control policy.

This will not only
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illuminate important elements in this
particular case, but
it aims to raise theoretical issues
concerning approaches
employed in the study of world politics.
Security. A11i .es and Technology Transfer;
Four Mod es of Interpretation

Modified Structuralism

Modified structuralism rests on three basic
assumptions:

the international system is anarchic rather

than hierarchic; it is characterized by interaction
among

units with similar functions; and the distribution of

capabilities across the states in the system varies over
time (Waltz, 1979).

Simply put, states are seen as unitary

rational actors that are guided by their interests in

determining strategies to gain desired ends on the basis of
calculations about their relative position in the
international system.
The most parsimonious version of this approach views
the distribution of capability as the principle determinant
of outcomes in state interactions at the system level
(Waltz,

Knorr,

1979).
1970)

Resources are fungible (Wolfers, 1962;

in that "they can be used to achieve results on

any of a variety of issues without significant loss of

efficacy" (Keohane,

p.

147,

1986).

Adherents to this

paradigm split over the relationship between system
stability and the distribution of capability.

One
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hypothesis holds that hegemony

-

disproportionate advantage

in capability combined with the
willingness and ability to

exercise leadership

-

on the part of one state results
in a

more stable international system than

a

system with

a

roughly balanced distribution of power among
several

first-rank states (Organski, 1968; Kindleberger
Krasner,

1976; Keohane,

1981; Gilpin,

1982).

,

1973;

This high

structuralism is modified by scholars who move away
from the
system level to account for how actors acquire preferences
or perceptions of interest.

Cooperation in the formation

and maintenance of international regimes requires leadership
(a

willingness as well as an ability to act) on the part of

one preponderant state in the form of setting standards of
conduct, getting other states to observe such standards

through the use of punishments and rewards, and assuming

a

disproportionate cost in defending regimes in times of
crisis (Krasner, 1983).

A shift in the distribution of

capability, away from hegemony, can set off changes in
states' policies leading to regime instability. According to

high structuralism, Western alliance collaboration on export

controls waxes and wanes in response to the distribution of
these structural determinants. According to

a

modified view,

changes in the system distribution of relative power, along

with changes in the United States' role and willingness to

provide leadership, can explain whether or not cooperation
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or discord will obtain on multilateral
export controls

(Mastanduno,

1988).

It can also explain the strength
or

weakness of alliance states' commitments to
the COCOM
program.
Michael Mastanduno of the modified structuralist
school has argued that the key factor influencing
alliance
states' collaboration on technology transfer controls
in

COCOM is the willingness of the United States to:

maintain the integrity of the control process;
domestic example;
controls; and

d)

c)

b)

a)

set a

minimize the administrative burden of

obtain the cooperation of key non-COCOM

suppliers of controlled technologies (Mastanduno, 1988)

.

He

evaluates the willingness and ability of the United States
to provide these elements of leadership in several

historical periods of alliance collaboration.

He claims

that COCOM strength, defined in terms of the commitment of

alliance states to maintain
embargo,

a

collaborative strategic

is a function of United States leadership. COCOM

strength is assessed in terms of four factors:

exception requests;

b)

a)

embargo

enforcement of the embargo, meaning

the willingness of states to devote resources and effort to

prevent, or hamper the illegal diversion of controlled
items; c)

the degree of shared interpretation of items that

should belong on the control list; and

d)

the general

attitude of member governments regarding the COCOM effort as
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an integral part of a national
security strategy

(Mastanduno,

1988).

He takes these factors and
attempts to

show that COCOM was weak in the
1970s, but that it gained
renewed strength in the 1980s. These turns,
Mastanduno
argues, were the result of the nature of
United States
leadership.
His argument deserves a reappraisal in this
project because it is an attempt to account for
the dynamics
of collaboration through a type of modified
structuralist

interpretation.

His argument modifies high structuralism in

that he contends that despite relative shifts in the
system

distribution of power the United States had the ability, but
not the willingness, to provide leadership in the 1970s; in

the 1980s it had both.

According to Mastanduno a congruence

of interests in the alliance along with United States

leadership are essential to maintain the strength of the

multilateral export control program.
A subset of this approach distinguishes between the

overall interstate power distribution and the distribution
of power within particular issue areas (Keohane and Nye,
1977)

.

The distribution of power within particular areas

may vary independently from the system level distribution.
In addition, power may not be fungible across areas.

Shifts

in the issue-specific relative power structure can,

according to this view, set off policy changes regarding the

particular regime (Odell, 1982). According to this view the
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dynamics of United States-Western
European collaborate-on are
explained by changes in the United
States' relative position
in the distribution of the
development and production of
high technology with dual-use potential.
The decline of the
United States government's resources in
this
area alters the

terms of collaboration as states and firms
recalculate their
interests and hence, the costs of compliance
with East-West
export controls in high technology areas.

Recent work in micro-economic theories of contested

exchange complements the modified structuralist perspective.
A micro-economic model of contested exchange provides
unique

insights into the instruments by which

a

preponderant state

attempts to extract compliance from states and firms for

preferred policy strategy.

a

This is particularly helpful for

understanding the strategy of preponderant states in

a

program that requires

Samuel

a

coordinate policy endeavor.

Bowles and Herbert Gintis have constructed

a

model that

demonstrates the relationship between the instruments by
which buyers induce proper seller behavior in the exchange
of goods that are subject to contested exchange (Bowles,

1987; Bowles and Gintis,

1988). An exchange is considered

contested when there is some form of conflict of interest

between agents and when some aspect of the goods exchanged

possesses an attribute that is valuable to the buyer and is
at the same time difficult to measure or otherwise not
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subject to determinate contractual
specification (Bowles and
Gintis, 1988 147)
:

.

Bowles and Gintis have shown that buyers
ensure
desired seller behavior, or determine the ex
post terms of
an exchange of a contested good, by offering
the seller a

strategic rent.

This rent is

a

strategy of claim

enforcement on the part of the buyer because it increases
the cost of contract termination for the seller.
the case of labor, where an employer offers

a

Thus in

wage in

exchange for which the employee offers not some fully

specifiable pro quo

,

but only a promise to perform at an

adequate level of intensity and care, the strategic rent
along with contingent contract renewal acts as

mechanism (Bowles and Gintis, 1988).

a

discipline

The strategic rent in

this case can take a number of forms, such as a wage higher

than the competitive equilibrium.

In addition to the

strategic rent and the threat of contract non-renewal the

agent-buyer develops surveillance systems to determine

whether or not the good, in this case labor, has been
delivered with the promised level of intensity and care.
Bowles and Gintis set out to demonstrate that in liberal
societies, where political instruments for the enforcement
of the terms of an economic transaction available to

economic agents are limited, an economic cost-minimizing

combination of surveillance systems and contingent contract
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renewal, made effective by strategic
rents, serve as
strategies of claim enforcement for agents
such as employers
and financial investors (Bowles and Gintis,
1988).

Strategic rents persist in competitive equilibrium
because
they result from the competitive optimizing
behavior
of

agent-buyers (Bowles and Gintis

p.

147,

1988).

The fact that issues of power are bound up in economic

relations is not

a

political economy.

revelation to scholars of international
Economists have begun to apply this

model to international trade.

Kiaran Honderich, for

example, has applied this model to international trade by

showing how Japan used strategic rents to reduce the

possibility of United States protectionism (Honderich,
1989).

What is important about Bowles and Gintis' model for

this project is what it can demonstrate about the dynamics
of United States-Western European collaboration on

technology transfer controls.
This model can provide

a

framework for analyzing the

relationship between the instruments that United States

policy elites have used to attempt to extract compliance for

preferred policy positions in the multilateral program.

If

we recognize that COCOM is an informal organization

affording no recourse to formal measures to ensure

compliance in agreements or to sanction defectors, then we
can demonstrate how a combination of surveillance systems,
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contingent contract renewal, and rents serves as

a

strategy

to extract and ensure compliance on agreements
and to obtain

concessions on particular issues in COCOM negotiations.
Based on this theory we could tell the story of the

history of this collaboration in the following way. Limiting
Eastern Bloc access to Western technology required Western

European collaboration.

With a preponderance of resources

at the outset, the United States was able to offer

participation or enforcement rents to Western European
states.

Enforcement rents in this case could have taken

a

number of forms: access to relatively inexpensive advanced

technological goods and know-how, Marshall Plan aid,

government contracts for firms whose governments agreed to
prevent the sale of technology to the East.

While political

consensus, on some level, has existed on the need to have a

multilateral strategic export control program, there has
always been a "control threshold" beyond which alliance
states resisted what they considered to be excessive

controls (Bertsch and Elliott, 1988)
costs,

.

There have also been

forgoing trade with the East in certain areas, to

following the United States lead in this program. At the
outset of the multilateral program the provisions of the
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle
Act)

,

formalized contingent contract renewal in that it

required the termination of economic assistance and other
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privileges to allied states found exporting controlled

technologies to the Eastern Bloc.

The United States also

set up the Office of Export Control in 1949 with

a

system of

export licenses and used its intelligence networks for

surveillance to gauge compliance in this instance of

contested exchange.

The agencies charged with oversight on

export controls developed lists of known and suspected

violators of these regulations.

These instruments remain

embedded in the United States export control administration.
The diffusion of technological production capability
and know-how among industrialized states and firms has

altered the international distribution of high technology
goods production.

This has transformed the efficiency of

the initial United States governments' mix of surveillance

mechanisms, enforcement rents, and "contingent contract

renewal" as instruments used to ensure compliance from

states and firms on export control agreements.

Enforcement

rents offered for compliance have become more costly and the

possibility of sanctions for defection has become over time
relatively less effective. 2
Beverly Crawford and Stefanie Lenway have attempted to
identify the conditions under which stable cooperation occurs
theory
organizational
and
theory
regime
combining
by
that
argue
(Crawford, 1982; Crawford and Lenway, 1985). They
relatively
the erosion of United States preponderance and a
more equal distribution of power undermines compliance
strategies and produces a shared compromise approach to the
construction of policy collaboration in this area. Their case
study is the 1982 pipeline dispute. Instruments for a
2
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In the early 1980s compliance rents available
to the

United States were disappearing or were becomming more
costly.

in this context the Reagan Administration moved to

invigorate the unilateral surveillance program with the
intention of extracting compliance from the allies on

a

ref ortif ication of the multilateral control program.

As the

distribution of capability in this issue area shifted, the

United States attempts to refortify its relatively eroded
enforcement rent system by invigorating its surveillance
program.

This serves to increase the possibility of

detecting defectors from agreements or firms diverting

controlled items to actors subject to regulation.

The

enforcement rent system could have functioned effectively
with

a

somewhat less vigilant surveillance system in the

past because of United States preponderance and because

Western European firms and states did not have alternative
suppliers or effective replacement rents.

The intensity and

extent of United States vigilance on technology transfers

becomes

a

function of the cost and effectiveness of rents

and the vulnerability of states and firms to the sanction of

compliance extraction strategy are, however, still at the
disposal of the United States through the structure and
statues of the unilateral export administration program. This
model can help to explain the dynamics and the consequences of
the use of these instruments by the United States in the
1980s.

.
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rent withdrawal for non-compliance
or defection from the
agreement
As will be discussed below the
response of the United
States in this situation of decline might
be regarded as

counter-intuitive or non-optimizing.

The reconstitution of

these instruments in the early 1980s, however,
is

a

continuation of the overall compliance extraction
strategy
embedded in the United States unilateral export
control

program.

Moreover the level of compliance that the United

States desired from the allies in the early 1980s was

determined not by optimizing calculations, but the level
of
desired compliance was established in terms of what we will
describe as the absolutist discourse.
In the "absolutist model" set out below (figure

compliance

(C)

,

1)

defined in terms of the willingness of

actors to conform to the United States policy position on

technology transfer controls and to expend resources and
devote effort to prevent the illegal transfer of controlled
technologies, is

non-renewal and

surveillance

(s)

a
a
.

function of the threat of contract

combination of enforcement rents

(r)

and

As shown in the graph below, enforcement

rent effectiveness is eroded over time

(t)

producing

a

shift

in the optimal combination of surveillance and rents to

extract compliance. The result is

a

shift out on the

Y axis.

This means that the cost and intensity of surveillance

C
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Fig. 1:1.
"The Absolutist Model":
Contested exchanged
model and the dynamics of compliance extraction on
multilateral export controls.

Note:
In the model set out above compliance (c)
defined in
terms of the "willingness" of actors to conform to the
United States policy position on particular controls, to
comply with agreements on controls, and to expend resources
and devote effort to prevent the diversion of controlled
technologies, is a function of enforcement rents (r)
the
threat of their withdrawal and surveillance (s)
In the
graph above, enforcement rents are eroded over time (t)
producing a shift in the combination of surveillance and
rents to extract compliance. The result is a shift out on
the axes. The United States attempts to extract compliance
at a level determined in absilute terms with greater
resource outlays and increased vigilance on surveillance.
As discussed in the chapter this acts as an endogenous
factor accelerating (l) the erosion of enforcement rents as
firms and states (rent-takers) turn to alternative suppliers
and their next best alternative. Underlying problem = c
(r,s); minimize B(udget) subject to C > C A
(B = P s S + P
Ps =
R)
Pr = Price of imposing a rent of a given amount.
Price of surveillance (ri = > st).
,

,

.

.

r

.
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increases in relation to the decline
of the effectiveness of
rents and in relation to an increase
in the price of
imposing a rent.
This "abolutist model" shows the
consequences of using
these instruments in a compliance extraction
strategy.

While the effectiveness of enforcement rents has
been

undermined exogenously, attempts to strengthen the
compliance extraction system by increasing the intensity
and
extent of surveillance-which can make withdrawal
threats

more creditable-acts as an endogenous factor accelerating
the erosion of available rents and increasing the cost
of

imposing

a rent.

This is the case because the costs of

being exposed to the United States intensified surveillance

system and the threat of enforcement rent withdrawal, for
foreign firms and states, begins to outweigh the benefit of

accepting rents.

This becomes the case as alternative

sources of supply arise and as Eastern European markets

present more opportunities.

Western European states in this

case attempt to reassert autonomy by encouraging the

development of indigenous technology, by passing laws to
protect against the United States legal authority to

withdraw rents and by moving to collective intra-European
bargaining positions on East-West trade and export control
policy.

Firms attempt to reduce exposure by turning to

alternative suppliers and by designing products around
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United States technology (National
Academy of Sciences,
1987).
What this means is that where
enforcement rent::s are
being eroded exogenously, relying on
this coercive system
may bring about compliance from actors
in

the short term; in

the long term it accelerates the decline
of the original
basis of power in multilateral negotiations
on export

control policy and risks serious damage to
United States
commercial interests.
In contrast to the "absolutist model"

"optimizing model" (Figure 1:2) depicts
strategy.

(Figure 1:1) the

a cost

minimizing

in this case the United States would maxamize
the

net benefits of these instruments by extracting
compliance
at a level determined by an optimal combination of
available

rents and surveillance.

The level of desired compliance is

set exogenously under the terms of the absolutist discourse.
In order to empirically verify the applicability of

this model we would have to be able to identify the

enforcement rents and their recipients.

We would have to

specify who will be hurt and how much by their withdrawal
and whether or not they have an attractive next best

alternative.

If enforcement rents could be reduced to

inter-governmental aid transfers then the equation would be
rather simple.
rents can take

They cannot, however, because enforcement
a

number of forms (access to military

technology, to defense department contracts, to supplies of
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In this model the level
"The Optimizing Model":
Fig
1:2
to the optimal
of compliance (C & CJ shifts in proportion
Reduced
combination of rents (r) and surveillance (s)
on
surveillance
of
effect
rents lowers the marginal
from s o to
surveillance
optimal
compliance thereby reducting
.

(r

= > s

)

.

43

specific products and technologies) and
can be directed at
both firms and governments. Beyond that,
acquiring this data
is made difficult by the fact that
the dynamics of

negotiations on multilateral policy are not made
public.
Measuring the extent and consequences of an
enforcement rent
system on West-West trade is also made more difficult
by

the

fact that Western firms, tend to avoid public
discussions of
its impact due to the importance of the United
States market

and technology (National Academy of Sciences, 1987)

There is an abundance of suggestive evidence showing
that this model has explanatory power in terms of the

dynamics of United States attempts to enforce its preferred

position with COCOM and non-COCOM states and firms.

The

first Reagan Administration tried to bring allied states in
line with the United States position on increasing the

restrictiveness of multilateral export controls.

The

Administration intensified surveillance programs to gauge
compliance; and there were allegations that the United

States used the threat of enforcement rent withdrawal in an

attempt to enforce its position with Western firms.
example,

For

in 1982 Richard Perle indicated that United States

military technology was withheld from certain allies until
they agreed to strengthen their domestic export control

programs (Mastanduno, 1985)

.

In addition,

several scholars

as well as the 1987 study by the National Academy of
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Sciences have indicated that Western
European policy makers
and business executives are cognizant
of and resistant to
the threat of enforcement rent withdrawal
and the costs of

being subject to the United States
surveillance system
(Crawford and Lenway, 1985; Jacobsen,
1985;
Bertsch,

1988).

According to Bertsch and Elliott, for example,
during the
1982-1984 COCOM list review in which a compromise
was

struck

on computer hardware, computer software, and

telecommunications equipment, the United States nad
threatened to cut Britain off from supplies of United
States

technology unless Britain tightened its export control
enforcement practices.

In addition, the compromise Britain

and other COCOM states made with the United States meant

that a number of Western European firms were forced to scrap

East-West trade deals.

Bertsch and Elliott say that Britain

agreed to the compromise "not only for the sake of alliance
unity, but also for more pragmatic economic reasons that

transcended the interests of any particular firms, no matter
what their resources" (Bertsch and Elliott, 1988)
have been

a

.

There

number of other allegations that the compromises

worked out in the 1982-1984 talks were made possible in part
by United States threats to deny technology and defense

contracts to COCOM states and firms who resisted the
ref ortif ication of controls (Woolcock, 1983; Schaffer,
1985)

.

Contrary to the view that these compromises

.
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represented an alliance consensus to strengthen
the program
no matter what the economic costs, this
model demonstrates
the instruments that were available to the
United

States to

attempt to extract concessions on particular issues.

This

model also demonstrates instruments that the United
States
has used to enforce Western firms' compliance with
export

controls
This enforcement rent system can also be applied to

explain the United States approach to extracting compliance
on export controls from non-COCOM states and firms.

As

Mastanduno points out, when diversions of controlled
technology to the East through Austria in the early 1980s
were identified, United States officials said that Austrians

would be left with only "pastries and 1950s machinery" if
they did not tighten restrictions on technology transfer

controls (Mastanduno, 1985)

.

As a direct result of United

States threats to withdraw enforcement rents, the Austrians,
out of what they referred to as economic necessity, agreed
not only to cooperate with U.S. Customs Service surveillance

programs, but also passed domestic legislation that

established more effective domestic controls on technology
transfers to the East.

The United States has also turned to

this enforcement rent system to extract compliance from

other non-COCOM states and firms.

The United States has

used this type of strategy to assure COCOM member states

.
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that the trade their firms would forego by
complying with

multilateral controls would not be filled by non-COCOM
suppliers (Interview, Paris, November, 1990)
A number of studies have demonstrated the costs of

coercion strategies in extracting compliance on broadening
the multilateral export control program (Mastanduno, 1985;

Jentleson, 1986)

.

These studies have shown how allied

political resolve and domestic resistance have helped to

undermine such strategies, particularly in the case of the
Siberian gas pipeline dispute.

The contested exchange model

shows the potential detrimental long-term consequences of

compliance extraction strategy.

a

It also demonstrates in a

broader and more parsimonious way the inter-relationship of
instruments that have been used in an attempt to extract and
to enforce compliance with multilateral export control

agreements from COCOM and non-COCOM states and firms.

In

addition, the model offers a conceptual framework for

analyzing instruments available to the United States for

attempting to extract concessions on particular issues in
COCOM negotiations.

This framework allows us then to make

sense of the move to refortify United States surveillance

programs in the early 1980s as an integral part of

a

broader

enforcement rent system that had served to lace multilateral
control collaboration together in the past.

.
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The Market. F vpianatinn

The market perspective focuses on
Western competition
for Eastern European markets as the primary
factor

explaining the dynamics of United States-Western
European
conflict and cooperation on East-West export controls.

This

approach will be developed as essentially

a

group theory

perspective that emphasizes domestic interest-group

configurations as the decisive element in explaining the
limits to cooperation and the source of conflict at the

international level (Truman, 1951; Macridis, 1977; George,
1980; Hall,

1988)

The political process, according to this view, is

dominated by interest group activities.

This perspective

downplays the role of central state actors and sees

government policy as the result of bargaining and

competition among interest groups.

According to this view

the line between domestic and international politics is

blurred; foreign policy has domestic roots and conseguences
(Gourevitch,
here, then,

1986; Hall,

1987; Putnam,

1988).

The emphasis

is on the constellation of domestic actors

standing to benefit from either cooperation in or defection
from alliance coordination of technology transfer and export

control policy.

This approach thus considers which groups

are affected, how these groups are affected, and what they
do to advance their interests in terms of these policies.
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Changes in the mix of group interests
converging on alliance
governments from the domestic political
scene are expected
to bring about pressures to change
policies if these
new

groups stand to benefit from such changes.

Outcomes are

thus explicated by showing how these
groups entered into
political coalitions, at various times, to
influence

officials and alter policy (Katzenstein

,

1976).

Gary Bertsch argues that pluralism accounts
for the
politics of United States export control policy
(Bertsch,

1985)

.

Like others dealing with economic foreign policy

issues he argues that in the last two decades, with
the

"weakening of presidential power after Vietnam and

Watergate," the political process on export control policy
has become increasingly pluralistic; "marked by more

political actors and centers of power with access to the

making and implementation of U.S. foreign economic policy"
(Bertsch,
1989)

.

1985; Odell,

1982; Destler and Odell,

1989; Long,

Scholars of comparative foreign and economic policy

have pointed out that among advanced industrialized states
there are significant differences in terms of the strength
of the state, the porousness of state institutions and the

role of societal interest groups in the policy process
(Katzenstein,

Skocpol,

1976; Krasner,

1985; Hall,

1978; Evans, Rueschemeyer

1988; Gourevitch,

1988).

,

These

differences present problems for the generalizability of

and
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pluralist explanations of policy
formation and change across
states in the West.
Differences in the transparency of
the
political processes of foreign economic
policy formation in
these states also complicates the empirical
verification of
the perspective.
Nevertheless specific and identifiable
groups within each of these states are affected
by and have

taken an active interest in export control and
technology

transfer policy.

In the past this has included a wide
array

of groups from commercial interest groups to
groups with

particular ideological agendas.

What is often more

difficult than determining what groups are affected and how
is assessing the steps that these groups take to shore
up

and protect their interests.

The question is to what degree

is United States-Western European cooperation and conflict
a

result of the convergence, or divergence, of the interest of

domestic groups with the capability and will to influence

government policy on East-West trade?
societal level actors have become

a

In the past decade

much more significant

force in helping to determine the scope of the multilateral

export control program and in constraining the ability of

officials to negotiate inter-allied agreements.
Institutional ism
As the classical theorists Martin Wright and Hedly
Bull and some later regime theorists have pointed out,

institutions in the international society of states can

.
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encompass more than explicit organizations.

conceptualize institutions as taking
existing on

a

number of levels.

a

We can

number of forms and

There are system-wide

international institutions inherited from the
Western state
system, such as the balance of power or diplomacy.
There
are subsystem institutions of various forms
and
functions,

such as military alliances and

economic integration

programs. In addition, there are intra-state institutions

that interact with, affect, and are affected by the

subsystemic and systemic institutions.
The term institutionalism as used here subsumes

a

variety of perspectives associated with both intragovernmental politics models and theories of intergovernmental relations.

"Governments," according to one

variant of this approach, consist of conglomerates of
loosely allied organizations and individuals (Allison,
1971)

.

This perspective, however, also rejects the

pluralist view of the state as an epiphenomenal product of
civil society, simply reflecting a conglomeration of

societal characteristics or preferences (Krasner, 1978)

Individuals and institutions within the state, according to
this view, are able to resist societal pressures for policy

change that may run counter to their interests or

established understandings of the national interest.

Some

scholars drawing on this framework have concluded that the
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executive branch has dominated the process
of policy
formation in export control and technology
transfer issues
(Long,

1988 and 1989; Elliott,

1988; Mclntyre,

1988).

The institutionalist and the pluralist
perspectives

have been set up as two alternative explanations
of the

formation and change of states' domestic and foreign
policy
(Krasner,

1978; Odell,

this project

I

1981; Gowa,

1983; Hall,

1988).

in

employ these perspectives to interpret the

dynamics of international collaboration, evaluating how
these domestic level factors affect inter-allied cooperation
and conflict.

Bracketing out domestic level considerations

has been an accepted move among some international relations

scholars.

parsimony.

This step is often justified for the sake of
We do need to limit the field of possible

variables to explain an international event or the dynamics
and outcome of bargaining on an issue. As Hedly Bull (1968)

has pointed out, however, the demand for tidiness and

intellectual cleanliness often sacrifices

a

consideration of

the complexity and intractability of international

relations.

In this project

black box, to

a degree,

I

open up the domestic level

recognizing that this move could

open a "pandora's box" of analytical and empirical puzzles.

The aim, however, is to provide a "thick description" of the

conditions and pressures that lead to cooperation and

discord in this area of alliance inter-action (Geertz, 1973;

.
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Ruggie,

that

I

1982 and 1990).

agree then with John Ruggie
in
take thick description to be an
essential tool
I

of all

interpretive sciences (Ruggie, 1990).

provide

m

this project

I

theoretically informed multilevel
reconstruction
of the dynamics of collaboration.
a

The first variant of the institutionalist
approach
sees governments as consisting of existing
organizations,
each with a fixed set of standard operating
procedures and

programs.

Existing organizational routines circumscribe
the

effective options open to political leaders and can
deflect
societal pressures for policy change.
Policy orders
are

ground through various apparatuses of government that may
distort or alter initial intentions by employing old
routines
Stephen Elliott (1988) and William Long (1989) have

demonstrated that in the United States the executive branch
has historically dominated the policy process on export

control and technology transfer policy.

They also argue

that most of the agencies charged with responsibility for

these policies operate on principles that reflect the cold

war environment in which they were constructed.

According

to this perspective each agency involved in the export

control and technology transfer policy process attempts to
push policy in the direction indicated by its own program
(Janis,

1968; Allison,

1971; Halperin,

1972; Stienbruner,
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1974; Art,

1974; Destler,

1980; Odell,

1981).

Responsibility for export control is
often spread out among
several agencies.
As a result, particularly in
the case of
the United States, policy substance
can appear selfcontradictory.
This occurs when agencies charged
with
carrying out the policy have divergent
or conflicting

organizational routines that lead to inconsistent
policy
outcomes.
Such a situation imposes significant

limits on

top policy makers' ability to effectively
alter policy, or
to negotiate agreements (Nau, 1988).
Alliance conflict over
export control policy is more likely the more
policy

responsibility is spread out at the domestic level
among
agencies with divergent organizational routines

(National

Academy of Sciences, 1987; Root, 1988).
The second variant of this approach sees foreign

policy positions as outcomes of bargaining among players

positioned hierarchically within governments (Allison,
1971)

.

The decisions and actions of governments are

analyzed as intra-national bargains resulting from
compromise, coalition, competition, and confusion among

groups of officials who define and perceive export control
and technology transfer policy issues differently.

The

individual players in this game are nested within various

agencies that compete with each other for resources and

prestige (Neustadt, 1970)

.

These players typically seek to

.
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guard and promote the interests of
the agency that they
represent- -where they stand often
depends on where they
sit"

(Allison,

Odell,

1971 and 1975; Allison and Halperin,

1981; Hardt,

1983; Freedenburg,

1973

;

1987).

East-West technology transfer control policy,

according to this variant, represents the outcome
of

bargaining among these divided officials (Jentleson,
1986;
National Academy of Science, 1987; Elliott, 1988;

Mclntyre,

1988; Hillenbrand,

1988).

The dynamics of alliance

collaboration on export controls is explained in reference
to intra-governmental bargaining.

Department's ability to negotiate

For example, the State
a

community of common

controls is tied to the nature of intra-agency negotiations

with the Defense and the Commerce Departments (Root, 1988)
The Department of Defense has consistently advocated a more

restrictive approach to export controls.

Intra-alliance

cooperation is easier to achieve and to maintain, when the
State Department or the Commerce Department, advocating a
less restrictive approach, have control over the nature and

scope of United States export control and technology

transfer policy.

John Mclntyre has pointed out that for

a

number of reasons over the past fifteen years the

bureaucratic balance of power on COCOM issues has shifted to
the Department of Defense.

According to this perspective,

United States-Western European conflict occurs as

a

result
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of a situation in which agencies
that hold a preponderance
of power in alliance states'
intra-governmental politics

over export control are at variance over
the form and
function of such controls.
The third variant of this approach focuses
on

transgovernmental linkages between middle and lower-level

bureaucrats (Neustadt, 1970; Keohane and Nye, 1972
and
1977)

.

According to this view, government bureaucrats and

specialists in other areas working together in the same
functional issue context can develop common expertise and

consensual understandings in the process of addressing

policy coordination and problem solving
1980,

1983; P. Haas,

1989).

(E.

Haas,

1975,

This type of interaction in

turn can lead to more flexible bargaining and more extensive
cooperation.

Peter Haas has demonstrated how groups of

transnational specialists in the scientific community that
form what he calls epistimic communities can influence or

shape intra-governmental policy collaboration.

Transgovernmental links can thus affect national policies as
coalitions arise that turn consensual understandings back
into domestic policy processes in the form of knowledge,

information, and pressure (Keohane and Nye, 1977;

Williams, and Babai, 1977; Adler, 1986;

P.

Haas,

E.

Haas,

1989).

Western alliance cooperation on export controls might
be explained, according to this view, with reference to the
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nature and evolution of such transgovernmental
linkages.
Therefore, the perspective raises the
following questions:
Does ongoing policy collaboration within
COCOM result in
more extensive consensual understandings and
thus greater

cooperation among transgovernmental bureaucrats
and
specialists?

Have shifts in the locus of alliance states'

policy negotiations on export controls (away from

bureaucrats and specialists charged with responsibility
for
ongoing collaboration in COCOM)

,

resulted in greater United

States-Western European instability in the collaborative

program (Crawford, 1988; Hardt, 1988; Root, 1988;
Hillenbrand, 1988)?
Discourse Analysis

Calling discourse analysis an approach does not do

justice to the multiplicity of its variations and styles
(e.g.,

1976,

Foucault,

1972,

1982 and 1989; Odell,

1986; Ashley,

1980; Barthes,

1979,

1974; Ruggie,

1981; Kartochwil and Ruggie,

1986; Elshtain,

1986; Der Derian,

1987; Der

Derian and Shapiro, 1989; ISQ September 1990).

discourse analysis came late to the discipline

Because
I

will

provide a detailed articulation of the perspective.
Discourse analysis, in

a

general sense, concerns the

significance of "modes of reality making" for understanding
international cooperation and conflict.

It is also

examination of the circulation of influence between
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representations, perceptions, and policy
prescriptions and
state practices.
it also involves an examination
of the

production, circulation, and acceptance of
representationssymbols, language, and images-that constitute
meaning and
frame understandings of international relations.

The

circulation and acceptance of "meaning constitutive
representations" makes possible, legitimates, and shapes

particular policies and precludes others (Shapiro, 1989).
The approach focuses on the role of contrasting

meaning-constitutive representations, among alliance states'
policy elites.

This includes representation of the nature

of the Soviet threat, of strategic technology and Western

security and of the relationship between East-West trade and

Western security interests (Bertsch and Mclntyre, 1984

;

Jentleson, 1986; Hillenbrand, 1988; Root, 1984 and 1988).

According to this view, meaning and value are imposed
on the world:

"structured not by one's immediate

consciousness, or in correspondence to a reality, but by

various reality-making scripts one inherits, or acquires
from one's surrounding cultural, historical, and linguistic

condition" (Shapiro,

p.

11,

1989)

.

Discourse analysis

places an emphasis on intertextuality

.

A text is a field in

which words, bits of codes, formulae, fragments of social
languages, and representations meet (Barthes, p. 32, 1981).
All texts are polysemic in that they are spaces where the
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paths of several possible meanings and several
discourses
intersect.
Any text is thus an intertext - a multi-

dimensional space in which

a

clash (Der Derian, 1989).

International relations,

variety of discourses blend and

international theory, and the terrain on which debates occur
about export control policy, can all be read as such
-

as a text.

space

a

Understandings of international relations,

events, and situations are mediated through and contingent

upon representational practices.

The various perspectives

deployed in relation to international relations, in order to
explain an international situation or in order to defend

policy option do not always have

a

a

power outside of the

space or time they seek to represent.

They are dependent

for their intelligibility, meaning, and power on the

structure and circulation of past discourses that construct
and mediate understandings of international relations.

The notion of discourse implies a concern with the

significance of how meaning and value producing
representations are bound up in language and with power.

discourse is something more than language as

a code.

A

It is

a type of utterance that entails representational practices

that do not merely "reflect" its object, but organize it and

subject it to transformation (Todorov, 1984).

practices

-

Such

styles, grammars, rhetorics, and narrativity -

entail systems of meaning and value that constitute and

.

.
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legitimate particular policies and
collaborative endeavors
(Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989)
Discourses are reinforced and renewed
by, and
reinforce and renew, a whole strata of
institutional
supports such as pedagogy, organizational

processes, and

administrative systems of categorization and
standardized
procedures.
In that sense then they function as

systems of

inclusion and exclusion, and empowerment and
disempowerment
The focus of this analysis is on the
representational

practices of discourses within which the multilateral
export
control program is embedded. United States-Western
European

collaboration on export controls is thus assessed in terms
of how shared understandings, reigning ideas, and
meaning-

constitutive representations frame the possibilities and
limits of cooperation (Habermas, 1971, 1987; Ruggie, 1975,
1982; Odell,

1981; Larson,

1985).

This assessment can be

done by tracing representational practices that constitute

certain policies as legitimate for the protection of
national and alliance security.

Significant elements of

United States- Western European conflict on this issue are

uncovered by analyzing how the boundaries of contrasting
outlooks on the appropriate nature and function of

multilateral export controls relate to various
representational practices found in the discourse of
alliance states' policy makers.
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These "modes of reality making- are
bound up in
scripts or inherited in pre-texts of
apprehension, such as
national and cultural histories, generational
experiences,
and forms of professional education and training.

They are

embedded in the various discourses of states'

representatives who engage in negotiations on policy
collaboration.

The production, circulation, and acceptance

of certain dominant meaning-constitutive representational

practices establishes
of legitimacy.

a

common pre-text for shared notions

The extent to which the diversity or

plurality of discourses is subordinated to

a

common or

dominate discourse establishes the permissive environment
and structures the nature and scope of a collaborative

policy effort.
United States-Western European conflict on this issue
is explained in reference to the boundaries of contrasting

outlooks, to various representational practices, and how

these relate to reality-making scripts inherited from
cultural, historical, and linguistic experiences (Foucault,
1972,

1979,

1980; Der Derian,

1989; Elshtain and Der Derian,

1987; Der Derian and Shapiro,

1987).

this case lays stress on the following:

Discourse analysis in
the influence of

Western Europe's geographical propinquity with Eastern
Europe; Western Europe's stronger traditional trade ties

with Eastern Europe; each ally's past experiences with

.
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practices of economic diplomacy;
representational practices
relating to the image of the Enemy-Other;
differences in the
conceptualization of the relationship between
technology,

security, and power; and preconceptions
regarding the nature
of Great Power competition.
In this sense discourse

analysis complements and enriches the geo-political

perspective and studies of the role of perception.
The need for a discourse analysis is evident
from

statements made by former State Department official
Martin
Hillenbrand.

He has argued that "American and Western

European officials have tended to have basically different

attitudes toward Eastern Europe" (Hillenbrand,
1988)

.

p.

367,

He speculates on the source of these differences in

attitude citing Western Europe's historical heritage,
cultural links, and geographical propinquity with Eastern
Europe.

Hillenbrand says that these "differences in

outlook" lay at the heart of the United States-Western

European disagreements over East-West trade and export
control policy and that

a

"cultural lag" exists.

United

States attempts to pressure Western European states into

conformity with its perception of Eastern Europe, he argues,
have accentuated definitional and interpretation differences

regarding the function and substance of technology transfer
controls
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Henry Nau and William Root, both
former United State s
government officials involved in
negotiations on allianc
technology transfer control collaboration,
have also pointed
to the significance of divergences of
perceptions
in the

West over the nature of the Soviet threat
and over the
relationship between East-West economic activities

and the

East-West strategic conflict (Root, 1988; Nau,
1989).
Nau
argues that consensus and turbulence in the
inter-allied and
intra-national policy processes can be traced to contrasting

interpretations of these issues.
analyst, Stanley Hoffmann

Though not

a

discourse

has argued that apparent drifts

in Western alliance interpretations of the Soviet Union
and

discord over policies to protect Western security, can be
traced to fundamental perceptual divergences.

He says,

for

example, that differences in historical experiences in the

conduct of the "game of nations" and differences in national

character and political culture are important factors in

explaining the dynamics of United States-Western European

collaboration on East-West economic and security policy
(Hoffmann,

1981)

.

Discourse analysis picks up where Hoffman

leaves off.

Gary Bertsch and John Mclntyre have also attempted to

provide more well-defined criteria for evaluating the impact
of the divergence of perceptions in alliance collaboration

on East-West export controls.

They examine the divergence
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of perception over the Soviet threat
and over the

appropriate relationship between trade and
security concerns
on export control collaboration through
a case
study

(Bertsch and Mclntyre,

They take the state as the

1984).

unit of analysis and argue that there are national

approaches to these issues that can be associated
with

governments conceived as unitary actors.

Using Daniel

Yergin's nomenclature, they argue that the contrasting

perceptions can be grouped into two "ideal-types":
I,

a)

Image

that posits the Soviet Union as a monolithic world

revolutionary state driven by

a

single-minded search for

expansion and hegemony with a clear sense of objectives;
and,

b)

Image II, that sees the Soviet Union as relentlessly

opportunistic, but more in terms of

a

conventional great

power (Daniel Yergin, 1977; Bertsch and Mclntyre, 1984).
Bertsch and Mclntyre draw on several rounds of interviews

with United States and allied governments' officials and
business executives,

a

systematic canvassing the printed

media of key countries, and an analysis of government

documents (Bertsch and Mclntyre, 1984)

.

They attempt to

show the relationship between the United States' policy

positions on East-West trade and export control issues and
the acceptance of an Image

I

perception.

They also show the

relationship between some key Western European states'
positions and the acceptance of Image II perception.
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The discourse analysis approach shares
some concerns
with these studies. However, it provides
a conceptual and

theoretical framework for evaluating the role
of contrasting
"world views" in international collaboration.
Discourse

analysis also moves beyond the potentially reductionists
.c
features of the focus on the psychology of perception

tc
:o

a

broader analysis of the relationship between social
constructions, discourses, and policy.

Despite the

contributions that have been made to our understanding of
the factors that can lead to conflict and collaboration in

international relations by scholars such as Jervis and
Larson, who use a psychological approach, there has been

little analysis of the role of socio- cultural symbols,
images, and language in the dynamics of international policy

conflict and cooperation.
For the purposes of this project and for the sake of

analytical clarity,

I

articulate

a set of

contending discourses in concrete terms.
these have existed in a pure form,

contrasting and
While none of

argue that there have

I

been four contending and at points overlapping discourses in
the history of United States-Western European collaboration
on export controls on East-West trade.

There are important

differences between and within each alliance state.

I

do

not assume, as do Bertsch and Mclntyre, that governments are

unitary rational actors, but rather

I

contend that the

.
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discourses outlined below operate
at several levels,
addition, the history of the
alliance collaboration on
this
issue does not represent a
sequential, or teleological

m

path
of discourses, but rather these
discourses have been in
contention since the formation of
collaboration on export

controls
The first is an absolutist discourse.

The Soviet

Union is represented as the embodiment
of the evil
Enemy-Other.
In that sense it is an enchanted

discourse.

The world is profoundly Manichean and
there are no grounds
for peaceful coexistence or trust with
the Soviet bloc.

Within this discourse strategically significant
technology
holds a quasi- theological place. The original

sense of the

term, technology is fetishized, held up as
having magical

powers.

Broad controls on the transfer of this high

technology are constructed as necessary for the survival
of
the West.
In this discourse the technological edge
is

represented as the key to the strategic advantage, to
security, and to survival.

Strategic advantage is not cast

in a language of geo-political position or in quantitative

terms, but in a lanquage and through images of the space and

speed of technological innovation and lead time gaps
(Virillio,

1986; Der Derian,

1990).

These significations

are used in debates to argue for intense vigilance on

East-West technology transfers.
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In addition,

this discourse,

trade with the Soviet bloc, in terms of

is morally suspect,

and non- participation

in the export control program or questioning this

perspective is cast as criminal culpability in undermining
the security of the Western alliance.

discourse draws on

a

Finally, this

language that advocates waging and

winning superpower conflict through economic and
technological means.

In that sense it legitimates a policy

of economic warfare:

a

comprehensive embargo designed to

inflict maximum cost on and to disrupt the Soviet economy.
The United States Department of Defense has most clearly

articulated this discourse at points in the past.
The second is an instrumentalist discourse.

disenchanted technical and scientific discourse.

This is

a

The

discourse draws on representations of the Soviet Union as an

opportunistic great power interested in continuous
aggrandizement.

It also draws on the image of

"enlightenment man" capable of engineering political and
social relations through policy instruments made efficient
by scientific techniques and methods.

Thus it embodies the

belief that East-West relations can be managed through trade
policy instruments.

The West, in other words, can use its

economic and technological advantages in East-West tactical
linkage strategies.

trade denial

a stick,

Trade inducement can be a carrot, and
to obtain desired policies and to

.
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register approval or disapproval.

The United States state

Department and the NSC have most clearly
articulated this
discourse at points in the past.
The third and fourth are neo-kantian
discourses (Kant,
1790; Bull,

1977),

liberal and conservative perspectively

Both neo-kantian versions hold to

a

traditional liberal

enlightenment faith in the ultimate value of commerce.

The

conservative neo-kantian discourse evokes images that
equate
economic prosperity with the possibility of political
stability and moderation. Liberalizing trade with the East,
including the export of advanced technology and increasing

Eastern economic prosperity, according to this view has

value because it can reduce Soviet insecurity and can help
to stabilize East-West relations.

Despite these potential

political side-payments from trade, the neo-kantian

discourse focuses more directly on the images of relative
gains from comparative advantage in liberalized trade.
that sense then the discourse establishes

a

In

conceptual

separation, in East-West trade, of political or security
issues from economic issues.

The conservative neo-kantian

discourse does, however, represent the Soviet Union as

a

traditional great power in pursuit of its self interest.

Conflict of interest between Great Powers can never be fully

eradicated and thus the discourse legitimates

a

selective or

narrow strategic embargo of goods that would enhance Soviet

.
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military capability.

The United states Commerce
Department

has most clearly articulated this
discourse at points in the
past
The liberal version of the discourse
holds to

more

a

purely Kantian view in that it draws on
images and symbols
of a convergence of East-West political
and economic
interests through the "spirit of commerce."

it can be an

anti-state discourse that draws on images of the
world
economic citizen and a rhetoric that casts suspicion

on any

form of intervention in economic interactions.

Each of these discourses can be identified in the
past

debates over the nature and function of export and

technology transfer controls.

They have framed the

parameters of the policy options on this issue.

preponderance of any one of these discourses at

The
a

particular

point in time meant that more stable collaboration obtained.
The breakdown of the power of shared or common discourse

results in less stability in inter-allied collaboration and
more policy disarray and conflict at the domestic level.
Conclusion
This chapter has defined key terms of reference for
the project, reviewed the relevant literature, and set out
the four approaches that will be used to analyze the history
of Western alliance collaboration on multilateral export

controls. Within each of the chapters on the post-1945
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Western alliance export control
program, the power of each
approach to account for the factors
and the dynamics of
conflict and cooperation will be considered.
The

theoretical approaches drawn on in this
study have been used
separately in analyses of United States-Western
European
collaboration on East-West export controls.
There has not
been any attempt to draw these four approaches
together in
assessing the history of this issue.
In addition,
there has

been no explicit attempt to draw upon or employ
contemporary
theoretical work being done on discourses in the
examination
of the nature of this collaborative policy area.
Finally, most studies of technology transfer controls

have analyzed the case of COCOM in isolation from the

history of state controls on the diffusion technology.

it

is clear that there are unique elements in the post-1945

export control program.

Placing this case within the

context of past examples, however, allows us to consider the
shifts that have occurred in the relationship between the
control over the diffusion of technology, state power, and

understandings and the representations of the sources of
state advantage and security in the international system.

Explaining the dynamics of United States-Western

European collaboration in this area no doubt requires

multilevel analysis.

a

Collaboration has been shaped and has

been transformed as a result of structural, interest group,
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and institutional factors.

Conflicts in this area have also

emerged out of divergences in the meaning
constitutive
representations embedded in the discourses of
alliance
states policy elites charged with forming
and negotiating
the terms of the multilateral program.
The analysis

of the

post-1945 program is designed not only to clarify
these
factors, but also to refine the theoretical
perspectives and
to test the explanatory strength of the approaches.
Before

turning to the post-1945 case, however, we first must

provide the historical context.

CHAPTER II

EXPORT CONTROLS IN THE WESTERN STATE
SYSTEMTHE FORMS AND THE FUNCTIONS OF VIGILANCE
'

A n Introduction to Reading Fvpnrf

Control Systems

Reading through the "nitty-gritty" of export
control
procedures and administration can have all of
the

appeal of

a Kafka nightmare.

The subtext of debates over the nature

and goals of export control systems, however,
can be more

stimulating.

The debates can be read as a clash of views

over what gives
rivals.

a

state military or economic advantage over

By analyzing those subtexts, this chapter is

designed, to raise questions about historical

conceptualizations of power and advantage in competition
between states.
The attempt to control the diffusion of material,

instruments, or technology viewed as giving one state

strategic or economic advantage over another is not new in
the international system.

This chapter begins by reviewing

some past examples of attempts by states to control the

export of particular items.

This includes an assessment of

the types of issues and difficulties raised in the formation
and enforcement of these controls.
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The main focus of the chapter is on
nineteenth century
British controls because the administrative
structure that
system most resembles the present one. The
nineteenth

century British case and the post 1945 case might
appear at
first to be dissimilar.
The early nineteenth century
British control system was based on mercantilist notions
and
was designed to give Britain ongoing economic advantage

over

its competitors.

The most revealing element of these

systems, however,

is the symbolic value of the categories of

goods that are controlled:

what they represent (ed) within

the context of competition between states.

By looking at

the past in terms of both the language used to defend the

programs and the images and symbols evoked in debates over
the types of items that should be subject to control, it is

possible to assess con-ceptualizations of power and
advantage between states at particular historical junctures.
The Historical Legacy of Export Controls;
Various Forms and Functions

Many states have attempted to control the diffusion of
items,

instruments, and know-how that were considered to

give them significant advantage in military or economic

competition with rival powers.

There are no examples,

however, of systematic export control programs, with

elaborate administrative apparatuses and enforcement
programs, until the middle of the eighteenth century.

The
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rather rudimentary nature of the
state apparatus until the
late eighteenth century meant that
enforcement of controls
was limited.
The British control system, developed
in the

late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century, was the first
attempt to construct a standardized and
systematic export
control and enforcement program.
It is useful to bear in
mind earlier examples as reminders that while
states have
always attempted to control the export of some
items,

systematic export control and enforcement programs
could not
exist until the modern period.
One early example is the regulations that China
placed
on the export of gun-making designs, guns, and cannons
in

the fourteenth century (Pacey,
1980)

.

p.

73,

1990; see Alvares,

The Chinese went to great lengths in efforts to

prevent such items or know-how from reaching neighboring
powers.

In some cases, however, they were willing to export

these instruments to allies.

After experiencing repeated

attacks by Japanese ships in 1370, for example, the Koreans
asked the Ming government to make an exception to their

controls (Pacey,

p.

73,

1990).

The Chinese refused at

first, but after being attacked by the Japanese themselves,

they agreed to the Korean reguest.

The Chinese first sent

guns and material to produce such weapons; then they sent

technicians to Korea to help build ship-mounted guns used to
fire flaming arrows at Japanese vessels.

Chinese attempts
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to restrict the diffusion of
gun-making methods and designs
seems to have been effective;
they apparently devised some

arrangement with Korea as no other
countries are known to
have been able to obtain Chinese
know-how (Alvares, 1980;
Gille,

1986; Pacey, p.

73,

1990).

The first export control programs in
the West were
founded on and enforced by papal indications

(Cipolla, p.

93,

1965).

These indications emerged during the
Crusades

and were designed to prevent items and
material considered
to be significant in the ongoing conflicts
from being sold
to the Moslem powers, particularly the "Other,"
the OttomanTurks.
Those who sold "strategic materials to the Turks"
or

who aided them in the construction or use of
implements of
war were subject to excommunication (Cipolla,
p.

see McNeill,

1982; Gille,

1986).

95,

1965;

This, of course, did not

dissuade the Turks from attempting to attract or to kidnap
skilled Christian workers and gun-founders who knew how to

produce and use cannon.

The Ottomans' initial reluctance to

use artillery and their poor cannon production systems were

factors that kept them from being able to overrun

Constantinople for several years (McNeill, 1982).

In the

early fourteenth century, however, a Hungarian gun-founder
named Orbanin ignored the papal export control orders and

helped the Turks to build up their cannon production systems
(Cipolla, p. 93,

1965; Pacey, p.

75,

1990).

In a matter of
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two to three years the Turks were
able to produce a number
of cannons of various caliber
including the "Mahometta" that
threw 1,000 pound stoneballs and took
140 oxen to draw.
This increased capability allowed the
Turks to complete
their siege of Constantinople and to
expand further into
Europe (McNeill, 1982)
.

The first of the more systematic efforts
to control
the diffusion of items and production
techniques emerged
during the intra-European dynastic state conflicts
of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These controls
focused
on those instruments and production methods
regarded as

significant in maintaining military advantage over rival
powers.

For example, during the long and intense conflicts

between the Spanish and the Dutch, the Spanish relied on
the
gun and cannon design and production of the Low Countries
(McNeill,

1982). As conflicts intensified in the late

sixteenth century, however, the Spanish began to import
British guns and cannons and casting techniques (Kail, 1952;
Schuburt,

1957).

Henry VII

established an iron industry in

Sussex in Ashdown Forest, Sussex in the latter part of the
fifteenth century.

By 1567 an export industry for cannon

and ordnance had emerqed.

Better castinq techniques and

the type of iron used in the foundries made British quns

more reliable than those produced in the Low Countries
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(Cipolla, p. 44,

and thus the Spanish
attempted to
acquire British products.
1965),

The English Court became suspicious
of this export
trade, particularly the Spanish
purchases in the 1570s.

sir

Walter Raleigh warned Queen Elizabeth
that "British
technique and product in this area was
a

jewel of great

value" and asked why should the English
"place such
in the hands of potential enemies?"
(Cipolla,
p.

44,

jewel

a

1965).

As a result the Queen issued an order in
1574 that

restricted the export of British guns and
cannons, the
material used in the production of such
instruments,

and the

designs or methods of casting such items (Schuburt,
1957; Cipolla, p.

45,

1965).

p.

67,

The order restricted the

number of cannons and guns to be cast in England
to those
"for only the use of the Realm" (Cipolla,
p.

45,

1965).

A

rudimentary licensing system seems to have been developed
in
the latter part of the sixteenth century. The controls
were

waived in certain cases, on permission of the Crown,
allowing founders to export ordnance to Protestant powers.
Other Protestant powers with sophisticated ordnance,
the Dutch and the Swedes, also established such controls
(McNeill, p.

147,

1982).

In 1615 at the beginning of the

Thirty Years War, Gustavus Adolphus imposed controls on the
export of cannon and other material and production
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techniques to prevent the, from
falling into the hands of
his Catholic-Spanish enemies
(Cipolla,
p.

67,

1965).

As conflicts between the
Dutch and the French emerged
in the 1670s, these export
controls posed problems for
the
French.
Following the intense internal
conflicts of the
seventeenth century, Richelieu had been
able to rebuild the
administrative, military, and political
structures of France
(McNeill, 1982; Pacy, 1990).
He had not, however, been
able
to develop an effective base for
the production of arms or

gunpowder (Cipolla,

p.

56,

1965).

Skilled labor had been

driven from France and the export controls
of the other
European states prevented the French from
acquiring

arms

openly.

As a result, the Marquis de Seignelay
and Colbert

sent agents into Holland, England, and
Sweden to acquire
arms illicitly.
In addition, France sent agents into
Sweden
to kidnap skilled workers and gun-founders
(Cipolla, p. 60,

1965)

.

All of the export control programs that existed
prior
to the eighteenth century were unsystematic.

Administrative

agencies and enforcement programs were minimal and there was
little attempt to rationalize or to standardize controls.
This is of course explained by the fact that the modern

bureaucratic state with its codes of efficiency and systems
of standardization did not emerge full blown there until the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

For that reason that
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it is intriguing to look in
more detail at the British

export control system of the eighteenth
and nineteenth
century.
The types of problems that concern
us today can be
found in the context of the debates
that occurred over the
establishment, enforcement, and continuation
of that system.
The Construction o f British Export Pnnt-mi

c

James Wheeler, the historian of Manchester,
wrote that
the British "inventions and the developments
in
the woolen,

textile, and the iron and steel industries
excited the

admiration and jealousy of all of Europe" (Wheeler,
1836).

170,

p.

Not only that, but they excited a British desire
to

have a monopoly control of these goods.

Controls on the

export of machines and tools and the know-how to
produce
such instruments developed, as we will see, over time

beginning with the first decree in the seventh year of the
reign of William III in 1696

(7

&

8,

William III,

c.

1696; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons,
504, v 115)

20,

1825,

.

From 1696 to 1841 the English supplemented Elizabeth
I's controls with a comprehensive set of laws and sets of

administrative and enforcement systems to attempt to prevent
inventions and state-of-the-art machines and tools or

a

knowledge of them from being transferred to military and
commercial rivals. Clearly the perceived economic interest
of the manufactures provided significant support for
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preventing these inventions from
flowing out of England.
There, however, seems to have also
been other
factors

driving the development of these laws.
In some cases,

as with innovations in the iron
and

steel industry, the items placed under
control had military
as well as civilian applications.
in other cases, controls
were placed on items that would strengthen
a competitors'

economic capabilities.

Of course it is difficult in the

mercantilist period to find

a

clearly articulated conceptual

separation between the reasons for restricting the
export of
goods that advanced a states military productive
capability
as opposed to economic capability (see T.S. Ashton,
W.

Bowden,

1925).

1924 and

The more elementary issue was preventing

the transmission of any machine, tool or resource to

a

competitor state that might increase its power capability,
quite broadly understood.
In this section

I

lay out the details of the

development of the British export control system and raise
questions about what such

a

of the power of a state.

Tracing the establishment and

system did in terms of the idea

development of the British export control system only to the
economic interests that lay behind the programs does not go
far enough (Jeremy,

1983).

For that reason

I

identify in

suggestive, perhaps some might say interpretative, way

a
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articulations and explanations of the
rationale of the
controls on the diffusion of these
innovations.

This effort to control diffusions
of innovations began
with the 1696 statue.
It sought to protect
the

"stocking-frame and the mechanisms used in the
manufacture
of silk"

(7

Wm.

Ill,

c.

20,

1696).

The statute made it

unlawful for anyone to export these frames
because this
"mystery increases his Majesty's glory and his
Majesty's
customs because great guantities are wrought off

in a little

time"

(7

Wm.

Ill,

c.

1696).

20,

The statute also goes on to

state that as a result of some of these instruments
falling
into the hands of competitors,

"several English families had

suffered impoverishment and inconveniences."

By preventing

these items from falling into the hands of competitors, the

government stated it was protecting the interest of both the
Crown and the subjects.
The next law passed in an attempt to guard the secrets
of innovations and inventions was in 1750 (23 Geo. II,
13,

1750).

c.

This statute related to the woolen industry as

well as to the manufacture of silk.

The woolen industry was

protected in England by having a monopoly in the home
market.

There was also

a

natural supply of material, but

this statute stated that English subjects could be

disadvantaged by allowing "foreigners to obtain these new
instruments" and thus through such laws "His Majesty" was
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preserving as much as possible to "His subjects
the benefits
arising from those great and valuable inventions"
(23,

II,

c.

13,

Geo.

Curiously, in this same statute "His

1750).

Majesty" also began "preserving the interest of the
Kingdom
by preventing the outmigration of English artisans
and

skilled craftsmen."

The statute not only further extended

prohibitions on the export of machinery then, but it also
forbade skilled workers from leaving the country.

Heavy

penalties were established for skilled workers who violated
the law. In addition, penalties were set out for individuals

who attempted to get British skilled workers to leave the
country.

The first offense for a skilled worker leaving the

country carried
pounds fine.

a

penalty of six months in prison and 100

The second offense was one year in jail and an

unlimited fine.

If a British artisan was discovered abroad

and did not return when directed by the British government,

then he ceased to be a British subject and all of his
property, and in some cases his family's property, was

confiscated (23 Geo. II,

c.

13,

1750; Mantoux,

1961).

Individuals who aided artisans or skilled workers in an
attempt to emigrate were subject to five years in jail and
500 pound fines for the first offense.
In 1774 export controls were extended to the cotton

and linen industries (14 Geo. Ill,

c.

71,

1774).

Like the
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laws for the woolen industry and
silk manufacturing these
laws covered both the physical machines
and the artisans
(Wheeler, p. 254, 1836; Bowden,
p.

130,

1925).

In 1781, a

law was passed that also made it illegal
to export sketches,

miniature models, or the specifications that
would "allow
foreigners to construct machines or instruments

used in the

woolen, silk, cotton, and linen industries"
(21 Geo. Ill
37,

1781).

c

This statute also prohibited the transfer of

information on methods of application or production

processes (21 Geo. Ill,

c.

37,

1781).

This, along with the

controls placed on the emigration of artisans, represented
an attempt to control the outflow and exchange of the

intangible know-how.
In 1785 this system was expanded to include

innovations, machines, and tools used in the iron and steel

industry (25 Geo. Ill,

c.

67,

1785).

In this area a large

number of devices and processes had been developed that
improved the quality and the strength of metal products.

Many of these processes were essential to the refining of
steel used in the production of cannons and guns.

Export

controls in this category of goods were intended to prevent
these innovations from falling into the hands of foreign

military rivals (see, Ashton, 1926). The 1785 statute was
much more extensive than the 1774 order.

The passage of

this statute prohibiting the export of tools, utensils, and

.
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machines used in iron and steel
manufactures was accompanied
by what may have been the first export
control list
(see

table 2:1; 25 Geo. Ill, c

.

67,

1785).

Included on the list

of items subject to control were rollers,
casting molds, and

lathes-all essential instruments in the manufacture
of high
quality weapons of the period (Ashton,
p.

Beckman,

1846; Cunningham,

143,

1926;

1895).

All of the above statutes were continued in
force by

acts passed year to year until 1795 when a general
and

perpetual law was passed.

One of the more significant

features in the expansion of this system was the fact that
in 1781 the British had moved to control information
on

production processes.

Once this move is made the system

becomes that much more complex and requires that much more

vigilance for enforcement.

The 1795 law was designed to

establish more permanent controls on the diffusion of any of
the machinery or tools unique to England or new innovations

that might bring productive advantages over competitors (35
Geo.

Ill,

c.

38,

1795).

A magistrate from one of the new

and growing industrial centers published a statement of

support in

a

local paper stating that "the discoveries and

the improvements of the age diffuse a glory over this

country unattainable by conquest or dominion.

And promise
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TABLE 2.1

Sample British Export Control List
Established by the Statue
- 25th George III. chapter 67,
1785
(Partial

52^,^?^^°'

T ° 01

-

Listf

Ut -sil hereafter

Hand Stamps
Doghead Stamps
Stamps of All Sorts
Screws for Stamps

Presses for all sorts of iron, steel, or other
metal
Piercing Presses of all sorts
Iron and steel dies to be used in stamps or presses

Rollers of cast iron, wrought iron or steel, for rolling
of
metal or frames
Casting Moulds
Lathes of all sorts for turning, burnishing, polishing
Lathe strings
Stocks for casting buckles, buttons, and rings

Cast-iron anvils for forging iron and copper
Pins or stocks for making screws

85

to stamp a luster on His Majesty's
reign to the latest

generations" (cited in Bowden,

p.

127,

1925).

Enforceme nt of Br itish Cnntrnic
Perhaps secretiveness in the conduct of

a craft was a

posture inherited from the preindustrial
apprenticeship
system.
With the emergence of "technologies"
of an

altogether different order in the eighteenth and
early
nineteenth century, industry in Britain was conducted
overall atmosphere of secrecy (Musson and Robinson,
1969; Jeremy p.

36,

1981).

in an

p.

216,

The export control system was

only one of the means by which Englishmen attempted to
guard

their secrets from foreign competitors.

The design of many

of the factories themselves was intended to maintain the

maximum amount of surveillance over workers and skilled
craftsmen and to ward off intruders.

These factories

combined features of a medieval castle system and

panopticonic design (see Crump, 1931; Foucault, 1979;
Jeremy,

1981)

.

The main shops were open to quadrangle yards

with observation towers at each corner.

It was impossible

to see into the shops from the outside as the windows facing

outward were small and high from the ground (see Tann,
1970)

.

Gateways and halls leading to the outside were

always narrow and well guarded.

All workers were sworn to

secrecy and visitors were not permitted into shops or into

quadrangle areas.

Rules were posted in many shops such as

.
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this one from the Taylor and Go's
cotton mill at Halliwell,
Lancashire, in 1804:
"if a stranger comes into the
Factory,
the Spinner who spins next to the door
[is] to send for the
Overlooker, but if he cannot be found, then
the spinner who
came last in that room [is] to order him
out" (Jeremy, p.
37,

1981).

Newspapers in Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds,
and
London particularly after 1795, contained frequent

references to foreign spies, not only French, who
had come
to England to acquire machines and to entice
artisans abroad
(

see Manchester Mercury, June 14, June 24, and June
29, 1786

among others in Burney Collection Papers, British Museum,
London; Bowden, 1925; Musson and Robinson,

p.

217,

1969).

In the latter part of the eighteenth century, England

particularly in the industrializing areas, became extremely
"spy-conscious."

Local community members were told to be on

guard for "foreigners snooping around factories and

warehouses" (Mantoux,

p.

258,

1964).

Workers were urged on

the grounds of patriotism, as well as because of the legal

penalties, to refrain from taking their skills abroad and to
be vigilant for fellow workers who were tempted to leave or

who were involved in schemes to export controlled goods
(Bowden p.

127

,

1925)

In the industrial centers of Britain special
comm:littees made up of machine producers, manufacturers,

and
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loyal artisans were formed to police
local communities.
There was close collaboration between
these groups and the

government in the enterprise of "rooting
out spies that had
come into England with ill intentions"

(Musson and Robinson,

p.

220,

1969; Bowden, p.

128,

1925).

Individuals who were

suspected of spying were summoned before these
committees
and interrogated, warned, and threatened
(Musson
and

Robinson, p. 222,

1969).

Because of these committees most

of the prosecutions under the export control
laws and the

controls on artisans were carried out (Bowden,
1925).

in 1785,

122,

p.

for example, a Prussian by the name of

Baden, after having been gone over by one of these

committees "was tried and fined 500 pounds for having

visited Manchester and (illegally) having tried to seduce
cotton operatives to Germany" (Wheeler,

p.

240,

1836).

There were several other cases involving continental

Europeans who were fined or imprisoned for violating these
laws (see Wheeler,

1836 and Musson and Robinson,

1969).

Members of these committees seemed willing to go to
extreme lengths to enforce prohibitions on artisan

emigration and machinery exports.

Various schemes were

advanced. Josiah Wedgwood, supported by some of these

committees, proposed developing extensive secret government

surveillance programs for "opening letters of workingmen in
order to secure evidence on which of the skilled workers
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were planning to emigrate- or were involved
in spying
(Bowden,

p.

129,

1925).

In another case, James Kipping,
an

industrialist of Liverpool, suggested that every
emigrant be
required to produce papers signed by local authorities

attesting to the fact that the holder was not
emigrant (Jeremy,

p.

40,

1981).

prohibited

a

This call for a passport

system was rejected. The Passenger Act of 1803, however,
was
in part designed to supplement the laws on the emigration
of

artisans by reducing outmigration and creating

a

more

controlled and supervised system of passage (see MacDonagh,
1961)

.

This Act would then allow inspectors to uncover more

easily violators of the emigration law.
Many of the individuals involved in enforcing the

export control laws viewed their activity as
duty (Bowden,

p.

128,

a

patriotic

1925; Musson and Robinson,

1969).

"Since it was considered a loss to a private producer if

someone knew his trade secrets, it seemed equally obvious at
the time that the country should also keep her trade secrets

from other nations" (Musson and Robinson, p. 265, 1969).
All of this British secrecy, however, only increased the

effects of foreign manufacturers and states to acquire or
secure knowledge of English inventions and innovations.

Continental powers offered large sums of money to induce
British artisans away from England.

Some of these powers

formally offered to remove protectionist laws and to buy

.
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British goods in exchange for samples
of the machines and
the technology used to produce those
goods (Bowden, p. i 28
1925; Ashton,

,

1924). Continental states also offered
special

subsidies to local manufacturers who succeeded
in securing
English machines.
in the early nineteenth century
the
Prussians set up

a

special school in Berlin, called the

"Gewerbe Institut," to train individuals in engineering
and
mechanics.
The Prussian government financed the illicit

acquisition of British machinery and then trained and
paid
these students to copy the prototypes (Great Britain,

Parliamentary Papers, Commons, Second Report of the Select
Committee, VII, 1841). The continental states did in fact
send agents to England to set up spying and acquisition

networks
The Great Power competition among the continental

states perpetuated the complex networks of prohibitions on
the export of machinery and on emigration or foreign travel
by artisans.

The possession of these industrial innovations

formed one element in the perception of the balance of
power.

The commercial and competitive benefits they

afforded provided more tangible advantages.

France,

Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Holland all were involved in
the attempt to acquire state of the art machinery and

know-how.
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Between 1824 and 1841

a

succession of British

Parliament committees charged with
inquiring "into the state
of the law in the United Kingdom,
and its consequences,
respecting artisans leaving the Kingdom
and residing abroad;
also into the state of the law and its
consequences,

respecting the exportation of tools and
machinery" (see
Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers,
Commons:
V,

1824; V,

1825; VII,

1841).

1824; VI,

in each of the reports one of

the central concerns is with establishing
the consequences
of these laws in terms of the broader
competition with the

other Great Powers.
The chief offender referred to in most of the reports
is France.

Increases in the British perception of threat

from the French during the Napoleonic period may well have

increased the intensity of domestic surveillance on

compliance with export control laws.

difficult to measure.

That, however,

is

The creation of surveillance

committees and other enforcement measures predates the
outbreak of open hostilities between France and Britain.
The British control system encompassed both civilian and

military items (see table 2.2).

Thus security and

international economic motives were mixed in the

construction of the British export control system.

.
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TABLE 2.2

Sample British Export Control List 26th George III
Chapter, 89, 1786 (Partial List)
Rollers, either plain, grooved, or of
any other form or
denomination, of cast iron, wrought iron
or steel, for the
rolling of iron, or any sort of metals or
frames.

Presses of all sorts in iron, steel or other
metals, which
are used with a screw, exceeding one inch
and a half in
diameter, or any parts of these several articles;
or any

model or models of any before mentioned Utensils,
Implements
and Machines, or any parts thereof.

Engines or Machines used in the casting or boring of cannon,
or any sort of artillery, or parts thereof, or any model or

models of Tools, Utensils, Engines or Machines used in
casting or boring of cannon or any sort of artillery, or any
parts thereof.

Source: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons,
Appendix to the Report of the Select Committee Appointed to
Inquire into the State of the Law in the United Kingdom, and
its Consequences Respecting the Exportation of Tools and
Machinery, vol. V, p. 161, 1825.
In this list there is a clear attempt to clarify the
thresholds of the type of technology that is subject to
control
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British officials, however, did
pay special attention
to the French and often
expressed dismay at their
ability,
both during and after the war, to
acquire English
innovations.
The French sometimes were able
to acquire
state of the art cotton production
machinery before
it had

been fully integrated into English
factories.
been able to entice

There was

a

a

They had also

number of British artisans to France.

huge copper plate factory in France,
"for

bottoming the ships of the French fleet
was a British colony" (Bowden,

p.

129,

-

the whole of which

1925).

Aside from the more tangible factors that
drove the
creation of the British prohibition statutes-economic
interests, notions of patriotism, and calculations
of Great
Power competition-there were broader less tangible,
but

nonetheless powerful forces at work.

Notions of progress

and development were bound up in the emergence of
mechanical

processes.

The transition from hand methods of production

to mechanical processes of production had symbolic as well
as material significance.

Possessing and controlling these

innovations was valued not only for the tangible advantage
they might bestow, but for an idea:

that having them and

introducing these new devices was tantamount to being
"ahead" on a continuum of human progress.

The possession of

them seems to have been at work in the distinction between
the more civilized and the less civilized in the Western
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state system (see Musson
and Robinson,
Mantoux, 1961).
that sense,

m

maintain

then,

p.

216 - 230

,

1969;

the attempt to

monopoly possession of the
innovations by the
state was bound up in a
conceptualization of status and
a
perception of power that such status
accrued.
a

The prohibitions were by and large
fairly ineffective

and economically irrational for

a

number of reasons,

particularly given competitors' ability
to acquire English
inventions.
The bulk of the eighteenth century
statutes,
however, remained in place for almost
a century,

m

addition, several English firms apparently
kept to strict
rules of secrecy and "stealthiest"
practices even after the
items that they possessed were in wide
circulation. When
former leading firms became "anxious about
their

increasingly hollow reputations," they often
maintained
their former practices to conceal their decline.

m

Alexander Galloway,

a London engineer,

1824

stated that the

"uncommon degree of mystery" practiced by Boulton

&

Watt's,

formerly one of the leading firms in all of Britain,
was

a

result of the fact that they "have nothing to show
beyond
what is well known in other places; they continue from
pride
that exclusion which before was dictated by interest"
(Jeremy, p.

37,

1981).

also have been driven by

This "Wizard of OZ" feigning might
a

belief that one could retain

a
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Position of advantage by creating
the perception that
one
possesses mysteriously powerful
instruments.
Not everyone was enamored by
or shared this perception
of the symbolic value of the
mechanical instrument or
process.
The fairly widespread riots of
machine busting
displaced laborers in England is
well documented (see
Ashton, 1924 and Mantoux, 1961).
After the Lancashire riots
of 1779, however, a cotton-spinning
machine producer
articulated in clear terms the sentiment
shared by most
industrialists and some skilled workers of
the day.

Regarding the power and status bestowed
by the mechanical
device, he wrote:

Read the history of mankind. Consider
the gradual
steps of civilization from barbarism
to refinement
and you will not fail to discover that
the progress of
society from its lowest and worst to its
highelt and
most perfect state has been uniformly
accomplished and
chiefly promoted by the happy exertions of
man
character of a mechanic or engineer. Let all in the
machines
be lost or destroyed and we are reduced
in a moment to
the condition of savages; and in that state
men may
indeed exist a long time without the aid of
curious
and complex machines, though without them they
can
er
G abOVS
(T
1119 Cited in Bowden P«
"
130 i925
'

'

Later in the nineteenth century social and political

thinkers would challenge this notion of progress and the
idea that liberation from the human condition of enslavement
to nature would come through the machine.

Critiques and

lamentations over the cages of rationalization,
organization, and standardization that accompanied the
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introduction of machines and
mechanical processes would
also
give rise to counter conceptions
of power and alternative
forms of economic organization.
To argue that British
export controls and prohibitions
arose only out
of a simple

formula of economic interest giving
rise to policy is then
to miss one of the more intriguing
questions posed by the
emergence of these statutes: How were
these controls and
their development bound up with broader
conceptualizations
of status and power?
The Question of the Enforceability
and
the Conseque nces of British Controls
A number of factors led to the dismantling
of the
British system of controls on the emigration
of artisans and
the export of machinery in the 1840s.
Several of the issues
raised in debates over the effectiveness and
consequences of

these controls, and many of the difficulties
encountered in
enforcement have been present in the post-1945 United
States

unilateral and the COCOM multilateral programs.

The first

part of this section examines the problems encountered in
the nineteenth century British attempt to enforce controls.

The second part of the section will review some of the
issues raised in the debates over the prohibitions that

occurred in parliament between 1824 and 1841.

Administration of the prohibitions was the
responsibility of the Privy Council from the beginning of
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the war in 1795 until around
1820.

The Board of Trade in

the Treasury thereafter became
responsible for oversight on
the prohibitions (Brown, p.
161, 1958).
Officers with the
title, Controlling Searchers, were
responsible for policing
ports and the coastline to enforce
controls on both artisan
emigration and the export of machinery
(Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, 1824). By
1830 these
officers had at their disposal some 70 ships
and 6,138
sailors to police the 7,000 mile coastline of
England,

Scotland, and Ireland.

every port (Jeremy,

p.

There were additional personnel at
1981).

43,

Despite the requirement after 1795 that before

departure every vessel submit to Customs lists of all
passengers' names, ages, occupations, and nationalities,

enforcement was extremely difficult.

The first problem with

enforcing this requirement was defining legally the term
artisan or skilled laborer

.

Customs officers were often

uncertain as to which workers in what industry with what
specialties should be considered skilled workers or
artisans.

David Jeremy, who has done extensive work

analyzing the minutes of the Privy Council and the Board of
Trade on this issue, claims that there never really was an
agreed upon definition (Jeremy,

p.

41,

1981)

.

The

technology was shifting rather quickly and thus
specializations and skills were being displaced at

a

pace

.
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that often outstripped a fixed definition
of which
individuals had knowledge that should be
subject tc
controls.

Consequently, discretion in the enforcement
of
this prohibition was often left in the hands
of Customs

officials.

Aside from the definition question the sheer

logistical issue of identifying skilled workers and
artisans
at ports posed major problems.

Customs officials seemed to

be inclined to try to root out violators by random
searches
in hopes of discovering papers,

establish

a

letters, or tools that would

passenger's occupation (Ashton, 1926; Mantoux,

1961; MacDonagh,

1961).

Despite the enthusiasm of these

Customs agents, artisans were able to slip through fairly

easily
The most formidable threat seems to have been the loss
of nationality and property for not returning once

discovered abroad.

This, however, was often negated by

inducements that competing powers offered to artisans who

would leave England to practice their trade.

By the early

nineteenth century the magnitude of the difficulty of
enforcing the prohibition on the emigration of artisans
became apparent (Jeremy

p.

40,

1981).

The British

government tried various schemes to attract artisans back to
England.

First, they offered to pay the return travel of

violators, but this was less than appealing given the fact

that they were still subject to penalties at home.

By 1802
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rewards and amnesty were proposed
as an inducement to
artisans and skilled workers who
would return, but this too
had little effect. Even the invasion
of the United States by
the British did not frighten
immigrant artisans back to
England.
in the end the problem of
enforcement, and perhaps
the idea that this prohibition
violated the right of
free

born Englishmen, resulted in the 1824
revocation of the law
on the emigration of artisans.
in addition, the development
of standardization in training and
discipline
in the use of

machines and the operation of mechanical
processes reduced
to a degree the indispensability of any
particular artisan
(Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons,
v, 1824).

The British also faced a number of problems
similar to

those faced in the post-1945 Western alliance and
United
States' export control program.

The first complication that

Customs faced was the fact that after 1812 the government
set up a license system to allow for the export of

preindustrial tools, obsolete machinery, and some types of
finishing machines that were found to be widely available
among competitor states (Great Britain, Parliamentary
Papers, Commons, V, p. 130, 1824; Jeremy, 1981; see table
2.3,

2.4 and 2.5).

Loopholes in this system were extensive

as the nature of the machinery to be exported was easily

misrepresented on export license application forms.
Smugglers also developed other techniques to confound
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Customs officials.

Prohibited machines were broken
down and
shipped with machines or tools
that were not under controls.
Often these illicit machines were
shipped from several
different ports over the course of
an extended period of
time (Great Britain, Parliamentary
Papers,
Commons, V, p.

HI,

1824).

In addition the "parts of such
prohibited

machinery not to mention the plans or
models of such
machinery were small and concealed in ways
that made

detection impossible" (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers,
Commons, V, p. no, 1824).
Further, Customs officials' often had
difficulty

identifying prohibited machines. One Controlling
Searcher of
The Customs stated:
"There are a vast number of packages
which we open, where there are parts of Machinery
packed
with other iron and steel articles from Birmingham,

purposely packed for deception; and it is almost an
impossibility for an officer to know whether they are or are
not prohibited, being only parts of Machinery
.

.

.

It is a very rare occurrence indeed to meet with

prohibited Machinery which appears so" (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons,

V,

p.

no, 1824).

As one

Customs officer put it, in order to be effective or "to

decide the real character of

a

Machine on search reguires

the knowledge of a lawyer and the skill of an engineer"
(Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons, VII, p. 270,
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TABLE 2.3

Sample British Export License,
1841

FORM of License granted by the Trea^ii™ *w *-u r,
TreaSUry for the Exportati on
of Machinery Prohibited by
Law

Gentlemen,

TREASURY CHAMBERS,

The Lords of the Committee of the Privy
Council for Trade
having signified their opinion that M
may be allowed to export the following
articles of
machinery
**
commanded by the Lords Commissio ners of Her
Maiest v's
Treasury, to desire that you will give
directions for
permitting the exportation of the machinery in
question;

'

To the Commissioners of Customs

I am, Gentlemen,
Your Obedient Servant

Whitehall Treasury Chambers
19 May 1841

All applications for permission to export machinery were
required to be submitted for the opinion of the Board of
Trade.
Source: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons.
Appendix to the Report of the Select Committee Appointed to
Inquire into the State of the Law in the United Kingdom and
its Consequences Respecting the Exportation of Tools and
Machinery, vol. VII, p. 295, 1841.
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TABLE 2.4

Sample Customs Re:port of
Detentions and
Controlled Machinery (Partial)Seizures of
;

A RETURN of the number of Detentions
and Seizures of

mr.-aas Mrs
f

Port

!°;.°
npf
Detentions

No of
Seizures
:

No
Sold
-

"N^
Returned

Penalty"
Paid;

Pounds

London
84
Beaumaris
Bristol
Cardiff
Deal
Dover
Goole
7
Hull
13
Liverpoll
9
Port Glasgow
Belfast

93

76

1

1

2

198

2

1
3

3

35

27

5

76
70

1

500

8
7

300

5

38
50

51
29

47

2

2
1

2
3
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12

424
2

Customs House, London
15 May 1840
Source: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons.
Appendix to the Report of the Select Committee Appointed to
Inquire into the State of the Law in the United Kingdom and
its Consequences Respecting the Exportation of Tools and
Machinery, vol. VII, p. 295, 1841.
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TABLE 2.5

Applications Made to the Board of
Trad^ for m
Export Licenses and Proportion
of Refta^

w

•

Ts?sTB ?i

Year

Total
Applications

Applications
Refused
No

1825
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843

total

10
24
37
52
48
67
52
69

85
124
124
124
135
204
178
186
200
244
135

2, 098

1

10

2

8

13

35
20
27
21

10
13
14
10
8

11

26
15
14
9

19
10
11

19
11
12

21
12
11
6.
9
5
6

7

3

17

14

4

2

218

.

96

10.4

Source: Daivd Jeremy. Transatlantic Industrial Revolution
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1981. p. 44
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1841).

Even if a Customs officer
was able to receive
instruction in what type of
machines were subject to

prohibitions, it was extremely
difficult for him to keep up
with the new innovations and
inventions (Great Britain,

Parliamentary Papers, Commons,

V,

112

p.

1824)

customs
officers also complained that they
were understaffed and
that there was inadequate coordination
between port
,

.

officials.

some customs officers who testified
before the
House of Commons in 1824 stated that
they doubted

enforcement could be effective while "any
Tool or Machine
whatsoever was allowed to be exported" (Great
Britain,

Parliamentary Papers, Commons,

V,

p.

109,

1824).

The numerous smuggling routes and techniques
of

illicit transfers made customs officers almost
powerless,

particularly when it came to uncovering the transmission
of
drawings and designs. Nevertheless, Customs
officials
did

make a number of machinery seizures and detentions.

From

1824-1841 the number of such actions at major ports was
298
and between 1830-1839 an additional 289 seizures occurred
as
a

result of coastal searches (see table 2:5; Great Britain,

Parliamentary Papers, Commons, VII,

p.

295,

1841).

These

actions were, however, often fairly random in nature as
Customs officials seized what looked suspicious.

Twenty

percent of the seizures made at Liverpool from 1830-1839
were of unidentified machine parts (Jeremy,

p.

43,

1981).
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in one case prohibited machinery
was confiscated, taken
to a
Port Customs House and sold in
auction back to the

individual from whom it had been
confiscated (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, v,
1824).
These prohibitions were also undermined
by the
expansion of the publication of technical
journals and
exchanges among the growing scientific
community.
the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century certain
international figures and inventors, such as
Benjamin
Franklin and Matthew Boulton, were members of
"almost every
scientific society in Europe" (Musson and Robinson,

m

223,

p.

1969).

To make the prohibition on the outflow of
English

innovations and inventions effective would have no
doubt

required the policing of the interactions of members
of the
scientific community. This was something the British
were

unwilling or perhaps unable to do.
There was, however, control and suppression of the

publication of technical information as a part of the
attempt to enforce the prohibitions on the transfer of
English technique (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers,
Commons, V, p. 112, 1824; Ashton, 1926; Jeremy, 1981).

Some

authors engaged in self-policing as James Ogden admitted in
1783 when he said that he left technical information out of

his publications for fear the French would benefit (Ogden,
1783; Jeremy, p.

39,

1981).

Other authors, however, were
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prevented from publishing technical
data because as was
stated -a knowledge may be
acquired out of this country"
(Duncan,

1807 cited in Jeremy p.

39,

1981).

The first major

publication to outline in detail the
technical features of
British mechanical inventions and
innovations was The
Universal Dictionary of Arts, Science,
and Literature,

edited by Abraham Rees.

This was a twenty-nine volume
set

published between 1802 and 1820 (Rees,
1802; Ashton, 1926;
Jeremy, 1981).
However, regulations on the
publication of
technical information on British technological
innovations

continued well into the mid-1800s.
The series of patent and trade journals
that emerged
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century made it

even more difficult to prevent the transmission
of knowledge
about English inventions. This included the
Repertory of
Arts, Maufactures, and Agriculture which began
in England in
1794.

This journal published, in a rather random fashion,

patents for woolen cloth and textile manufacturing
inventions (Jeremy,

p.

47,

1981).

The French had their own

version of this journal called the French Repertory of Arts,
that reproduced apparently all of the material published in
the British publication.

A British engineer named Henry

Maudslay told the Commons in 1825 that the type of exchange
that went on between the technical community in England and

Europe made the enforcement of British export controls

106

clearly impossible. According
to Maudslay:
every month, books are packed
off

"on the first o f

to Hamburgh, and sent

through Holland to all parts
of the Continent, and
a friend
of mine has written to me
within a week of their
publication, saying I understand
you have obtained a patent
for so and so, and I hope it
will turn out to your
advantage, and so on" (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers,
Commons, V, p. 13 l, 1825
what this meant, as Joseph
Hume
questioning Mr. Maudslay put it, was
,

.

that foreign

competitors "came into the possession
of drawings, plans,
and information on every British
invention or patent as soon
as they are published in England(Great
Britain,

Parliamentary Papers, Commons,

V,

p.

131,

1825).

A century

and a quarter before the United States
and the Western
alliance confronted the tension between
the free exchange of
ideas and the maintenance of an effective
export control
system, the British were at a loss as to
how to police

information exchanges between technical communities
that
were by today's standards slow and rudimentary.
Clashing C onceptions of the Source of
British Pow<=> r: Arguments for
Revocation of Export Controls
There were other factors that undermined and

eventually helped to end support for prohibitions on the
export of machinery and mechanical processes as

a

maintaining British advantage over foreign powers.

means of
There
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were endless debates in the
Colons from 1824 to 1841
Qver
the theoretical justifications
and potential consequences
of
these policies.
These debates were, of course,
bound up in
the broader issues and
discussions about the benefits
of
free trade versus the protectionist
and mercantilist

system.
It is no coincidence that
James Deacon Hume, Secretary
of
the Board of Trade and staunch
free-trader,

was called

before the Commons to testify as to
the theoretical and
practical unworkability of export controls
on machinery and
mechanical processes and know-how (Great
Britain,

Parliamentary Papers, Commons,
1859).

There is

a

V,

1824; V,

1825; Badham,

large well-studied literature on the

exchanges between Manchester manufacturers
and the Board of
Trade on this issue.
Leaving off the finer details of the
debates to the more knowledgeable, we focus
here on some of
the points that seemed to recur throughout
the Parliamentary
Reports.
First, several of the witnesses stated
that

"preventing the exportation of machinery to foreign
powers
(France) has a tendency to force them to become
machine-

makers themselves, and to rival us in
into which,

a

branch of industry,

if they could get machines from England, they

would have no motive to come into competition" (Great
Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, p. 126, 1824).

The issue, which the Commons Report said deserved the most

serious consideration, was that the export control system
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seemed to be self defeating over
the long term because
it
inspired foreign powers to develop
their own indigenous
technological capability. This was
seen, as stated above,
not only to create a source of
commercial

rivalry, but also

to reduce potential British
influence on these rival powers
(Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers,
Commons,
V,

1824).

This conflict, as we will see,
parallels debates in the
post-1945 era as to whether or not
Western controls lead to
Soviet bloc attempts to develop technological
selfsufficiency.
The second intriguing point made in the
Commons
Reports was that the extensiveness of the
British export
control laws inhibited and drove away inventors
at the

expense of Britain (Great Britain, Parliamentary
Papers,
Commons, VII, p. 276, 1841).
in some cases inventors

and

machine designers left England for countries where fewer
controls existed and where there were thus potentially

greater opportunities to profit.

British controls led

foreign powers to attempt to attract these individuals.

The

point again was that by setting up control systems in an
attempt to maintain

a

lead time or monopoly possession of

particular types of knowledge or particular inventions, one
ran the risk of distorting the environment that encouraged
the development of such knowledge or the creation of such

inventions in the first place.

This was particularly the
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case when other states were
not p laying by the same
Qf
prohibitory rules or at ieast
were wining to waive
the m for
economic gain.

^

The final points raised in
these debates involve more
complex economic arguments for the
removal of controls on
the export of machines and
mechanical processes. These
arguments run throughout the Parliamentary
Reports

from 1824
to 1841, and they are usually
prefixed by references to "the

justly-celebrated work of the late Mr.
Ricardo on the
Principles of Political Economy- (e.g.,

Great Britain,

Parliamentary Papers, Commons,

V,

p.

127,

1824).

Amidst

long discussions of price-wage theory,
there are three
arguments set out in these Reports that we
will consider.
The first two are fairly straightforward.
The third,

however, is more complicated because it
involves the

articulation of a conceptualization of power that
is meant
to counter the conceptualization on which
the export

control

laws were said to have been based.
First, members of the Special Committees argue that

liberalization of controls would result in the exportation
of machinery that had already been surpassed by new

inventions (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons,
p.

129,

VII,

v,

1824; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons,

1841).

By exporting this older machinery, that would

be integrated into the production systems of rival powers'
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industry,

Britain would retain the
technological lead time.
Secondly, with liberalization of
controls, according to some
of the witnesses, "the ingenuity
and skill of our workmen
would have greater scope, and that,
important
as the

improvements in Machinery have lately been,
they might,
under such circumstances, be fairly expected

to increase to

degree beyond all precedent- (Great Britain,
Parliamentary
Papers, Commons, V, p. 130, 1825).
Increased foreign

a

demand

and trade opportunities would, some argued,
produce more

dynamism that would lead to even greater creativity
and
increase Britains' lead in the long term.
Finally, some participants articulated

counter

a

discourse about the sources of Britain's advantage over
its
rivals in the early nineteenth century. These debates over
export control policy can be read, then, at

a

broader level

as clashes between two divergent understandings of the

sources of British advantage.

The members of the Special

Committee opposed to prohibitions argue first that the
export control laws are founded on old and "very erroneous

notions in regard to commerce."

They then say that the

enactment of these laws was founded not on reasoned
principles, "but they were dictated by

a

mistaken jealousy

of permitting other nations to benefit from our

improvements" (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons,
V,

p.

120,

1825).

In addition, the Reports state that such

Ill

prohibitions "cause jealousy
^ousy
J

...

^

„ f other
of
nations toward

us" and that "the members
of every enlightened
government
must necessarily wish to see
such laws removed, and
which
the Legislature appears to
have had in view in the
late

various important alterations
in the commercial
relations of
this Country (laws relating to
artisans)" (Gre at Britain,

Parliamentary Papers, Commons,

V,

p.

124

,

1825).

The

prohibitions to export tools and
machinery the Reports state
are "calculated to perpetuate
these jealousies."
These Special Committee members
criticize the export
controls as being based on emotion
not on reasoned argument.
The laws are construed as part of
an unenlightened age that
did not understand, as Kant sought
to explain and whose
ideas are reflected in the position
of some Committee
members, the potential of free commerce
to reduce jealousies
between nations (see I. Kant, "Perpetual
Peace").

The Reports state at one point that "it
is the opinion
of many of those who object to the
exportation of Machinery
that Great Britain owes her present superiority
[in

manufactures] solely to the excellence of her
Machinery"
(Great Britain, Parliamentary Paper, Commons, V,
p. 129,
1825)

.

Three arguments are advanced to counter this

understanding of the source of British advantage.

The first

is attributed to "the late Mr. Ricardo" and it is that
this

power or position "is

a

result of the natural advantages
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England possesses."

Among the particular
factors listed as
natural advantages are:
raw materials for
producing
machinery and for manufacturing,
better communications
and
transportation systems throughout
the country, a better
division of labor, and the
advantage of trained workmen
habituated to all industrious
employments (Great
Britain,

Parliamentary Papers, Commons,

V,

p.

129,

1825; VII, p.

268

,

some of these are, of course,
only arguably "natural
advantages," but the overall articulation
of the sources of
1841).

British advantage is broadened in
two ways.
First, in
response to the question of whether
"the French would pose a
challenge to us if they were supplied
with British machinery
or mechanical processes," one witness
responds:
"They will

be behind us until their general
habits approximate ours"
(Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers,
Commons, V, p. 129 and
153,

1825).

This traditional or cultural source of

advantage then compliments the natural.

The second way the

conceptualization of advantage is broadened is in terms
of
the mode of knowledge or experience acquired.
When asked

why a particular Continental power "would remain
behind us"
a

witness said:

».

.

.a

cotton manufacturer who left

Manchester seven years ago would be driven out of the market
by the men who are now living in it, provided his knowledge

had not kept pace with those who have been during that time

constantly profiting by the progressive improvements that

113

have taken place in that
period;

^^^^^^

tM^ax^i^J^^

(emphasis
added: Great Britain, Parliamentary
Papers, Commons, V, p.
129,

This is an articulation of the
understanding of
the source of British power and
advantage as the result
1825).

of

an ongoing interactive process
between natural endowment,
culture, experience, and knowledge.

The emphasis in these debates is
always on the
progressive and the dynamic as characteristics
necessary for
maintaining advantage over competitor nations
and
powers.

This articulation, with the images of pace
and movement that
are evoked, is meant to counter the
conceptualization
of

advantage or power as

a

static or fixed condition.

it is

also meant to counter the belief that advantage
can be

retained by retreating behind the secrecy and the
walls of

a

medieval-castle-style factory or by attempting to retain
one's advantage by maintaining possession of any
particular
machine, mechanical process, or technology.

in this sense

we can say then that these particular debates brought

together two counter conceptions of power, and that perhaps
these reflected broader issues of self -understanding and

questions of the sources of state power that were present in
the societies of Western state systems.
We cannot leave a discussion of the factors that

undermined the nineteenth century British export control
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system without acknowledging the
domestic economic interests
that clashed over the issue.
The interests

are fairly clear

cut in this case (Brown,

1958).

The manufacturers for the

most part continued to support export
controls on machinery
and mechanical processes.
in some branches of the textile
industry there was vertical integration of the
industry
and

thus there was little conflict.

Machine producers did not

actively oppose the prohibitions until the economy
slowed
during the 1830s. Their views were well received
by the

Board of Trade where the overall system of protectionism,

particularly in agriculture, had come under attack.

There

is an extensive literature on the politics of the
Board of

Trade (Ashton, 1924 and 1933; Cheyney, 1921; Henderson,
1958)

.

The power of these interest groups in their

endeavors to see the export control system dismantled can
not be understated.

The sorts of critiques of the

presuppositions on which the export control system was based
articulated in the Commons Reports, however, pre-dates the
rise of a united and strong opposition by machine producers
to the laws.

This is explained by the emergence and growing

acceptance of the ideas of economic liberalism at the turn
of the century.

Members of this rising industrial class

that had the most to gain from free trade were no doubt the

more serious readers of Ricardo and Smith.

Their growing
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power in government eventually
held sway and the early
export control laws were
largely dismantled by
1343.
Conclusinnc
The nineteenth century British
government faced an
ultimately insurmountable set of
logistical and theoretical
puzzles in its attempt to establish
and maintain an export
control system.
Thus one can imagine the
difficulties that
the United States and the Western
powers have faced in their
attempt to construct, maintain, and
enforce a much more
complex multilateral export control
system over the past
fifty years.
Defining the rationale for an export
control
program acceptable among a number of
states or among a
number of groups at the domestic level
has posed problems in
the past.
This has particularly been the case
when there
were divergences in perceptions of economic
interests

between states or groups or when there was

a

perception that

some states or groups were less vigilant in
abiding by

control arrangements.
The issue of what items to control is in part
decided
by the resolution of the issue of the rationale
adopted for

the program, but questions of the form of the item that

should be controlled remain.

Post-1945 export control

officials have faced the same question that eighteenth
century British officials faced.

Can an effective export

control system be maintained by simply prohibiting the

.
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transfer of deviroc
1C6S

ny~
r

°

tan 9 lbl * goods?
+-

•

*

-,

or is information
or

know-how the key factor in
technology transfer?
(Se
chapter 5 on the Bucy Report.)
As British officials
discovered more than one
hundred years
ago,

once the

exchange of models, designs,
information, and know-how
become subject to prohibitions
one confronts not only
more
complicated enforcement problems,
but also a much more
significant set of theoretical
issues.
These issues

include

questions about the role of the
free exchange of information
in liberal societies.
Finally, in the contemporary
period
the methods and avenues available
to acquire illicitly or
to
sell illicitly controlled items
are infinitely more
sophisticated than in the nineteenth
century.
The

construction of a bureaucracy with
surveillance and
intelligence capabilities extensive
enough to enforce
broad embargo again raises a series
of
problems.

a

These

include not only questions of
governmental and economic
cost, but also more fundamental
questions about civil
liberties
The way in which the goal of guarding
"high technology
secrets" has been represented in the press
and by political
leaders, however, often seems to silence
discussions of

these broader social and political issues.

High technology

and strategically significant technology,
slippery terms to

begin with, were discussed in the first Reagan
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Administration, for example, as having
hyper-real power.
Maintaining the "technology gap"
with the East was perceived
by some Department of Defense
officials as offering
such

obvious and instant advantages that
there seemed to be a
temptation to provide any policy that
was appropriate to the
activity (MacDonald, 1990). These
officials argued that
more authority needed to be ceded to
conduct surveillance
and to enforce regulations in hopes of
maintaining
this

"technology gap."

This, however,

is an issue quite

independent of the ability to enforce and control
the
diffusion of technology. Nonetheless, a fetishized
vision
of the benefits of holding the lead-time
advantage
in

militarily significant technology has been used by
some
officials in Washington to aggrandize the role and
power
their particular agencies.

of

One scholar has said that if

"strategically significant technologies" could be neatly
defined, labelled, and clearly differentiated from other
items, the concept would lose its political significance

(MacDonald,

1990).

The concept can thus be read as a sign

that has use value. Its use value is increased by the fact
that the specifics of the lists of "strategically

significant technologies" are often classified.
This sign's signification politically, culturally, and

socially has been bound up in or fixed to images of power
and advantage over rivals (see Barthes on semiotic
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interpretation)

.

m

that sense then
1BI1

'

insofar
msorar

as some of the

dynamics of the formation of
18th century export
prohibitions can be explained by
a fetishization of
the
notion of the "machine,"
"strategically significant
technology" has had a similar use
value or in propelling the
formation of post 1945 export control
policies
and in

legitimating arguments for constructing
and ceding authority
to enforcement bureaucracies.
It is clear that the Soviet Union
and Eastern bloc

states have maintained extensive technology
acquisition
networks in the United States and Western
Europe.
it would
also clearly be irresponsible for any
country
to "sell to

its adversary the rope on which it
might be hung."

The case

of the war against Iraq demonstrates
the potential danger of
an ineffective strategic export control
system.
The goal of
this project is thus not to raise questions
about the

legitimacy or illegitimacy of any strategic export
control
program.
Rather it is concerned, however, in part,
with

questions about the role of the notion of "strategically

significant technology;" how it has been used and how its

signification is bound up in particular conceptualizations
of power and advantage.

It is at this level that the

debates of the early 1980s were similar to the debates of
the early nineteenth century.

In the Congressional debates

of the 1980s over the renewal of the Export Administration
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Act,

the abuse of this notion by
some hard-line officials
in
the Department of Defense to justify
broadened enforcement

authority for particular agencies was
attacked from
of camps.

a

number

As in the debates in the House of
Commons,

critics of the use of this concept sought
to articulate
counter conceptualizations of the source
of United States
advantage and power and to warn of the long
term

commercial,

economic, and political consequences of the
expansion of the
United States export control program (NAS,
1987; see chapter
5)

.

This chapter has demonstrated that the state
practice
of controlling the diffusion of technologies or
items

considered strategically or economically significant has

history in the international system.

a

By assessing past

examples of this practice, this chapter provides

a

historical context for an analysis of the post 1945 case.
Secondly,

it is clear from this assessment of the past that

the logistical problems and political issues raised in the

construction of post 1945 export controls are not altogether
new.

The particulars of the British case are striking in

this regard.

Finally, by looking at the way in which the

items that were controlled were represented, we have sought
to raise questions about conceptualizations of power and

advantage and about how those representations worked to
propel the formation and maintenance of controls.

CHAPTER III

CONSTRUCTING THE POST-1945 EXPORT CONTROL
UNITED STATES POWER, ENFORCEMENT RENTS SYSTEMAND
CLASHING DISCOURSES
Turning Away from the "One World" visinn
In the final months of the war against
the Axis the

nature of post-war United States-Soviet economic
relations
was not preordained.
Conflicts over the shape of
the

post-war order were, however, already beginning
to emerge.
In this context of uncertainty a variety of
perspectives

on

the appropriate relationship between East-West trade
and

Western security interests were articulated.
Roosevelt,

President

for example, envisioned "One World" in which the

failures of the interwar period could be overcome through

economic interdependence and international organizations.

According to this view, ideological differences between
powers would take a back seat or even evaporate in the face
of the common interests of economic recovery, industrial

expansion, and welfare enhancement (Yergin, 1977; Gaddis,
1984). Roosevelt's perspective was predicated on a

particular image of the Soviet Union and on
of the role of trade.
a

a

liberal notion

The Soviet Union was perceived to be

traditional Great Power that could be brought under

control by appeals to common interests.
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Commerce in turn
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would be the great civil
i2er

Hopkins put it, articulating
the interwar period,

poverty" (Jentleson,

As Roosevelt s aide

.

,

^

lesson from the failures
of
"destroying monsters grow
out of

p.

73,

a

1986).

After Roosevelt- s death and
in the face of mounting
tensions over the war settlement,
alternative perspectives
on United States-Soviet
economic relations gained
greater
credence in Washington. These
views were buttressed by
past
experiences with the Soviet Union and
by telegrams from
American diplomats in Moscow.
Ambassador Averell Harriman,
for example, drew on an
instrumentalist discourse, saying
that economic carrots and sticks
could be used on
the

Soviets.

He said that "any expansion of
economic relations

or reconstruction aid should be
tied to Soviet behavior in
international matters" (Yergin, p.
309, 1977; Jentleson,
1986)
.

in a longer telegram that would
have a more enduring

impact, George Kennan, the charge
d'affaires in Moscow,

articulated an image of the Soviet Union that
would come to
guide American Cold War economic policy.
He said that the

Soviets were "impervious to the dictates of
reason."
carrots and sticks would not work.

Thus

The best that the United

States could do would be to reduce economic interaction
as
far as possible in hopes of isolating and containing
what

Kennan called the "malignant parasite that would feed on

.
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IZox^P^Mp^^

diseased tissue"
(hereafter FRUS)

,

vol. VI, pp.

696 . 709/

at 7Q9§

Fro, 1945 until early 19
47 the United States
pursued a
somewhat confused policy on
economic relations with the
Soviet Union and its emerging
satellites.
President Truman
cut off lend-lease assistance
on V-E day only to
free up

$200 million worth of industrial machinery
and "non-lethal"
lend-lease supplies in October 1945
(Yergin,
p.

Jentleson,

embargoed

p.

50,

1986).

151,

1977

The Truman Administration
also

number of items of direct military
significance,
but allowed United States-Soviet
trade to expand in other
areas with only minimal government
intervention.
a

In 1946

American exports to the Soviet Union
totaled $352 million
(Jentleson, p. 53,

1986).

This situation was short lived.

Strains of the emerging Cold War in Iran,
Eastern Europe,
Greece, and Turkey helped to alter radically
the United
States position on East-West trade.
By March 1948 the United States instituted
a broad

program of export control on transfers of goods
with direct
and indirect military significance to the Soviet
Union and

Eastern Europe.

This control program included an elaborate

export licensing administration as well as surveillance

mechanisms to maintain vigilance on Soviet bloc economic
relations with the non-Communist world.

Along with the

Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, economic warfare
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became an essential part of

a

triad of United States Cold

War foreign policy.
This chapter reviews the formation of
the United
States export control program and economic
warfare

strategy.

The chapter begins by describing how the
policy was
developed and then analyzes the construction
of the

administrative instruments that were used to carry
out the
program.
This includes an analysis of domestic
level

divergences of opinion on the appropriate approach
to
East-West trade.

In addition,

this chapter assesses the

degree to which the preponderance of an absolutist
discourse

legitimated
bloc.

a

policy of economic warfare against the Soviet

The image of the nature of the threat posed by the

Soviet Union also helped to justify statutes that granted
the executive unprecedented authority to interfere in

commercial transactions in the interest of national
security.
The chapter also assesses diplomatic initiatives to

induce Western European states to conform to the United

States position on East-West trade controls and examines the

dynamics of the negotiations that resulted in the

construction of COCOM.

Despite divergent positions on the

appropriate Western alliance strategy for East-West trade
and divergent economic interests, Western Europe followed
the United States lead in the COCOM program from its
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inception in 1949 until 1954.

The reasons why are co
mp ie*

There was a level of shared
peroeption of mu tual security
interest.
This was particularly the
case following the
outbreak of the Korean war.
American political prestige
was
also a factor that added to the
United States' ability to
convince reluctant allied
iea sta.pc
states of ^v,~
the necessity of a broad
embargo and of minimizing economic
transactions with the

Soviet bloc.

More significantly, however,
the United
States' national export licensing
program and Marshall Plan
aid provided leverage for extracting
compliance from the
allied states. The United States could
hold up transfers of
goods by delaying or denying export
license applications and
could cut off aid if allied states were
found to be in

violation of export control regulations.

There were

intergovernmental conflicts over the advisability
or utility
of using these instruments to coerce
reluctant Western

European states to agree to an extensive embargo.
Despite
the inter- governmental disagreements, these
instruments

played a central role in getting allied states to
comply
with the United States position. This chapter
draws

on the

contested exchange model to show the relationship between
the instruments that were at the disposal of American

officials and evaluates the effectiveness of the instruments
in this case of contested political exchange.
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Finally, the chapter analyzes
the liberalizations
in
the COCOM multilateral
export control program that
tooK
Place after 1954. The United
States continued to maintain
stringent unilateral controls as
well as an extensive export
and reexport licensing program.
The chapter explains why
the United States acquiesced in
Western European

governments' demands for relaxations
of the COCOM program in
1954.
The theoretical perspectives
outlined in chapter one
will be drawn on to provide a fuller
description
of the

complex factors in United States-Western
European
collaboration on export controls and the
instruments used by
the United States to impose its
position on Western firms.
The Emergence o f Economic Warfare
In the months leading up to the end
of the war,

American officials encouraged the Soviets to
join in the
Bretton Woods agreements and considered
proposals
from

Foreign Minister Molotov for post-war loans
(Yergin, 1977).
Truman, Harriman, and Acheson among others came
to believe
that the Soviet Union was a "world bully" and that
"economic

pressure could be used to control, discipline, and punish
it"

(cited in Yergin, p. 93,

1977).

By late 1945 Secretary

of State Acheson said that "the first instrument of
United

States foreign policy (diplomacy and negotiation) had failed
to control the Soviets or to build trust."

Therefore,

Acheson said, "we must use our second instrument of foreign
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policy, namely, economic power,
to control the Soviets"
(Yergin, p. 308, 1977)
.

The persuasive power of such
a view was contingent
on
an acceptance of the presupposition
that the Soviet

leadership would react rationally and
predictably to
economic rewards and punishments.
Several executive
officials and United States Congressmen
did

not believe,

however, that the Soviet leadership was
guided by "rationalcalculations of interest. The instrumental

conceptualization articulated by Harriman ran
counter to the
construction of the Soviet Union as the embodiment
of the

Enemy-Other.

As inter-national events spiraled out
of

control and as the understanding of Soviet
actions became
increasingly determined by more radical constructions

of the

nature of the threat, the faith in the instrumental
value of
United States economic levers to control the Soviets
faded.

United States policy makers moved to reconsider their
East-West economic policy strategy.
George Kennan in his long telegram articulated

succinctly the presuppositions that were to guide United
States East-West economic policy strategy throughout the
1950s.
a

Kennan cast the Soviet leadership as being driven by

type of "neurosis" and "internal logic" that was alien to

the West.

He said that there "can never be on Moscow's side

any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the

.
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Soviet Union and the powers which are
regarded as
capitalist- (FRUS, vol VI, 1946).
"Everything possible will
be done to set the major Western Powers
against each other,"
Kennan contended, and the Soviet leadership,
he said, was
"committed fanatically to the belief that with
the United
States there can be no modus vivendi" (FRUS, vol.
VI,
p.

698

,

1946)

Kennan set up the contrast between the Soviet
Union
and the West as a juxtaposition of a rational
enlightenment

individual to the uncivilized or the insane.

He said that

the United States in formulating policy must "study it
with
the same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same

determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by
it,

with which a doctor studies an unruly and unreasonable

individual" (FRUS, vol. VI,

p.

709,

1946).

What strikes

Kennan as peculiar to the Soviet Union is "the fact that it
is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in

its basic reactions.

For it, the vast fund of objective

fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure

against which outlook is constantly being tested and
re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are

selected arbitrarily and tendentiously to bolster an outlook

already preconceived" (FRUS, vol. VI,
addition,

p.

708,

"the Russians," according to Kennan,

1946).

In

"have learned

to seek security only in patient, but deadly struggles for

.
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the total destruction of rival
powers, never in compacts
and
compromises- (FRUS, vol. VI, p. 698,
1946).
The Soviet
leadership, he argued, believes it
"necessary to destroy our
traditional way of life" and will "spare no
effort to

discredit and to combat all efforts which
threaten to lead
to any sort of unity or cohesion among other
powers."
Kennan concludes his analysis by saying that
"this problem
is within our power to solve," but that
"there is nothing as
dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown" (FRUS,
vol. VI,

p.

709,

1946)

Kennan' s telegram can be read on a number of levels.

His images and the construction of the source of Soviet

conduct meant that appeals to common interests or the use of

economic inducements in any form were useless.

The Soviets

could not be disciplined or reformed through means that

would work on those for whom there was still hope for
salvation.

The Soviets, like the untameable Eastern hordes

of old, had to be walled up or marginalized.

To combat this

threat that had an ability to penetrate our body politik

required "every courageous and incisive measure to solve the
internal problems of our society, to improve self-

confidence, discipline, morale, and the community spirit of

our people" (FRUS, vol. VI,

p.

708,

1946).

Within the

confines of this discourse the sanity of the West or of the

United States became constituted and confirmed through the
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image of the Soviet Union.

"Reality" while separate from

was something we were closer to
because we constantly
tested our positions and our ideas
in relation to that which
was external.
We were empirical, non-ideological
and closer
to the truth.
The Soviet leadership was alien
and
unenlightened.
us,

This construction of the Soviet threat
would come to
require, in terms of economic policy,
"constant surveillance
(of economic interactions) through a
comprehensive export
licensing system" (FRUS, vol. I, p. i 03
0, 1951).
The policy
strategy this set of representations legitimated
was one of

economic warfare.

The reasoning behind the program was that

by debilitating the Enemy's military and industrial

development, the West could undermine the Soviet "war
making

potential."

The other central rationale for this program

was that by attempting to maintain monopolies or at least
lead times on technological advances, the West or the United

States could maintain economic and military superiority
(FRUS, vol.

I,

p.

1032,

1951; on the rationale for economic

embargoes see Hirshman, 1945; Gordon and Dangerfield, 1947;
Medlicott, 1959; Snyder, 1966; Knorr, 1975; Baldwin, 1985).
The Domestic Effort
In the summer of 1947 the Truman Doctrine was

proclaimed.

In that same year the Soviet Union consolidated

power in Hungary and in 1948 it did the same in
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Czechoslovakia. In the economic
sphere, Congress approved
$17 billion in aid for the Marshall
Plan.
Like the other
parts of the national security
apparatus created
in 1947,

such as the National Security
Council and the Central
intelligence Agency, the system to
control East-West trade
did not emerge suddenly and
full-blown.
The system was
institutionalized gradually through a
series of statutes and
organizational innovations. The legal
foundation
for the

United States control system came
first, through extensions
of the export control authority
granted to the executive in
World War II and then in 1949 through
the Export
Control

Act.
In 1947 the newly formed National
Security Council and

the newly created Policy Planning
Staff in the State
Department (headed by George Kennan) began
to develop
long-range policy strategies for the United
States position
on East-West trade.
In a November 1947 report submitted by
Kennan 's staff, contrasting views were
articulated on the

particulars of the appropriate United States policy
on trade
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The
Commerce
Department had submitted a proposal to the NSC recommending
that all exports to Europe and dependent territories be

placed under control.

The report recommended that all

transfers be subject to an individually validated license
requirement.

Shipments of any goods, the proposal

.
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maintained, should only be
permitted to go forth when:
l)
the receiving country furnished
adequate justification of
need; 2) European recovery and
world peace would be thereby
served; and, 3) the position of
the United States would
not
be adversely affected (FRUS, vol.
iv, p.
490,

19 48 )

The reasoning behind this proposal
apparently was
threefold.
First, many United States officials
concluded
that the Soviet Union was doing everything
in its power to
"sabotage the European Recovery Program."
This included the
attempts to acquire and stockpile foreign
resources at the
expense of other European states. United
States officials
argued that this situation necessitated "an
immediate

termination of shipments from the U.S. to the
U.S.S.R. and
its satellites of all commodities critically
short in
the

U.S. and in Europe or which would contribute
to the Soviet

military potential."

Secondly, United States officials

believed that establishing

a

control system with a mandatory

individual license program for all commercial shipments to

Europe would allow for a more effective administration of
the European Recovery Program.

The United States could then

gauge and control the distribution of goods transfers.

The

third reason articulated in the proposal stated that "during
the period of operation of the recovery program, we will

wish to be able to exercise some pressure on countries

receiving our aid.

A blanket control program would give us

.
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the means for exercising this influence(FRUS, vol. iv, pp.
489-496, 1948)
The ensuing discussions reflected
schisms that would
characterize United States domestic policy
debates over
East-West trade controls into the 1980s, a
part of this
schism involved what has been called the conflict
between
the unilateralists and the multilateral ists.
Some members
of the State Department,

for example, expressed concern over

how such an action would appear given the United
States

position on free trade in the ITO Havana negotiations.
These officials pointed out that taking this action without
regard to the traditional role of Eastern European raw

material exports in Western European economies could have

a

potentially negative impact on U.S. -allied negotiations in
other areas.

Some of these officials expressed

a

concern

over the possibility that such a move would be interpreted
as a hostile act by Stalin and that he might retaliate by

cutting off Western European states access to Eastern

European raw materials and energy supplies (FRUS, vol.
120,

1949)

V,

.

After some discussion in order to address these
concerns the NSC on December 17, 1948 agreed to order

blanket controls for all of Europe and its territories
including the Soviet Union ("the R procedure for export
controls").

Instituting blanket controls was designed to

p.
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avoid the "overt act of
discrimination against the Soviet
Union and its satellites" (FRUS,
vol.
IV,

p.

512,

1948).

This was justified as a tactical
move to avoid retaliation.
By March 1, 1948 according to
the NSC order, all commercial
shipments to the "R" group would be
subject to review
through the individual export license
program.
This allowed
the United States to deny transfers
of goods to the Soviet
Union and the Eastern European states.
By March 1948 an overall strategy was
taking shape.

Secretary of State George Marshall, Secretary
of Defense
James Forrestal, and Secretary of Commerce
Averill Harriman
ordered an inter-departmental sub-committee to
"recommend

procedures for establishing
organization."

a

peace-time economic warfare

According to this committee's recently

declassified report "the objective of the United States
was
to inflict the greatest economic injury on the
U.S.S.R and

its satellites and at the same time to minimize the
damage

to the U.S. and the Western Powers resulting from;

probable Soviet retaliation; and,

b)

a)

the inability of the

East to continue exports of certain supplies to the West"
(FRUS, vol.

IV,

p.

525,

1948).

These contrasting goals conflicted at points and

produced inter-agency divergences of opinions as well as
clashes between the Executive and the Congress.
State Department there seems to have been

a

Within the

consensus that
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ensuring certain levels of
Eastern
eastern European
Fnr-™
raw material
exports was important for the
overall goal of Western
European economic recovery.
contrast, m any members of
Congress advocated a complete
embargo on trade with

m

Eastern

Europe and the Soviet Union.

m

addition, Congress

advocated strongly the use of economic
coercion to get
allied states to comply with the
United

States economic

warfare strategy.
The Commerce Department was supportive
of the idea of
an extensive embargo on trade with
the Soviet bloc.

Commerce officials argued that granting
licenses for the
transfer of any type of goods to the Soviet
bloc should be
based on a strictly specific guid pro gups
(FRUS, vol.

p.

538,

1948).

In addition,

IV,

the Commerce Department pointed

out that in order for the United States
program to be

effective "it would be necessary, through the ERA
and

diplomatic channels, to arrange that Western European
countries pursue export policies which were more or less

consistent with those of the U.S." (FRUS, vol.
1948)

IV,

p.

542,

.

Commerce Department officials were concerned that the

United States program would be undermined by Western
European re-exports or transshipments of controlled goods.
The licensing program, according to the Commerce Department,

should be used as an instrument of surveillance to detect
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unusual requests on the part of
Western European states
that
"might indicate re-exporting or
other activities

that should

be discouraged-

(FRUS,

vol.

IV,

p.

541,

1948).

Charles
Sawyer, who replaced Harriman as
Secretary of Commerce
expressed the view on several occasions
that pressure should
be brought to bear on states receiving
aid to bring them in
line with the United States" preferred
position
(FRUS, vol.

IV,

1948; FRUS, vol.

IV,

1950).

This stand brought the Commerce Department
into direct
clashes with the State Department's Division
of Commercial
Policy, Division of Investment and Economic
Development, and

Office of International Trade Policy (FRUS, vol.
1948).

in May 1948,

IV,

p.

545,

for example, to their consternation

Sawyer refused to approve export licenses for sales
of
equipment essential to raw materials production to
Eastern
bloc states, such as coal-mining and transportation

equipment to Poland.

The Secretary of State intervened and

tried to convince Sawyer to approve the export licenses by

arguing that such denials would be detrimental to Western

European recovery because it would impair Eastern European
states' ability to deliver raw materials.

This particular

issue was characteristic of the inter-agency conflicts that

occurred from 1948-1953.

It represented the conflict

between the goal of inflicting the maximum amount of

economic harm on the Soviet bloc and of making sure that
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such controls did not result in
greater harm to the United
States or the Western alliance
economies.
One way of dealing with the problem
of balancing these
goals was by establishing criteria to
categorize goods in
terms of their strategic significance.
The class of items
that were considered to have the highest
strategic value
were categorized as 1A. This included:
a.

Materials or equipment which are designated
or
used principally for the production and/or

development of arms, ammunition, and implements
of
war.
b.

Materials or equipment which could contribute

significantly to the war potential of the Soviet
bloc where the items incorporate advanced

technology or unique technological know-how. It
applies only to goods sufficiently important to
the war potential that the absence of an embargo

would permit

a

significant advance in Soviet bloc

technology over its present level of development.
c.

Materials or equipment which would contribute
significantly to the war potential of the Soviet
bloc in that the items, if embargoed, would

maintain or create

a

critical deficiency in the

war potential of the Soviet bloc.
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The 1A list originally contained
167 items including
specialized precision machine tools,
petroleum equipment,
chemical equipment, precision
scientific and electronic
equipment, and certain nonferrous
metals
'

(FRUS, vol.

iv,

p.

The 1A list also included a
separate Munitions
List.
The criteria for inclusion in the
list meant that it
contained items with direct and indirect
military
87,

1950).

significance.

That is, it included unique
technologies and
items that would help the Soviet bloc
states break

bottlenecks in their economies.
The second list,

IB,

consisted of "materials and

equipment which, if shipped in substantial
quantities, may
contribute to the war potential of the Soviet
bloc to so
great an extent that only reasonably small
quantities of
such material or equipment should be permitted

to move to

the Soviet bloc-

(FRUS, vol.

IV,

p.

89,

1950).

This list

included more than 300 items whose main contribution
would
have been to Soviet bloc states' general industrial
development. The list included some primary commodities such
as copper,

lead and zinc, and relatively common industrial

equipment and transportation equipment such as trucks and
freight cars (FRUS, vol. IV,
1985)

p.

89,

1950; Mastanduno, p. 98,

.

A more inclusive 1C list was also established in 1951

and contained an additional 200 items.

The Commerce

.
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Department in consultation with
an inter-departmental
advisory panel was given
discretionary power to approve
or
deny export license applications
for ic items (FRUS, vol.

IV,

1049,

p.

1951).

The united states

embargo on the 1A list items.

ha(J

an uncondit onal
.

For all practical purposes

the IB and IC lists were also
subject to embargo. In 1949,
for example, $22 million of class
IB license applications'
were submitted to the Commerce
Department, but only $770,000
worth were approved (FRUS, vol. IV,
p. 80, 1950; cited in
Mastanduno, 1985)
In 1948 the United States moved to
attempt to get the

allied states to adopt similarly broad
embargo policies.
The nature of the initial Western
European resistance
reflected not only a divergence in economic

interests, but

also a deeper divergence of perception.

The United States

and most of the Western European States did
not share the
same view of the appropriate relationship
between East-West
trade, export controls, and Western security
interests.

The United States became convinced that economic

warfare was the best strategy for Western security.
conviction was a result of

a

number of factors.

This

First,

United States officials believed that there was really no

difference between the Soviet military and industrial
sectors.

Any trade that would benefit Soviet industrial

productive capability or development to any degree

.
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whatsoever was thus seen as
strategic.
States officials believed that

Secondly, United

an embargo program
would

allow the United States to maintain
military and economic
superiority over the Soviet bloc.
The United states
preponderance in these areas was based
in part
on its

superior technology.

The experience of World War
II had

etched into the minds of the American
public the image of
what it meant to have the scientific
or technological edge
(Medlicott, 1959).
United States officials were
convinced
that the Soviet Union was attempting
to acquire, as quickly
as possible, material and advanced
technologies that would
allow it to make significant advances in
industrial

development and military production and
preparedness.
they believed that the embargo net should

Thus

be cast as widely

as possible,

and that particular attention should be
focused

on Western scientific and technological
innovations (FRUS,
vol.

I,

p.

1032,

1951).

Thirdly, a number of officials in

the NSC came to adhere to the construction of the
nature of

the Soviet threat articulated in Kennan's telegram.

What

Stanley Hoffmann calls the "containment crusade" was waged
and legitimated largely in the terms of what

I

have called

the absolutist discourse (Hoffmann, 1976; also see Larson,
1985,

on attitude change and the influence of Kennan's image

of the Soviet Union)
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What is also revealing about
the construction of
this
policy is the fact that analyses
conducted by both
the CIA

and the State Department-

s

Office of Intelligence
Research

concluded that the Soviet economy
was relatively selfsufficient in terms of resources

(this may have not been

true for rapid technology
development: see FRUS vol. I,
pp
1035-1041, 1951).
This meant that there was some
recognition that the economic warfare
program would only
have a limited impact on Soviet bloc
economic power. Thus we
can conclude that the policy was
driven to large measure by
the idea, widely accepted in Congress,
that any trade that
would benefit the "dictators of enslaved
peoples was morally
unacceptable" (Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson,
,

p.

58,

.

1986).

The rationale was then on one level expressive
of the
perceived moral outrage at the Soviet "Other."
it was also
driven by the idea that the "unruly individual
had
to be

isolated" or contained so as to minimize its potential

corrupting influence on the "reasonable" Western Powers.
The image of the Soviet Union that was articulated by
Kennan
thus helped to legitimate the United States' economic

warfare strategy.
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Western Europ pan Positinnc

immediately following the war most
Western European
leaders believed that a limited embargo
of narrowly defined
strategic goods was in the interest of
Western
security.

Most of these leaders were opposed, however,
to the
proposals for a broad ranging embargo. They

were averse, in

particular, to following

against the Soviet bloc.

a

strategy of economic warfare
There were a number of reasons,

economic, political, and perceptual, for the
contrast

between the United States and the Western European
positions.

As Adler-Karlson put it (1968, p. 40)

,

the

motives for these contrasting views, "over the formation
of
the export control policy, were based on different
beliefs

about reality."
In December 1947 while the United States was beginning

to organize for economic warfare, the British were in the

process of negotiating an Anglo-Soviet trade and financing

agreement with Stalin.

In the same month that the NSC

decided to place all exports to the "R" group under
licensing control, the British had agreed to sell railway
equipment, generators, and heavy machinery to the Soviets in
the hope that they could ensure raw material and fuel

exports from the Eastern bloc.

At the end of the war

virtually all of the states of Western Europe believed, that
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significant portion of their raw material
and energy needs
could be filled by Eastern bloc exports.
a

The first source of resistance to the
United States
proposal to engage in economic warfare with
the Eastern bloc
was economic interest.
Prior to the war, trade between

Eastern Europe and Western Europe had been
complementary;
finished goods flowed East and raw materials, fuels,
and
food flowed West (Jentleson, 1986; see table 3:1).
Most

American officials in 1946 did not understand the gravity
of
the devastation of Europe; a devastation "symbolized by
the

urban rubble, which, like graveyards, dotted the Continent"
(Yergin,

1977)

.

the end of 1945.

There was a food and an energy crisis at
More than 125 million Europeans were

living on an individual average of less than 2000 calories

per day.

This is in contrast to the 3300 calories per day,

individual average in the United States (Yergin, 1977)

.

In

this environment, Western European leaders were not very

receptive to the idea of engaging in economic warfare with
anyone.

They desired instead the resumption of

complementary trade arrangements with the East.
The second reason that European leaders opposed the

comprehensive embargo was because they believed it
impossible to implement in an effective manner.

Third, even

3
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TABLE 3.1

Value of Total Trade, United States
Europe with the Soviet Union and and Western
Eastern
Europe,

1938

(Millions of Dollars)

Western Europe (a)

Exports to:
USSR
Eastern Europe
Imports from:
USSR
Eastern Europe

USA

153.9
(b)

422.*0

H\l

292.2

26
31

54 3.2

1,411.

q
3

199.0

(a) Western Europe includes all of those states
that were
later members of COCOM: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and

(b) Eastern Europe includes Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the USSR

Sources: Bruce W. Jentleson Pipeline Politics (Ithaca NY:
Cornell University Press, 1986) p. 64 and Gunnar
Adler-Karlson (Stockholm: Almguist & Wiksell, 1968) p. 317.
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if it could be,

they were skeptical of the
prospects of the
strategy doing more harm to the East
than to the

m

West.

the event that Eastern bloc exports
were cut off in response
to the economic warfare program,
Western European states

would be forced to find alternative
sources of supply for
food,

energy, and raw materials.

The United States seemed

willing or incapable of providing full
compensation for this
potential loss of trade. Western European
leaders were also

skeptical of the success for such

a

broad program given the

practical difficulties and the administrative
costs.

The

leaders were concerned that their exporters would
be

disadvantaged by such

a

control program because of the

possibility that some states would choose to go it alone
or
to defect from the program.
The creation of the
multilateral COCOM program was designed to satisfy some of
these concerns because it provided for the exchange of

information between participant states.

Western European officials were also opposed to such
strategy because they did not believe that war with the
Soviet Union was inevitable.

The trade wars of the inter-

war period and the conseguences of isolating Germany

economically led some Western European officials to believe
that engaging in economic warfare with the Soviet Union was
a

slippery slope to war.

They also believed that such a

strategy might feed into Stalin's hands by giving him

a
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bargaining power in intra-Eastern
European trade
and an excuse to consolidate
communist rule to

regions

an even

greater degree in Central Europe.

Western European leaders

hoped that they could encourage
"Titoist" tendencies through
some level of economic
interdependence with the Eastern
European states (Adler-Karlson,
1968).

There were two final issues that
lay at the heart of
the United States-Western European
conflict over the issue
of export controls with the Eastern
bloc.
First,

devising

in

system of export controls that would
enhance
Western security, Western European
officials believed that
it was legitimate to separate Soviet
economic or industrial
potential from its military or war potential
(see
a

Mastanduno)
.

These officials argued that Western security

would be best served by controlling only
items of direct
military applicability. Western European
officials thus

advocated a much narrower definition of "strategic."
Secondly, there was simply a different understanding
of the

legitimacy of engaging in trade with the Soviet Union.

Western European leaders and members of parliament were
suspicious of Stalin.

When it came to the economic sphere,

however, moral indignation usually stopped short of casting
the Soviet Union as a evil adversary with whom there was no

hope of any ground for common interest.

Western European

businessmen's willingness to "sell themselves Red" was not
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held up to the same type of
sorutiny fooused on their
U.s
counterparts.
In the 1950s, for example,
Senator Joseph
McCarthy on more than one occasion
brought American
businessmen before his committee to
accuse them of "traitor
trade" (Jentleson, p. 63, 1986;
Adler-Karlson,
p.

33,

1;
.968

Gaining W estern European r 0 ii ah orat nn
In Economic Warfare
j

in 1948 the United States began
diplomatic initiatives

to get the Western alliance states
to agree to collaborate
in a coordinated export control
program and met resistance.
By January 1951, however, Western
alliance states agreed not
only to participate in a multilateral system
to coordinate a

strategic embargo, but also to accept the United
States
preferred strategy of economic warfare and the
U.S.

understanding of what types of goods should be
regarded as
strategic.
The United States 1A and IB lists were

accepted

by the allied states.

This meant, that despite deep

reservations, Western European officials agreed to follow
the United States lead.

There is some disagreement among

scholars when it comes to explaining the dynamics of Western

European collaboration with the United States on export
controls from 1949-1954.
The more widely accepted explanation is that the

Western alliance states were coerced into going along with
the United States preferred approach.

This explanation,
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advanced first by Adler-Karlson,
rests on the fact that
United States Marshall Plan
aid was tied directly to
compliance with the U.S. export
control
program.

Congress
was intent on making sure that
states receiving United
States aid did not trade with Soviet
bloc.
As Adler-Karlson
puts it:
"Despite all the West European
reluctance its
governments did cooperate in the embargo
policy.
Thus we
must also ask why the West European
nations did cooperate as
much as they did. The answer is clearly
to
be found in the

American threats to cut off aid in cases
of non-compliance"
(Adler-Karlson, p. 45, 1968; see tables 3:2
and 3:3).

This interpretation has been challenged
recently by
Michael Mastanduno.
He contends that the United States
was
able to persuade Western European officials
that a broad
embargo was in their interest. Mastanduno argues
that the

United States was able to get COCOM states to
agree to

embargo both the 1A and IB lists because the invasion
of
South Korea and Soviet actions in Eastern Europe had

increased Western European statesmen's concern over the

potential for East-West conflict.

Mastanduno concludes that the Executive was convinced
that attempting to force compliance with the United States

position on export controls would be detrimental to United
States security interests.

According to Mastanduno, the

15

4
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TABLE 3.2

United States Foreign Assistance
to Western
Europe 1950-1952 (in Millions of
Dollars)

Austria
Belgium

1950

1951

168

J- -L

.

229.7

Denmark

83 0

France

700.

Germany
Iceland

Ireland

.

733

6

.

7.1
4j

U

,

1952

J

11

/

8

.

59 6

Id 8

48 8

14 . U

.

.

435.0

i DZ

392

.

1

8

.

3

3

.

07

T

o

~> •

.

1

401.

6

262

0

170. 5

268

8

107.3

100. 0

Norway

95.2

41.3

16.9

Portugal

31.4

19. 0

Italy

Netherlands

Spain

Sweden

United Kingdom

.

X
51. 6

995.2

15 5

X

.

.

17.2

21.6
265.

6

X

35.5
X

350.

3

Source: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1,
1945-June 30, 1961, Agency for International Development
Statistics and Reports.
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TABLE 3.3

United States Aid to Western p„ron a n
Trade 1949 - 1955

HuSsTDXrs,^"^

1949

i960

6276.0
4 910.9

1951

1952

3619.2

2267.8

1349.1

466.4

3516.2

2211.5

1149.2

375.0

303.0

56.3

199.9

91.4

37.1

604.6

832.4

653.3

745.9

742.9 1100.1

1011.7

812.9

1009.8

995.4 1357.9

195!

Western Europe
Total Economic Aid

Grants
L ° anS

Total Military Aid
Total Exports
to Eastern Europe
Total Imports
from Eastern Europe

1365

'

1

xxxx

1013.9 1541.

Source: Adler-Karlson. Western Economic Warfare,
1968.

.
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Executive believed that imposing an
unconditional and broad
embargo would undermine the goal of
aiding in

the immediate

recovery of Western Europe and could
produce conflicts that
would harm alliance stability. For
these reasons
the

Executive, says Mastanduno, worked to
mitigate the potential
damage of coercive legislation by proposing
an exceptions
mechanism.
This allowed states to export controlled
goods
when to do so was necessary to obtain critical
supplies or
when prior commitments existed.
It was under this condition
that Western European states became more willing
to accept
the United States proposals for a broad ranged
embargo.

Mastanduno supports his argument through an analysis
of some State Department officials' expression of
the

Department's position on the issue and reports on
intra-allied negotiations from 1948-1951.

For example,

during this period Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated:
There is no intention of using the threat of
withholding ECA aid to force the acquiescence of
European governments in U.S. policies on export
controls, for U.S. policy in the long run will be
infinitely more effective if based on the spirit and
principle of cooperation and a common recognition of
the danger in developing the military potential of the
Soviet Union and its satellites" (FRUS, vol. V, p.
81-82

,

1949)

Mastanduno'

s

argument is persuasive in that there does

appear to have been a greater congruency in the State
Department's and Western European officials' perceptions of
the nature of the Soviet threat after the invasion of South
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Korea,

in addition,

as pointed out above,
the state

Department was opposed to the
use of economic leverage
to
get allied states to comply
with the United States
position
This argument fails to fully
consider, however,

the nature
of the instruments that were
available to the United States
to bring leverage to bear on
allied and Western governments
as well as firms.

The contested exchange model,
outlined in
chapter one, can demonstrate how the
United States enforced
a more restrictive position
on export controls throughout
the 1950s by offering compliance
rents to firms and states.
There were indeed deep and intense
divisions within
the Executive over the appropriate
tactics to use in the

negotiations with the allied states.

Allied officials were

aware of the fact that the Commerce and
Defense Departments
and the Congress favored the use of
leverage to bring them
in line with the United States policy
position.
Despite the
fact that the State Department expressed
its opposition to
the use of aid as a leverage, allied
officials realized that
the Congress had imposed an obligation on
the president to
cut off aid in instances of non-compliance or
to defend not

cutting off such aid before Congress.

There was no

guarantee that the State Department could keep Congress at
bay.

Western European officials were also no doubt aware of

the speed at which the United States Executive's position on

several issues had been undermined by the Congress following
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World War

I.

In addition

to slow down and in

see

,

the Unitgd states

^

cases deny licenses for
the export

of its goods when a clear
compliance with U.S. export
controls was not guaranteed. This
mechanism became an

effective instrument to get some
states to agree to abide by
the United States wishes regarding
controls on particular
items.
Thus some of the governments that
agreed to abide by
the economic warfare policy and to
comply with controls on
specific items did so as a result of the
threat of the
withdrawal of access to United States goods.

This was also

no doubt true for many Western European
firms.

Congressional Actions
In the opening discussions of the Marshall
Plan aid

program in March 1948, several amendments were
introduced
that tied aid to the issue of East-West trade.
These

amendments were incorporated into the Foreign Assistance
Act
in section 117

(d)

.

This section directed the Administrator

of Marshall aid to monitor the transactions of aid
receiving

states and to refuse delivery of United States commodities
"which go into the production of any commodity for delivery
to any non-participating European country for which such

a

commodity would be refused export licenses by the United
States in the interest of national security" (cited in
Adler-Karlson,

p.

23,

1968).

During the period in which the

Commerce Department was in the process of establishing
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criteria to designate which
classes of goods should
be
subject to what type of controls,
this provision was
inefficiently enforced.
As a result,

in late 1948 the Senate
Committee on

Expenditures in the Executive Departments
conducted a seri es
of studies that analyzed the
effectiveness of the United
States export control program.
in this review
'

the Senate

attacked the Office of International
Trade in the Department
of Commerce for its inefficiency
in terms of ensuring
compliance and enforcing the program.
The criticisms
contained in the Senate report were many
and focused not

only on the fact that some United States
exporters engaged
in flagrant violations, but also on
the "complete

ineffectiveness in terms of destination controls"
(The
Administration of Export Controls, Dec. 1948;

Senate report

no.

1775,

80th Cong., 2nd sess.).

The Senate report called

for a reorganization and reinvigoration of
the export

control and licensing program.

The proposed changes

included an expansion of the compliance and enforcement
staff; the collection of extensive lists and data on

individuals and firms that were engaged in exporting and

receiving United States goods; and the establishment of

mechanisms to monitor and prevent "unauthorized diversions,
transshipments, or end use of export commodities once such

commodities have left our ports."

154

The recommendations of
this Senate report
were
incorporated into the Export
Control Act in February
i 949
This Act formally
institutionalized and standardized
the
export control and licensing
program.
The stated purpose of
the new act was "to exercise
the necessary vigilance
over
exports from the standpoint of
their significance to the
national security- (Export Control
Act of 1949, Public Law
89-63, 89th Cong.).
The Act also declared that
it was the
policy of the United States "to apply
such controls to the
maximum extent possible
in dealings with the
.

.

.

Communist-dominated nations" (PL ,89-63,
1949).
regulatory procedures of this legislation

The

were exempt from

the Administrative Procedure Act
because of their sensitive
nature. Individuals and firms found
in violation of the
export control regulations were subject,
however, to severe

administrative sanctions.

This could include the loss of

all export privileges and criminal
penalties of fines up to
"five times the value of the exports involved
or $20,000,

whichever is greater, and/or five years imprisonment"
(cited
in Adler-Karlson, p. 218, 1968; PL 89-63,
1949).
The
extensiveness of this program, the vigilance it established
on Western individuals and firms engaged in trade,

is

striking given the fact that the United States Executive is
lauded historically as the beacon of free trade in the

post-1945 world.
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Throughout 1949 and 1950
Congress continued to
be
dissatisfied with what was seen
as the inability of
the
Executive to gain satisfactory
collaboration
fro, the

Western European allies on
imposing broad controls
on trade
with the Eastern bloc.
It was probably
the case that many

members of Congress were unaware
of the diplomatic
initiatives and headway to gain
Western European compliance
in the export control
program that the State Department
had
made from 1948 to 1950 (Adler-Karlson,
1968).

This was

because Western European officials
requested that any
cooperative arrangements on export
controls be kept
confidential.

Many members of Congress were also
unaware of
the role that Eastern European trade
played historically
in

the development of Western European
economies.

Thus by

l 950

the issue of the level of Western
European cooperation in
the export control program had become
highly controversial
in the Congress.
Resentment emerged in the Congress over
the prospect that aid-receiving European
states might be

willing to engage in trade for economic gain
with the Soviet
bloc at the expense of Western security. This
became an

issue not only because of the perception that
United States
firms who complied were disadvantaged, but more

significantly because it was cast as immoral to sell to the
enemy.

In the 1950 Annual Report of the House Committee on

Un-American Activities, Western European aid receiving
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states were viciously attacked
for their lax attitude
on the
issue of export controls
(Jentleson,
p.

55,

1986).

After the outbreak of the Korean
war the Congress
became even more vociferous and
adamant in its desire to see
unqualified Western European support
for the United states
position on export controls.
September

m

1950,

a rider was

attached to the Supplemental Appropriations
Act of 1951.
This rider, which became known as the
Cannon Amendment,
stated:

"During any period in which the Armed
Forces of the
United States are actively engaged in
hostilities while
carrying out any decision of the Security
Council of the
United Nations, no economic or financial assistance
shall be

provided out of any funds appropriated to carry
out the
purposes of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948,
as

amended, or any other act to provide economic or
financial

assistance (other than military assistance) to foreign
countries, to any country whose trade with the USSR, or any
of its satellite countries (including Communist China and
Korea)

is found by the NSC to be contrary to the security

interest of the United States" (Chuthasmit,

p.

40,

1962).

Many members of Congress were opposed to the provision
of Executive discretion embodied in this rider.

The

original version, proposed by Senator Wherry, was designed
to allow the president no leeway on this issue (Chuthasmit,
p.

36,

1962)

.

Senator Lodge, however, siding with some

.

157

m e mb ers o £ the state

Depart,

expended enormous amounts
of energy to get the
discretionary provision
included
(Chuthasmit, p. 46
1962)
in early 1951 there was
open conflict in the
Congress

and between the president
and Congress over the
enforcement
of the cannon Amendment.
this context Senator Kern
was
able to get a new rider attached
to the Third Supplemental
Appropriations Bill of 1951. This
amendment was much more
restrictive than the Cannon Amendment.
it required

m

the

Executive to cut off all assistance
to any aid-receiving
state that engaged in trade of any
item embargoed by the
United States.
it required states that engaged
in trade in
any form with the Soviet bloc to
demonstrate
in detail why

such trade should be exempt from the
provisions of the
amendment.
The Kern Amendment allowed for exceptions,
but

required that the NSC report all such
exceptions, with
supporting arguments, to all House and Senate
committees
involved in oversight on East-West trade

(Chuthasmit, p. 47,

1962; Mastanduno,

1985).

The requirements of the amendment

were to be carried out in an extremely short
amount of time
(approx.

2

weeks)

.

Truman was furious with this move and

stated that the rider was "an attempt to achieve by
coercion
(U.S.

of the Western Europeans) what must be achieved by

cooperation" (Adler-Karlson,

p.

27,

1968).

He reacted by

.
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wanting blanket exceptions
comply

^ ^.^^ ^ ^

State Department officials
attempted to get the Kern
Amendment replaced with a less
restrictive piece of
legislation.
The result was a compromise
in the form of the
Mutual Defense Assistance Control
Act (Battle Act) that was
passed on October 26, 1951. The
Battle Act was a
significant change in that it was a
more permanent piece of
legislation.
it was effective in times
of peace as well as
when the U.S. was engaged in
hostilities; and it linked
economic and military assistance to
compliance with U.S.
export controls (Mastanduno, 1985).
it required the
president to terminate, unconditionally,
all assistance to
any nation that exported arms,
implements of war, or atomic
energy materials to the Soviet bloc
(Chuthasmit,
p.

1962).

53,

it also required the termination of
assistance if a

state was exporting primary strategic
materials or "other
materials" to the Soviet bloc that were subject
to embargo
by the United States (Adler-Karlson,
28-30,
pp.

1968).

it

gave the president discretion, however, to provide

exceptions when the national interest would be served.

The

president was required to justify any exceptions before
Congress in the annual Battle Act Reports

.

The Battle Act

also established one of the key instruments for bringing

United States leverage to bear on Western European states
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and firms.

The Act required the
Executive to develop a
system to monitor permanently
the compliance of foreign
nations, firms, and individuals
with the United States
export control system.

The Executive never terminated
economic or military
assistance under the Battle Act. Yet
the actions taken by
Congress had significant and lasting
repercussions on

Western European officials' perceptions.
established and institutionalized

a

it also

variety of instruments

that could be used by the United States to
extract
compliance.

proceeded

it,

The Battle Act, and the legislation that

created a perception that various segments of

the United States government were willing and
able to use

economic leverage to attempt to get the allied states
to
comply with an economic warfare strategy. in addition,

the

Export Control Act built conflict into the institutional

structures of the United States government by vesting the

responsibility to administer controls jointly in the
Department of Commerce and the Defense Department.

This

brought these two Departments into direct conflict with the
State Department, which was responsible not only for

negotiating compliance with the United States export control
program, but also for establishing agreements with the

Western European allies in

a

number of other areas.

State

Department officials were often more reluctant to risk
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disrupting progress made in
other areas by taking
hard-line on the controversial

a

export control issue.

The contested exchange
model shows how
instruments
established through the ECA and
the Battle Act worked
together to provide leverage in
getting allied states to
comply with the United States
strategy.
The United states
had "rents" to offer; namely,
access to its high technology,
goods, and economic and military
assistance.
it could
threaten to withdraw them in two
ways.
First, Commerce
Department officials could use export
license delays or
denials to deny firms and governments
access to United
States goods and technology. Secondly,
and perhaps less
appealing because of political cost,
the United States could
threaten to terminate economic or military
aid.
The

surveillance mechanisms established through
the ECA and the
Battle Act allowed the United States to
gauge compliance by

individuals,

firms, and governments.

in the context of a

global economy where the United States
controlled

a

greatly

disproportionate share of almost all high technology
and
capital goods, it was not in allied states' or
Western
firms'

interests to defy the United States.
The Dynamics Of Negotiations
By early 1948, unknown to Congress at the time, the

State Department had embarked on

a

series of intense

bilateral initiatives to gain Western European collaboration
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on a coordinated export
control program.

The goal of these

initiatives was to gain compliance
as far as possible with
the United States 1A list and
then

to move on to the IB
and

1C lists

(FRUS,

vol.

I V/

p.

585/

1948).

The United States,

as was stated above, encountered
resistance to its proposals
for an extensive embargo strategy.
The bilateral talks

moved rather slowly and the Commerce
Department began to
demand that the State Department exert
more pressure to
bring aid-receiving states in line with
the United States
policy (FRUS, vol. IV, p. 469, 1948). The
Secretary of
Commerce complained bitterly to Secretary

of state that non-

compliance and undesirable transshipments by
Western
European states was undermining the United
States program.

Secretary of Commerce Sawyer began to use "special
screening
procedures" of export licenses for countries where
bilateral

negotiations were moving slowly (FRUS, vol.
1948)

iv,

pp. 523-545,

.

The European responses to the United States diplomatic

initiatives varied.

The British and the French were the

most receptive to the initial United States proposals.

They

expressed agreement in principle to the necessity of

establishing some type of program that would curtail exports
that could increase the Soviet bloc war potential, but were

reluctant to go beyond the United States 1A list.

Italy,

the Scandinavian countries, and the other smaller Western
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European states were more
reluctant to go along
although
they did state a general
agreement in principle
(FRUS vol
IV, p.586-587,
1948).
while agreeing on principle
none of
these states were willing to
take concrete actions to
implement any program that United
States officials proposed.
All of these governments
shared similar concerns.
First, they were skeptical of
United States assurances of
compliance by other alliance member
states.
They did not
want their firms to be disadvantaged.
Secondly,
,

they were

concerned about the effects of trade
and reexportation
through third party non-alliance states
such

as Switzerland,

Sweden, and Austria.

Thirdly, they were reluctant to
enter

into such a program because they were
wary of violating

their obligations under trade agreements
with Soviet bloc
states.
Finally, they were reluctant to enter into
a formal
or public agreement with the United States
on this issue

because of the possible reaction in their
respective

parliaments (FRUS, vol. IV,

p.

69,

1949).

In late 1949 the Western European states agreed
to

participate in multilateral discussions to coordinate
of common controls.

a list

The informal multilateral mechanism

that resulted from these talks was

a

compromise.

The United

States and the Western allies agreed to set up two permanent

bodies in an organization to coordinate export controls:
the Consultative Group (CG) and the Coordinating Committee

.
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(COCOM)
.

Kingdom,

The

^ership

of the organization
was the United
the United States, Canada,
Belgium, Japan, the

Netherlands, Luxembourg, France,
Italy, Denmark, Portugal,
West Germany, Norway, Greece,
and Turkey.
The CG was to meet four times

a

year as a policy and

guideline making body made up of
high level representatives
from participating states.
COCOM was to meet on a regular
basis to coordinate and implement
agreed upon controls.

The

terms and even the existence of the
organization were to be
kept confidential.
COCOM was meant to solve
the issue of

uncertainty by providing information on
the nature and level
of alliance member state participation
in the
export control

program.

in addition, Western European
states, particularly

the smaller ones, believed that this
organization could help
mitigate against intense United States
diplomatic pressure.
Compliance with CG-COCOM recommendations were
considered

voluntary, but required if the organization
was to last
(Mastanduno,

1985)

The states that agreed to join COCOM decided,
based on

the United States proposal, to set up a series of
three

international lists of items that would be subject to
control.

The international list

I

included items that the

member states agreed should be embargoed unconditionally.
The second list, international list II, was made up of

classes of goods that were to be subject to quantitative

.
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restrictions.

The last

l

ist was made up Qf

^^^

under consideration as candidates
for control and that
were
monitored.
This list was known as the
surveillance list.
Negotiating the content of the lists
was volatile and
protracted.
The State Department sent
officials from
capital to capital to generate support
for the United States
position while the multilateral CG-COCOM
talks proceeded in
Paris.
The American, French, and British
officials
also met

in New York and London in tripartite
talks to work out

particular details and to develop specific
proposals to be
submitted to the multilateral forum (FRUS,
vol.

IV,

pp.

187-194, and 234-241)

Initially the Western European states agreed
to
embargo unconditionally 144 of the 177 items
that were on
the United States 1A list.
Six of the items on the United
States 1A list were placed on international list
II while 27

were retained on list III (FRUS, vol. IV,
pp. 87-93, 1950).

Western European officials refused to embargo a variety of
items on the United States 1A list such as tankers, diesel

engines, ball-bearings, and certain oil exploration and

transportation eguipment (FRUS, vol.
cited in Mastanduno, 1985)

.

IV,

pp.

87-93,

1950;

Once the organization was in

place, the United States began to pressure the Western

European states not only to accept all of its 1A list for
unconditional embargo, but also to agree to bring
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list.

This would mean that the
United states export
control
guidelines would become the
COCOM guidelines.
By early i 952
the United States had
succeeded.

immediately following the formation
of the CG-COCOM in
1949 the United States was faced
with three challenges.
if
its economic warfare strategy
was to be effective the
United
States had to: first, persuade
the Western European
allies
to adopt controls of the US IB
list; second, convince
the
neutral European states to adopt or
honor US and alliance
export control regulations and last;
develop alliance

cooperative mechanisms to uncover
diversions and to prevent
transshipments. The United States used
diplomatic
persuasion rather effectively to achieve
these goals.

The

appeal in negotiations was to the common
security interests.
Where diplomatic initiatives bogged
down, however, the

export control licensing system and the
threat of "throwing
the allies to Congress" provided a means
to apply leverage.
The United States used data collected on
trade flows,
and on firms and individuals to develop
blacklists

identifying violators of international and the
United States
export control regulations (FRUS, vol. IV,
255-257,
pp.

1950; FRUS, vol.

I,

pp.

1032 and 1059-1067,

1951).

The

United States was able to use this information to delay or
to deny export licenses bound for individuals,

firms, or
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nations that were reluctant
relurt^f to comply
witn the Vnit
position on controls
th-;~
ntrols.
Thls was a much more
differentiated
system of instruments to
n res „„ 0 to
bring
j-iiiy pressure
bear on the
Western European states
tares than the
t-h= .
"sledgehammer" approach
congress had established
in requiring the
termination of all
economic and military
assistance to states that
were found
in violation of export
controls.
United states technology
and capital inputs were
required to quickly rebuild
*.

^

.

,.

Western

European industrial plant.

in

addition, United states

exports were important input
supplies for Western European
finished goods. This gave
American officials with the
power
of export license reviews
leverage.
It was widely known at
the time, particularly by
British and French

officials, that
the State Department and the
Commerce Department radically
disagreed over the appropriate
tactics to be used in
negotiations (FRUS, vol. I, p. 1153
1951)
while the
Department controlled the negotiation
process, the Commerce
Department and Secretary Sawyer - who
favored the use of
leverage sooner rather than later controlled the export
licensing program.
,

^

.

Throughout 1950 the United States attempted
to get the
Western European states to adopt the IB
list in full.

Secretary of Commerce Sawyer and Secretary of
State Acheson
had numerous exchanges over the issue of
tactics.
By 1952

the Western European states had accepted the
IB list so that
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there was virtually no difference
between the COCOM Lists
and the United States lists.
the context of the heated
negotiations, recently declassified
documents show that the
United States -held up licenses
applications for the export
of ball bearing manufacturing
equipment to Italy and the
United Kingdom and of a steal strip
mill

m

to Sweden-

vol

I,

p.

154,

1950).

(FRUS,

These license applications were
being

held up so that United States officials
could "express
concern" over the inconsistency between
member state control

criteria and the United States' criteria.

m

addition,

American officials in London were instructed
"to point out
that if shipments of strategic items to the
Soviet bloc

resulted from the licensing, public opinion in
the United
States might force the government to adopt a more

restrictive policy toward licensing to the United
Kingdom"
(FRUS, vol.

I,

p.

154,

1950).

This was significant because

the United States was using the British as a mouthpiece
for
the American position in negotiations with other Western

European states.
In another case the United States delayed licenses for

the Danish Ford and General Motors subsidiaries to export

automotive parts.

These items were not on the international

lists and the Danish government had been bartering the parts
for desperately needed coal from Poland (FRUS, vol.
1173,

1950).

I,

pp.

Within the context of the COCOM discussions
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the Danes had been rather
outspoken in their
opposition to a
broad embargo strategy.
The license applications
shipments of these parts were
held up in the Commerce
Department despite the fact
that the Danes made
several
appeals regarding the grave
necessity of obtaining
Polish
coal.
The State Department, playing
"good cop" made several
appeals to the Commerce Department
regarding the licenses.
It took an intervention by
the President to resolve
the
issue.
He ordered to Commerce
Department grant the licenses

^

(FRUS, vol.

I,

pp.

U61-U76,

at 1176,

1950).

During the

process of resolving this issue,
however, the Danes moved to
support the expansion of the COCOM
embargo.

Leverage was applied much more directly
in persuading
neutral states to adopt controls
parallel to COCOM
On
numerous occasions the United States
made it clear to Sweden
and Switzerland that the United
States would have to review
"with much greater scrutiny" applications
for export
licenses to these states if no assurances
were forthcoming.
.

State Department officials were told to
"use this point at
the appropriate point in the negotiations"

(FRUS, vol. v, p.

65,

1949).

While the State Department would have preferred

to bring these neutral states along with persuasion,
the

Department "recognized that withholding license applications
has had an affect on the Swiss willingness to cooperate"
(FRUS,

vol.

I,

p.

H54, 1951).

In the case of the Swiss,
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Acheson instructed his
negotiator to
that the Swiss have not agreed

"exnr^
express

**

disappointment

to the embargo and
si.ply

indicate that the US will have
to continue to review
licenses for these items in light
of all the facts

depart" (FRUS, vol.

I,

p.

1157#

1950)

...

and

.

Alliance niv eraencp. and thp
Relaxation of COCOM Cnntrnic
By 1951 the Western Alliance was
following a policy of

economic warfare against the Soviet
bloc.

This program, as

we have seen, was organized and led
by the United States.
By 1953 a variety of factors came
together to result in a

movement away from the broad embargo policy
in COCOM.
United States continued, however, to unilaterally

The

pursue

policy of economic warfare.

a

United States officials used

the validated license program and developed
an import

certification and delivery verification system to
maintain
its instruments of leverage on Western firms.

The United

States also maintained its surveillance, intelligence,
and

blacklist system for firms and individuals that did not
comply with its more restrictive control system.

In order

to avoid a diplomatic conflict, however, the United States

was willing to acquiesce to Western European governments'

demands that large numbers of items be removed from the

COCOM Lists.

.
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in 1953 Joseph Stalin
died.

began pushing

The Soviet leadership

peaceful coexistence line
that included
courting Western commercial
interests (Jentleson,
a

1986).

The Korean war had also ended.

occur in West-West relations.

m addition
m 1952-1953

changes began to
there was

a

global recession.

Western European growth rates
declined
and unemployment was "27 percent
above the 1950
rate in

France, 25 percent higher in Great
Britain and 15 percent
higher in Italy" (Jentleson,
p. 80, 1986).
Marshall Plan
aid outlays were also quickly fading
and this meant some of
the resources that the United States
could draw on for
leverage were decreasing (Adler-Karlson,
p.

91,

1968;

Jentleson, 1985)
In this context the Western European
governments

became highly critical of the extensiveness
of the COCOM
embargo program. While McCarthyism raged in
the United
States, Western European officials began to
eye Eastern bloc
markets.

There was a public outcry in Western Europe

against the United States pressure to continue tight

controls despite the changes in East-West relations.
Protest was registered openly in the British and German

Parliaments (Adler-Karlson, 1968)

.

Various Western European

newspapers also published criticisms of the United States
embargo policy.

In the summer of 1953 Le Monde and II Sole

demanded revisions of the United States policy and recession

"
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of the Battle Act

(

Adler-Karlson

,

1968)

.

Several

European states, particularly
the British and the
French,
sent trade delegations to
Moscow in the summer of
1953
(Labbe, 1988; Bertsch and
Elliot, 1988).
Most notably,

Winston Churchill in

a

speech before Parliament
advanced

a

neo-Kantian argument for expanding
East-West commercial
relations.
He said that trade was a
peace-promoting agent
and that "the more trade there
is through the Iron Curtain

...

the better still will be the chances
of our living

together in increasing comfort(Adler-Karlson, 1968).
speech had been prepared by British
Board of Trade

This

officials

whose Department had always opposed
extensive controls.
By 1954 negotiations were underway
between the United
States, France, and Great Britain to
institute a relaxation
of the COCOM control system.
The major revisions of the

COCOM Lists took place in three stages in
1954, 1955, and
1958.
When they ended in 1958 the United States was
1

^This chapter does not deal directly with the
nature of
allied negotiations over the formation of a
multilateral
economic warfare policy against China. It should be
pointed
out, however, that a so-called "Chincom" was formed
in 1952 as
a part of the CG,
to administer and coordinate controls
directed at China. In addition, following the Korean War and
at the 1954 revisions, the COCOM states agreed not
to
liberalize controls on China. This resulted in a situation
where, at the United States insistence, there was a disparity
in the controls applied to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
and those applied to China. This was known as "the China
differential
Clearly, this policy was self defeating in that items
controlled for China could be transshipped through the Soviet
Union or Eastern Europe. By 1956 Chincom and the differential
.

.
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pursuing an economic warfare
program unilaterally
(Adler-Karlson, 1968; Jentleson,
i

986

;

Mastanduno, 1985)

The united states maintained
its position that export
controls with the Soviet bloc
should encompass all
"industrial fields which serve to
support the basic economy
of a country and which therefore
support either a peace-time
or a wartime economy" (Jentleson,
p. 78, 1986).
The COCOM
program, however, was scaled back
to a more narrow strategic
embargo (Mastanduno, 1985).
addition, while the United
States goal of a coordinated alliance
economic warfare

m

program was rejected, the goal of denying
Soviet bloc access
to items where there was a Western
technological monopoly
was retained.
In the initial negotiations the
COCOM List

from 320 items to 226 items.

I

was cut

The quantity control and

"surveillance" lists were cut from 92 to 26 and
102 to
items respectively (Jentleson, 1986; see
table
3:4).

63

The

most significant decontrols occurred in general
industrial

equipment and chemical products while the decontrols
in

electronics and precision instruments and metalworking

machinery were much lower (see table 3:5).

The total

classes of items under any kind of controls decreased from
514 to 315.

The 1958 revisions established

a

policy that

in controls applied to the Soviet Union and China were
disbanded. See Mastanduno (1985) for a closer analysis of this
case

.
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the international lists
should be revised yearly
addition, in 1958 the C0CQM
J

^

^^^

lB

^

one list oalled the "watch
list" (Adler-Karlson,
19M)
Items that were taken off
of the international
lists
included "some types of
civilian aircraft, electrical
generating equipment, some classes
of ships, p umps and
oil
drilling equipment and refining
equipment, electric motors,
turbines, small steel rolling
mills, industrial diamonds,
industrial ball bearings, aluminum
and copper and tires"
(Adler-Karlson, 1968)
.

:

'

These revisions represented

a

concession by the United

States.

The United States was willing
to go along with
these revisions for a number of
reasons.
First, and at a
general level, the United States was
concerned with

maintaining intra-alliance harmony.

President Eisenhower

stated that it was in "the interest
of the United States to
facilitate accord with the allies by
going along with
liberalizing multilateral controls"
(Jentleson,

Secondly, there was

a

quid pro quo.

1986).

The United States

agreed to the relaxations, but continued
to maintain strict
unilateral controls.
In exchange, the Western Europeans
agreed to develop legislation and administrative
systems to

provide for much more extensive and effective
enforcement

mechanisms and transshipment controls (Adler-Karlson,
1968).
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TABLE 3.4

Number of Items on COCOM
Lists Before
Revisions of August 15, 1954 and After

Before revision

320

After revisi<

Source: Task Force on Economic Defense
Policy to the
Chairman, Council on Foreign Policy,
"Draft Guidance Paner
St W
Trad6 '" ° Ct0ber 5 19
^'
A??achmen?
Rnv ?1 Folder:
; ?f
Box
CFEP-East-West Trade, Records of Clarence A
Francis, 1954-1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library, Abilene, Kans., cited in Bruce w.Presidential
Jentleson
lne EfllltlSfi dthaca, NY: Cornell University
Press,
<

^g^

T
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The United States wanted
to ensure that its
control
Program would not be frustrated
by the inconsistency
between
its lists and the items
subject to control in other
Western
European states.
since 1948 the United States
Commerce
Department granted licenses for
exports of controlled goods
only when the government of
the receiving agent was
willing
to guarantee that "such goods,
the products of such goods,
or similar goods would not be
re-exported to a controlled
destination or to provide information
as to why such
reassurance was impossible" (Mastanduno,
1985).
To increase
the effectiveness of this policy,
the United States in 1954
set up an Import Certification/Delivery
Verification (ic/DV)
program and required all states receiving
U.S. controlled
exports to adopt the system. This meant
that all importers
of United States goods and "users"
of United States'

technology were required to obtain

a

certificate from their

home governments stating that the U.S.
control policy would
be honored and that re-export would not
occur.
Importers
were required to present this document to the
United States

government as part of the export license package
Re P° rt no

-

v

/

May 17, 1954; Mastanduno, 1985).

States could also request

importing country.

a

(

Battle Act

The United

delivery verification from the

The United States also reserved the

right to impose sanctions, such as the penalties proscribed
in the ECA,

and to deny access to the United States market,
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on firms and individuals found
in violation of its
export
control regulations and the IC/DV
system (Battle Act Report,
no. V, May, 17, 1954).
This meant that the United
State
:es

imposed its export controls
extraterritorially

This

.

ensured that the United States could
maintain leverage
instruments that could be applied to
Western
firms.

The COCOM revisions explicitly
required the West*:ern
European states to strengthen enforcement
of this system.
The revisions also called for the
establishment of a similar
system, Transit Authorization Certificate,
to monitor the
movement of goods through free ports.
in addition,
a

"financial transaction surveillance system" was
agreed upon
to prevent allied firms from financing sales
of controlled
goods through third countries Battle Act Report
(

June 28,

p.

21,

,

1957; cited in Mastanduno,

no.

9,

1985).

Thus, despite the COCOM relaxations the United States

retained significant control over the goods that could flow
East.

This control was possible because of the strict

unilateral program, the IC/DV system, and the fact that the

United States held the commanding heights in leading edge
and advanced technology.

In addition,

in the first two

decades following the war the United States government

accounted for the vast majority of R

&

D spending in all

high technology areas such as space and nuclear technology
(Mastanduno,

1985).

This fact gave the U.S. government

.
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significant control over access
to advanced technology
developments.
The revisions did not
prevent the United States
from
keeping its export control
administration and COCOM
intact
as organizations designed
to help the West maintain

technological monopolies and lead
times over the East.
Following the revisions uj.
of the
i9Rn«!
tne iysos,
h^.idebates in COCOM were
no longer preoccupations over
the effectiveness of a
coordinated alliance economic warfare
strategy.

The

conflicts and debates were over
whether or not particular
items should be added to or removed
from the lists on the

basis of their strategic significance.
Conclusi on

The dynamics of U.S. -Western European
collaboration
during this period are explained most
readily in terms of
the structural distribution of power
and discourse analysis.
However, the institutional and market
explanations also help
to account for aspects of the collaboration.
in this

conclusion

I

will consider how some of these intepretating

contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of
collaboration.

In addition,

I

will summarize how factors at

each level of analysis interacted to bring about

collaboration
The form of post-war East-West trading relations was

uncertain in 1945.

As misunderstandings and conflicts
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between the superpowers
multiplied, an
came to determine united
states lnterpretations
o( soviet
actions.
This discourse legitlmated
a poUey
economic
Warfare
S ° Viet
as the embodiment
««
o f the
Enemy-Other intent on disrupting
international harmony ana
on destroying "Western
civilization." In order
to isolate
this threat, the United
states adopted rules and
estahiished
institutional structures to
carry out a broad export
-

^

^

—

control

program

This program was set up
to guard Western
security
and was designed to inflict
damage on Soviet bloc
economic
development and war-making
potential.
addition, a
central goal of the program
was to maintain Western
technological lead times and
monopolies.
The United States
policy was legitimated by the
terms of an absolutist

m

discourse that had been accepted
within the NSC.
Western European powers had had

traditional trading

ties with the Eastern bloc states.

while suspicious of

Stalin, most Western European leaders
did not share the
image of the Soviet Union articulated
by George Kennan.

While they supported the idea of

a

limited strategic

embargo, many Western European officials
believed that trade
could have an instrumental value in manipulating
the Soviet

Union and dividing the Soviet bloc.

In addition, many

believed that trade held mutual economic benefits.

Some

Western European officials argued that trade and economic
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issues should be decoupled from political
considerations.

Most groups within Western Europe wanted to
reestablish

traditional trade ties for economic reasons.

Despite this

strong preference, these states followed the United
States
lead.

They participated in the formation of COCOM and

agreed to impose an embargo on East-West trade in items of

direct as well as indirect military significance.

Western European officials agreed to adopt the United
States approach to export controls from 1951-1953 for

number of reasons.

a

First, the outbreak of the Korean war

led Western European officials to be wary of following an

economic policy that would increase Stalin's war-making
potential.

Western Europen officials also became more

willing to accept the terms of the absolutist discourse.
Secondly, Western European government and business officials

were reluctant to incite

a

Congress that had passed

legislation requiring the Executive to cut off all economic
and military assistance to states that violated the United

States policy. Marshall Plan aid, at this point, was much

more important to Western European economies than Eastern

European market. Thirdly, the United States State Department

helped to develop an exceptions mechanism in COCOM through

which trade in essential Eastern bloc goods, raw material
and energy supplies, could be maintained and standing

contracts honored.

Unlike the Commerce and Defense
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Department, state Department
officials appeared more
inclined to attempt to find
compromises with Western
European States reluctant to
forgo trade with the
East
The
fourth reason that Western
European officials followed
the
United States lead is explained
by the micro-economic
contested exchange model. The
United States could use
access to relatively scarce
goods it controlled as well
as
the threat of denying export
licenses for these goods, to
extract compliance with its position
in negotiations with
governments and to extract compliance
from Western
firms.

The surveillance programs on
transactions and trade flows
established through the Battle Act
and the ECA allowed the
United States to gauge compliance and
to establish
blacklists of violators. This practice
allowed the United
States to apply leverage instruments
effectively.
By 1953 the nature of Western-Soviet
bloc relations

had begun to change.

In addition, Marshall Plan aid had

begun to dry up and Western Europe was coping
with the
effects of a global recession. In this context,
Eastern
bloc markets became more appealing while United States

economic leverage was in part eroded.

The United States

believed it was in its interest to concede to Western
European demands for

a

relaxation of multilateral controls.

The United States did not abandon its economic warfare
strategy, but fell back on the IC/DV system and its export
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control licensing program to
deny the Soviet bloc
access to
its goods.
After 1954, allied states
were willing to
continue cooperation in COCOM as
a coordinated effort
to
prevent flows of strategic items
and advanced technological
goods to the Soviet bloc. Conflict
continued over which
items should be controlled on these
grounds.
The United
States continued to pursue a unilateral
strict control
policy for over a decade.
in the 1960s economic
and

political forces came together to transform
the United
States position on East-West trade. As

we will see in the

next chapter, the rise of detente and
the reemergence of an
instrumentalist and a neo-Kantian discourse
legitimated a
much more flexible and relaxed United States
export control
system.
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TABLE 3.5

of Ite»s

OecoXoVed'

Product Category

Before
Revisions

^roa^t

After
Revisions

Percentage
of items
decontrolled

General industrial
equipment

41

14

65.8%

Chemical products

98

45

54.7

Chemical and petroleum equipment

49

25

49. 0

Electronics and
precision instruments

74

50

32 4

53

32 0

51

5.5

Metalworking machinery 78
Munitions and atomic
energy

54

.

.

Source: Task Force on Economic Defense Policy
to the
Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy, "Draft
Guidance Paper on East-West Trade, » October 5, 1955
Annex
4, Attachment A, Box 1, Folder: CFEP-East-West Trade'
Records of Clarence Francis, 1954-1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower
Presidential Library, Abilene, Kans., cited in Bruce W
Jentleson P ipeline Politics (Ithaca, NY; Cornell University
Press, 1986) p. 77.

CHAPTER IV

EAST-WEST TRADE POLICY IN
THE
ECONOMIC COMPETITION: THE CONTEXT op
CLASH OF
INSTRUMENTALIST AND NEO-KA^IAN THF
DISCOURSES
The Purpose Bpo nd th^_SJ
1 m_i n
Trade Pnl iry

_^t^ est

i

,

'

This chapter is an analysis
of the changes that
occurred in United States policy
on East-West trade and
COCOM in the 1960s and the
1970s.
this examination of
how the alteration of United
States policy affected the
COCOM program, I address the two
following questions:
1) To
what degree was the state of
multilateral export controls
during this period determined by
intensified West-West
economic competition; and 2) Was the
linkage approach to
East-West trade liberalization that
emerged made possible
and legitimated by an instrumentalist
discourse?

m

After the 1958 COCOM revisions the United
States
maintained a more restrictive unilateral
East-West export
control program. This more comprehensive
program was
designed to "guard United States technology
that was not

available anywhere else in the world"
(McKitterick,
1966).

p.

22,

As described in chapter three, surveillance

programs, the IC/DV system, reexport control authority,
and

compliance rents were all designed to provide leverage for
the regulation of trade in categories of items or
technology
183
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where the United states;

held a nonopoiy;

a)

^
^^

^^

to prevent the diffusion
of that technQlogy
late 195 os and early
1960s Eastern bloc demand
for Western
European capital goods and
high technology items
increased
There was a movement away
fro, the economic
isolationism
envisioned by Stalin.
addition Western European
officials became more willina
iiin 9 to
t-n »n™,
allow firms to fin this
demand.
This resulted from both
a growth in inter-Western
economic competition and the
fact that Western European
_

m

officials' perception of the
appropriate relationship
between East-West trade and
Western security shifted away
from a policy of economic
denial to one of inducement.
This
represented a shift away from an
absolutist discourse
toward

an instrumentalist discourse.

These changes caused American
officials in various
executive departments to reassess
the broader and more
restrictive United States approach to
East-West trade
controls.
By the early 1960s the economic
warfare strategy
that had been legitimated by the
absolutist discourse came
to be seen as misguided by many executive
branch
officials.

This was due only in part to the expansion
of Western

European-East bloc trade and

a

greater diffusion of

technological development and productive capability.

The

reassessment was also due to the fact that even in the face
of economic warfare, Soviet bloc states made tremendous
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strides forward in economic
growth and in industrial
and
technological development.
B y 1960f having
launched the
Sputnik and produced
sophisticated missile delivery
systems
the Soviet Union demonstrated
an ability to develop
and to
maintain advanced military
technology despite United
states
restrictive controls on technology
transfers.

'

in this context American
executive branch officials

faced a choice over how to
reform the United States
approach
to export control policy.
As Mastanduno argues,
there

appeared to be three options: pursue

a

unilateral economic

warfare program; attempt to coerce
allied states and firms
into compliance with a coordinated
broader restrictive
program; or reduce United States
controls to the level of
other alliance states (Mastanduno,
1985).

The unilateral

option made some sense in that the
United States could have
used various instruments to attempt
to bring Western firms
into compliance and to ensure that
the embargo was not made

ineffective by Western European-East bloc
trade.

The

potential cost of resorting to attempts at
coercion with
increasingly sensitive allies was seen by
United States

officials as politically unacceptable.

However, simply

liberalizing United States-Eastern bloc trade was

problematic given domestic constraints.

There was strong

domestic opposition to East-West trade liberalization

particularly in the Congress where trade was still regarded

c
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as more of a privilege
than a right and trading
with
Communists snares
,
states U3
was a moral issue.
Ultimately the
.

executive branch advocated
liberalization
xj.jjeraiization of controls
tied
to political concessions
from the Soviet bloc.
The image of the Soviet
Union on which the eventual
United States policy shift
was based, as
well as, the

language used to defend the
policy, represented
from the Cold War absolutist
discourse.

a

move away

By the mid-1960s an

instrumentalist discourse that
legitimated a tactical
linkage strategy became the
guidepost for the executive

branch position on East-West
export control policy.
discourse broke with the images,
symbols,

This

and

representations that had been articulated
by George Kennan
in 1946.
united States executive branch
officials

began to

draw more directly on an image of
the Soviet Union as
traditional great power with interests in

a

status quo

supporting relations.

Officials in the Kennedy, Johnson,

Nixon, and Carter Administrations all
spoke of trade as a
"tool to be used" on the Soviet Union and
the Soviet bloc

(McKitterick, p. 26, 1966; Hardt and Holliday,
1973).

This

type of language could have authority or persuasive
power
only with an image of the Soviet Union and the Soviet
bloc

different from that of the Cold War period. This "new"

discourse was based on the supposition that the Soviet
leadership, out of "rational calculations of interest,"

.

187

would react in a predictable
fashion to appropriately
designed instructs of foreign
polioy discipline. The
rise
of this discourse corresponded
with the incorporation
of
behaviorist methodologies in
foreign policy
formation.

included,

This

for example, attempts to
rationalize United

States' nuclear strategic policy
and the Kennedy
Administrations' reorganization of
the Pentagon (see Gaddis,
1982)
This instrumentalist discourse
clashed, however,
with counter discourses, both
absolutist and neo-Kantian, in
Congress
.

Changes in the nature of West-West
economic
competition, the expansion of Western
European-Eastern bloc
trade, and the breakdown of the
images that held together
the Cold War consensus produced a
shift in United States
policy on East-West trade. That shift was
most clearly

articulated in 1969 when Congress replaced
the Export
Control Act with the Export Administration
Act.

However,

the theoretical framework for the policy
shift and the

initiatives for implementation came from the executive

branch in the Nixon-Kissinger and Carter-Huntington
versions
of trade linkage.

This chapter is divided into four sections.

The first

section reviews the state of inter-allied relations over

COCOM in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

I

assess executive

branch proposals to alter United States policy on East-West
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trade during the Kennedy
and the Jo hnson
Administrations
in addition, z analyze
the position of the
Congress and
sectors of the business
community.
The second section of the
chapter is an anaiysis of
the dynamics of executive
branch and Congressional
relations
during the movement from the
Export Control Act to the
Export Administration Act in
1969.
There were significant

intra-governmental divergences of
opinion during this
process.
The executive branch supported
East-West trade
liberalization, but attempted to
retain discretionary
authority over export controls for
foreign policy purposes.
Key members of Congress attempted
to move to a unilateral
East-West trade liberalization
without any connection to
superpower politics. The outcome of
this struggle and its
relationship to Western European states'
policies, such as
Brandt's Ostpolitik, will be the focus
of the final part of
this section.
The key issue in this section is explaining
the change in the United States' position.
Was it driven by
transformations at the international level? Which
branch of

government led the way in altering United States
policy? Was
the policy shift a result of interest group
pressure
in the

face of growing West-West commercial competition? Finally,
to what degree was the United States' policy shift bound
up
in the move to an instrumentalist discourse?
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The third section evaluates
the differences between
the Nixon and the Carter
Administrations approaches to
establishing links between concessions
on export controls
and changes in Soviet domestic
or foreign policy.
This will
include an analysis of the types
of domestic constrains
and

international difficulties these
administrations faced as
result of the peculiarities of their

a

approach.

The final section of the chapter
focuses more directly
on how the transformations of the
United States position
played out in the context of COCOM.
COCOM regulations were
ignored or by-passed by the United States
and by Western
European states during this period. What
explains the

disregard of COCOM by the United States and
the Western
allies during the 1970s? in 1980 when the
Reagan

Administration moved to invigorate the multilateral
export
control program, many cases of COCOM and United
States

approved transfers of security sensitive technologies
were
made public. Reagan Administration officials pointed
to

these cases, claimed that detente was

a

foreign policy

failure, and said that it had done significant harm to

Western and United States security interests.
Mastanduno argues that COCOM became an ineffective

organization during the 1970s because the United States did
not provide leadership for maintaining the integrity of the

program (Mastanduno, 1985)

.

This, however, does not tell us
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«*.

This chapter will show
that on

west-west economic competition,
changes

-ages

^^

a

in

allied officials

o f the nature of the
Soviet threat,

,

and changes in
allied officials, perception
of the appropriate
reiationship
between East-West trace
ana Western security.
United states
capability to ensure the
integrity of controls on
these
technologies where it maintained
a global lead
regained
relatively intact. This
included areas such as
eguipment
for the exploration and
production of oil and gas,

computers, robotics, and
microprocessors. United'states
pclicy, however, might have
become guided by a sentiment
best expressed by Secretary
of Commerce Pete Peterson
who
said:
"There comes a point at which
we must face the fact
that business is business, and
if it's going to go on in
any
event we might as well have a
piece of the action" (Peterson
Report, 1973).

cocom After iq^«

Following the revisions of 1958, reviews
of items in
categories on the COCOM control list were
held annually.

Adler-Karlson, who conducted interviews in the
1960s with
Western European representatives to COCOM reported
that the
reviews of the late 1950s and early 1960s were
largely

technical exercises.

items were removed from the lists when

intelligence information showed that Soviet bloc states had
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^

mastered the productiQn
process
such goQds>
also removed when they
had grown militarily
obsolete
Predictably, however, conflict
arose in COCOM over the
question of what should be
added to the COCOM control
lists
The united States was
interested in controlling
the transfer
of leading edge and state
of the art technology.
whether or
not other COCOM states agreed,
the United
States continued

to maintain a more extensive
unilateral export control
program. The unilateral control
program over high end
technology was eroded little by
Eisenhower's 1959 decision
to liberalize trade in some
consumer-goods sectors such as
textiles and agricultural machinery.
United States exports
of consumer-goods to the Soviet
Union increased from $3.4

million in 1958 to $60 million in i960
(Jentleson,
1986)
The Soviet Union during this period

p.

95,

became much more

.

interested in acquiring Western commodities
and consumer
goods.
The United States, however, continued
its broader

definition of what types of technological
innovations and
items had military significance.
Part of the
reason for

this was that in the 1950s and early 1960s
military

applications of newly developed technology usually
perceded
civilian applications.

United States government funds

dominated R and D spending in the defense, space and
high-technology manufacturing industries (Nau,

p.

68,

1976).

,
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in 1959 59% of the
dollar value of all
an r and Dn preformed
.
in
the industrial sector
in the United
ea bt
state*
ates »
was provided by

the federal government
(Kau, p. 65
1976)
Th£ government
share of R and D funding
in 1963 was 65% in
equipment and communications
sector, 90* in the
aircraft
sector, and 571 in the
manufacturing sector
,

.

,

^

(Nau, p. 68
In addition the
government and particularly
the DOD
,

1976,
.

served as the first market
for many newly developed
technologies.
1963, for

m

example, the DOD was the
sole

consumer of all integrated
circuit production in the
United
States (Mastanduno, p. 298
19 „,
The high percentage Qf
governmental input meant that
federal agencies, particularly
the DOD knew of the military
value of technology
,

.

before it

was released into private
markets.

This gave United States

officials an advantage in setting
out the criteria that
should guide the regulation of the
transfer of newly
developed technology. The fact that
these officials
considered the military application of
these technologies
first strengthened their arguments for
its
regulation.

As

we will see, higher percentages of
private R and D funding
and the development of Western European
technological

productive capability in the mid 1960s reduced
United states
government officials' proprietary knowledge and hindered
United States leverage over the transfer of dual use
technologies to the East bloc.
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The United States' unilateral -u, «,«
uiiiidteraiiy more restrictlive
export control system was
based on the view that
qualitative
military and industrial
superiority provided the
strategic
edge over the Soviet bloc
numerical and conventional
superiority.
The United States believed
that it could
maintain qualitative superiority
with advances in
technological capabilities that
provided a lead time over
Soviet military developments.
In addition to this substantive
basis for the United

States more restrictive program, by
i960, as Henry Nau
points out, "U.S. technology began to
acquire a broader
foreign policy significance, being
valued as a symbol of

American leadership and prestige, as
well as
contributor to military systems- (Nau,
p.

a

substantive

56,

1976).
Thus,
as we will see, some members of the
United States Executive
came to believe that there was a way
of preserving Western

military technological advantage through
focused controls,
while at the same time using access to some
items and

technology in an instrumental fashion.

Based on this view,

the Kennedy Administration began to articulate

a

vision of

how technology could be used to win friends and
influence
potential and long time adversaries.
In the early 1960s, however, the United States' more

restrictive position still rested on the view that the
export control program was designed to retard, as far as
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possible, soviet bloc economic
development.
In 1963 Labour
party leader Harold Wilson
stated that his party
(soon to be
government) did not share the
United States understanding
of
the goals of the COCOM
program.
He said that the
.-American
view is still based on a hope
of containing Soviet
economic
growth by refusing to trade,
especially in plant and
equipment that incorporates
Western know-how" (AdlerKarlson, p. 99, 1968)
.

The State Department was willing
to tolerate growingly
significant disparities between the
U.S. control criteria
and those of COCOM and other
COCOM states.
Recall
from

chapter three that many members of
the state Department
disagreed with Congress and other
agencies over how to best
bring European states and firms in
line with economic
warfare.
other agencies within the American
federal

government had been, and remained, highly
critical of this
state of affairs. Nevertheless, inter-allied
conflicts in

COCOM in the late 1950s appear to have been
minimal.

This

was due to the fact that the COCOM control
criteria had been
made more narrow and were based on an explicit
definitional

requirement of military as opposed to economic significance
(Mastanduno,

1985).

The United States' had compromised in

the context of the multinational forum, but the United

States maintained its unilateral program.

In addition,

by

1960 a COCOM procedure called the "administrative exception"

195

had been instituted.

This procedure was an
addition to the
general exception request procedure
that required that all
exceptions for trade in controlled
items be subject to

multilateral approval in the COCOM
forum.

The

administrative exception, however,
permitted governments to
allow the export of controlled items
unilaterally
when it s

officials were "satisfied that no security
interests w ere
being endangered- Adler-Karlson
p. 99,
(

1968).

states that

provided exceptions under this procedure
were required to
report all cases to COCOM.
One of the inter-allied conflicts that
occurred in
1960 resulted from a difference in understanding
over the

administrative exception procedure.

The ambiguity of the

criteria ("satisfied that no security interest
is being
endangered") led to conflict between the French and
other

COCOM members.

De Gaulle seemed to be rather easily

"satisfied" on this issue.

In March 1960 he used the

procedure to unilaterally extend trade with Eastern bloc
states in

a

number of categories of goods that were subject

to COCOM control.

Included in these agreements was

communications equipment valued at $1 million
Report, no.

14,

December 20, 1960).

(

Battle Act

The United States and

other COCOM states protested the deal.
In the United States this issue sparked more general

intra-governmental conflict as the DOD and Commerce
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Department once again came
into conflict with the
state
Department over the issue of
the United States
acceptance of
the Western European more
liberal position on export
controls. According to
McKitterick, " mo st of the
domestic
departments of the Federal
government fought a rearguard
action against the state
Department', over the
issue of

control criteria (McKitterick,

p.

21

,

1966)

.

The

Department in 1959 attempted to
persuade other alliance
states that COCOM as an
organization should adopt an
international blacklist and

a

greylist of individuals and

firms that were known to have or
were suspected of trading
controlled items with the Soviet bloc
(McKitterick, p. 21,

The United States developed these
lists, but the
proposals were rejected.
1966).

The Articu lation of a New Vision of
East-West Trade in thp
Kennedy Administration

According to his secretary of commerce Luther
Hodges,
John

F.

Kennedy came to office with

a

vision of expanding

trade between the Soviet Union and the United
States
(Jentleson,

1986)

.

In addition,

in his State of the Union

address in January 1961, Kennedy stated that the United
States should use "economic tools to establish historic ties
of friendship between the United States and the peoples of

Eastern Europe" (McKitterick,

p.

26,

1966).

This echoed a

speech Kennedy made in 1957 on the floor of the Senate where
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he said that "we must an*
ourselves with more
economic
tools.
we must be willing to
recognize divisions in the
Communist Camp and be willing to
encourage those divisions"
(Adler-Karlson, p. i 05 1968).
He went on to state that
the
President should be allowed to use
United States economic
strength to "wean captive nations
away from their Kremlin
,

masters."

Kennedy's references in 1957 were
to Poland and
Yugoslavia.
The United States had provided
aid and
trade

concessions to Yugoslavia after Tito's
break with Stalin in
1948 and to Poland after Gomulka came
to power in 1956.
Kennedy's vision was to use United
States economic and
technological power in a broader more
systematic way as
rewards or inducements. This was evident
in several of the
Administration's ambitious programs such as
the Alliance for
Progress.
terms of Soviet-United States trade,
Kennedy
advisors such as George Ball had recommended
"scrapping

m

the

existing embargo" and opening trade talks with
the Soviets
(Jentleson, p. 96,

1986).

Kennedy went to the Vienna summit

in June 1961 with proposals for liberalization
of trade

controls.

He presented this idea to Khrushchev under the

condition that progress would be made in finding solutions
to unresolved problems.

The Vienna summit was a failure.

Khrushchev rejected the linked liberalization proposal.
addition,

In

immediately after the summit tensions erupted over

Berlin and Kennedy's vision of the potential political
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benefits of East-West
trade fell victim
1Ctlm to hdomestic
reaction
and constraints.

^

——

Congress too, two steps
in

abUitY

"

l 962

to curtail executive

E

,t trade for foreign
policy
purposes.
The Trade Expansion
Act ot
act
.
of i1962
9fi? required
denial
of most-favored-nation
tariff
11 status
<-„ v
statue to
Yugoslavia and
Poland (Mckitt
p»«). The Executive uas able
to w 0rk around t h i S
provision More signiflcantly<
however
Congress reinforced the
export control system
aytjuem as an economic
warfare embargo through an
amendment to the Export
Control
Act of 1949.
Based on the recommendation
of a House Select
Committee set up to review
the United States export
control
system, Congress reduced
Executive discretion by stating
that export licenses must
be denied if the goods
concerned
contributed to the "economic
potential" (new language, or
the "military potential"
(old language) of Eastern
bloc
states (McKitterick, p. 26,
1966; Adler-Karlson, 1968;
•

^-<

.

„

Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson,
1986).

While economic

potential had been the implicit criteria
of the United
States' more restrictive export
control program since its
creation, the Kennedy Administration had
hoped to use
loopholes in the 1949 ECA to move away from
the total

economic warfare program.
Paul Kitchin (D.-N.C.) who chaired the committee
said

that "the free world would sink deeper into the
guicksands
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of a world dominated
by
international communism"
y internation.i
if trade
was not curtailed (Jentleson,
p. 98
»o, 1S86)
f
i 986
th
The new law
also required the executive
to seeK
seek allied
allipH compliance
with
more restrictive coni-rnic
controls and recommended
the use of
>

^

.

leverage once again through
the extraterritorial
applications of United States law.
Here once again the
Congress displayed its willingness
to impose sanctions on
states that violated the United
States position on controls.
This new policy did not enjoy
support within elements of
the
executive, however, in this case
State and Commerce opposed
the restrictive policy.
Nevertheless, the bill passed in
the House by 339 and in the
Senate by
57

1986)

(Jentleson, p. 99,

.

The Kennedy Administration encountered
pressure on the
East-West trade issue not only from
Congress, but from
right-wing political organizations and
conservative consumer
groups such as the "Committees to Warn
of the Arrival of
Communist Merchandise on the Local Business
Scene"

(Adler-Karlson p. 107, 1968).

These groups led attacks on

local businesses that sold items imported
from the Eastern

bloc states and exposed firms that entertained
the

possibility of entering into joint ventures to attempt
to
gain access to the Eastern market.
In the context of
the

domestic reaction to increased East-West tension, the
Kennedy Administration used United States leverage to impose
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an embargo to stop the
Soviet . Western

^^^^

^

Pipeline ana to force allied
states to violate
existing
contracts to supply
wide-diameter pipe (40
inches, to th .
Soviet Union.
The Soviets had planned
to use the wide-diameter
p ipe
wh lch they could not
produce, to build the so
called
Friendship Pipeline to
transport oil from the Baku
fields
through Eastern Europe to
the West.
In COCOM the United
States argued that if western
firms enabled the Soviets
to
break this production bottleneck,
the oil would be used to
supply soviet armies in Eastern
Europe and the foreign
exchange earnings would be put
into increased military
production.
Due to the unanimity principle
in COCOM the
United States moved the issue into
the NATO fcrum.

m

November 1962 NATO voted to embargo
all exports of pipe over
19 inches in diameter to the Soviet
Union (Jentleson, 1986).

This move caused a major confrontation
at the interallied level and at the intra-governmental
level in Western
European states. The response of the
Western European
leaders varied. Germany and Italy., the
states with the
highest stakes in the deal, finally complied
with the United

States position.

Several German firms were forced to

violate contracts that they had signed with the Soviets
in
October 1962. The Adenauer CDU government infuriated the

domestic business community by giving in to the United

.
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States.

This case demonstrated the
United states' ability
to use leverage effectively
on a specific issue in
East-West
trade (Mastanduno, 1985)
The 1962 Friendship Pipeline
case was politically
costly for alliance unity. one
consequence was that it
created the perception that the
United States was willing to
use leverage on export controls
and COCOM to attain

commercial benefits for United States
firms.

United States

oil interests stood to lose a great
deal from the pipeline
and they lobbied in opposition to the
trade agreements.

Western European firms viewed this as

a

clear case of the

United States policy on controls being
driven by commercial
interests.
In addition, shortly after the NATO
resolution
the United States signed an agreement to
sell

surplus wheat

to the Soviet Union.

As intra-Western economic competition

increased in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Western

European states, perhaps recalling the United States
actions
in this case,

became increasingly more suspicious of

American motivation in COCOM.
United States intra-governmental conflict during this

period demonstrated the continued strength of the absolutist

discourse in the Congress and in the public at large.
Despite the fact that members of the executive were

convinced that technological trade with the Soviets and the
bloc could be used as an effective tool of foreign policy
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^

the ma:ority of the
Congress viewed

^

and the Soviet bloc
was one of a
"monolithic evil" that
would not respond rationally
or predictably to
policy
instruments designed
esigned t-^
to reward or induce
good behavior

absolutist discourse became
unravelled to some extent
in the
midst of the breakdown
of the forei™
toreign policy consensus
over
Vietnam After this point
the Kennedy vision
of the
potential value of economic
and technological tools
entered
into Congressional debate
and was implemented
through the
detente program. This is not
to say that the absolutist
discourse disappeared.

^

Shifting United ms Po n ny
Export Admini stration

.

The

1QfiQ

art-

Micheal Mastanduno argues that
the adjustment of
United States East-West trade
policy was prompted by the
growing East-West trade of the
allies and the recognition by
United States officials that the
unilateral economic warfare
program had become a futile exercise.
As stated
above,

in

addition to these factors the transition
away from economic
warfare to the trade linkage strategy was
made possible by a
transformation in the understanding of the
appropriate

relationship between alliance security and East-West
trade
among United States executive branch officials
and
in
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Congress.

if an absolutist

^
^

^

be

the ground for United
states foreign polio
y consensuis on
export oontrois in the
late 1960s then
,

^

alliance state East-West
trade might have been
irrelevant
United States officiais who
refined tied to this discourse
would have argued for the
oontinuation of an economic
warfare policy for symbolic
or moral purposes.
As we will

see,

the American public did
continue to be divided on
moral
grounds on the legitimacy of the
detente program. This
divisiveness and Congressional
actions such as the 1974

Jackson-Vanik Amendment eventually
constrained executive
branch flexibility in the use
of trade as

a link for
leverage in other foreign polioy
areas (Gaddis, 1982).
Because of the expansion of Western
European-Eastern
bloc trade, United States business
interests had become
growingly concerned with the economic
and competitive
consequences of the more restrictive
American export control
program.
In 1964, business leaders expressed
their support
for an expansion of East-West trade
before a Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing entitled:
East-West Tr*rl 0 B
-

Compilation of Views of Businessmen
Experts.

Bankers. ,nd

The title of this document is significant
because

of the way it organized and presented the
support for

expanded trade.

In these hearings over more than hundred

business executives argued that trade restrictions should
be

.
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liberalized and that the United
states should make
differentiations in the export
control progran, between
the
East bloc states.
The Eastern bloc m ar k et
during

the late

1960s was expanding rapidly.
East-West trade grew at 12%
compared to overall international
trade at 8% (Mastanduno,
P-

173,

1985; see table 4:1)

.

in the late 1950s and
1960s United States firms

witnessed

a

significant expansion of allied
East-West trade.
Most of this expansion was a
consequence of massive
bilateral, long-term trade agreements
concluded by Western
European and Soviet bloc governments.
Under De Gaulle the
French in 1964 signed a five year
trade agreement with the
Soviet Union.
De Gaulle hoped to use
French-Soviet trade to
counterbalance United States influence,
and he expressed a
vision of -detente, understanding,
and cooperation" in a
Europe that stretched from the "Atlantic
to the Urals"

(Labbe, p.

186,

1988).

in addition,

the "Grand Commission"

was formed as an organization designed
to promote

French-Soviet scientific, technical, and economic

cooperation
In 1959 the British had become the first Western

nation to sign a long-term trade agreement with the Soviet
Union.

This was followed up by similar agreements in 1964

and 1969.

These agreements put Western European firms in

a

strong position in relation to American competitors because
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TABLE 4.1

Western Trade with the Soviet
Union

EXPORTS
1958

1960

1 962

1963

($

million)
1966

178.8

111.3

141.1 178.8 249.5 233.2
75.6 155.3 256.5 265.1

UK

145.5 148.9

FR

75.9 115.6

138.1

64.2

64.1

FRG

72.2 185.3

206.8 153.5

193.6

31.1

78.6

102.3 113.6

90.7

3.4

38.4

IT
US

161

19.7

^ ^

1964

22.6

146.

135.3 197.9 273

90.1 132
41.7

60.2

179

406

268.3

57.7 105.5

TOTAL TRADE

UK

312.0 358.7

396.5 433.5 382.8

492.9 515.8 628.9

706.4

FR

170.8 210.2

248.8 205.3 205.3

247.2 342.4 439.3

478.3

FRG 164.4 345.4

421.8 362.3 430.9

423.5 472.7 567.1

740.8

IT

71.5

204.4

268.6 289.5 237.9

280.1 409.7 463.5

531.3

US

20.8

61.3

91.2 101.2 116.2

157.0

35.6

43.7 167.1

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1958-1970; Micheal

Mastanduno

p.

174,

1985.
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the agreements established
aoiished »a framework
f>*.=«
out of which allied
state firms could develop
Eastern bloc markets.
The
British, the French, and
other COCOM member states
also
Provided further incentives
to expand East-West
trade by
lifting quantitative import
restrictions for many Eastern
bloc states.
In addition the British,
in 1964, extended a
fifteen year credit of $300
million to the Soviet Union
(Bertsch and Elliott,
1988).
Several other COCOM states
followed the British example.
A large proportion of
these
trade agreements involved
incentives for Western European
firms to build -turnkey plants"
in Eastern Europe and
the
Soviet Union (Bertsch and Elliott,
1988).
These plants are
exported as complete facilities
and are installed and
equipped on site by Western technical
specialists.
This
type of technology transfer became
an issue during the

Reagan Administration because it is

a

transaction that

necessarily involves the transfer of Western
know-how
particularly in the area of manufacturing design
and

production processes.

in addition it is an ongoing and

active transfer of technology because of the
training etc.,
supplied to staff the facilities.
While the business community in the United States

expressed an interest in expanding East-West trade, there
appeared to be little public support for such an opening.
In addition, most members of Congress continued to cast such
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an expansion as a .orally
questionable move.

The John son

Administration attempted to
highlight the potential
benefit.s
of East-west trade, and
to sway Congress by
commissioning a
Special Committee on U.S. Trade
Relations
'

'

with Eastern

Europe and the Soviet Union.

The Committee was chaired
by

Irwin Miller, a businessman
from the mid-west. The
committee of twelve included
representatives from academia,
business, and banking. The
xiic niiier
Miller Keport,
R P nnrf
released in 1965,
concluded that:
J.

•3

The time is ripe to make more
active
arrangements as political instruments use of trade
in relations
with Communist countries. Trade
should be brought
e P° llc y ar ea.
should be offered or
°
J
H
withheld,
purposefully and systematically as
opportunities and circumstances warrant
This
requires that the President be in a
position
to remove
trade restrictions on a selective and
discretionary
basis or reimpose them, as justified
by our relations
S
with individual Communist countries.

^

Two elements of this Report are noteworthy.

First,

the report called for "differentiation"
between Communist
states in the export control program. The
President was to
be given discretionary power to impose or
remove controls

based on calculations of United States interest.

This view,

which had been articulated by the Kennedy Administration,

diverged from the view underlying the earlier economic

warfare program.

Export controls were not to be imposed on

states simply by virtue of the fact that they were
Communist, but were to be imposed discriminatingly on states

that posed identifiable threats to United States interests.
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in other words,

this new image diverged
fro, the image of a
monolithic communism" that
McKitterick says donated
"the
mind of Congress and the
public" during the 1950s
(Mckitterick, p. 29 1966)
The second noteworthy
of the the Miller Report
is the fact that it
justified
liberalization of controls on
instrumental grounds.
Gr0 wing
intra-Western economic competition
may have led the business
community to raise criticisms of
the United states' more
restrictive program, but the
justification of the
,

.

reconsideration of export controls was
cast in
instrumentalist terms. Mastanduno says

that this was

because it was impossible to justify
the expansion of
East-West trade on the grounds of commercial

interests

alone.

He says it was also evidence that the
issue of

United States trade with the Eastern bloc is
an inherently
political issue. Many of the Western European
states had

been more receptive of the "peaceful coexistence"
overtures
from the U.S.S.R..

Many of these states had expanded trade

with the East and had justified their position simply by

claiming that mutual economic benefits should be separate
from East-West political or strategic considerations.
The Miller Report also expressed elements of what

have called a neo-Kantian discourse by concluding:
The intimate engagement of trade, over a considerable
period of time, when taken with the process of change

I
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Communist societies'
11
t0 OUr
purpose and to world "onrpatL^f^rabL't^
pea e
?
° f * he feW
channels available to'
1Ve cont acts
with nations with whom wp finSconstruct^
2
hostil ity.
the long run, selected trade
and wisely administered?
may' turn
of our most powerful toils
"
of national
Y
(Department of state Bulletin Mav in poUcv
855;
quoted in Hardt and Holliday?'p
P

L

j

m
in^?^
ou^tfn^T^*^
^
7,

^973)

'

'

The first part of this paragraph,
insofar as trade is
seen as leading to greater
harmony between nations, is
expressive of a neo-kantian discourse.
The last sentence of
the paragraph, however, is more
directly expressive of an
instrumentalist discourse. The paragraph
articulates
questions that would be posed in the
Congressional debates
that would occur throughout the
detente period.
First, to

what degree should political detente
precede economic
detente? Secondly, should trade concessions

be tied overtly

and tightly to specific political
concessions?

Thirdly, to

what degree should detente, trade-linkage
policies, and
relaxations on export controls be tied to Eastern
bloc

internal political affairs as opposed to foreign
policy
issues?

The Nixon and the Carter Administrations
answered

these questions differently.

This resulted in domestic,

Western alliance, and Soviet responses peculiar to each
Administration's brand of detente.
After the Miller Report was released, the Johnson

Administration moved to attempt to push legislation through
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^

Congress to liberalize
East . West
give the President discretion

over the

relaxation of export controls.

In the

regulations

position

SWer

^^
^

or

Qf 1965

Johnson Administration,
arguing that the United
states
needed to build bridges
between the Eastern bloc
and the
Western Alliance, began to
formulate the East-West
Trade
Relations Bill of 1966. This
legislation would have
provided a framework for the
expansion

of trade by lifting

import controls and by providing
credits in see cases.
Events in Southeast Asia and
the "Great Society" program,
however, overshadowed the
Johnson East-West trade
liberalization vision and the bill
died.
Not until a strong
coalition emerged in Congress to
support liberalization
did

United States policy actually shift.
The major push for the reform of
the Export Control
Act of 1949 came from the Senate
Committee on Banking and
Currency. Senators Walter Mondale
(D-Minn) and Harrison

Williams (D-N.J.) were instrumental in the
political
maneuvering that lead to the passage of the

new Export

Administration Act in 1969. According to William
Long
31,

1989),

(p.

Congress passed this legislation in response to

new and more vociferous business demands for access
to

Eastern bloc markets.

Support for the bill was not

overwhelming, but it did represent

a

significant shift in

the position of Congress on the issue of East-West trade.

.
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This change reflected in
part the relative erosion
of the
United States in the international
economic hierarchy.
Business leaders, fro* the high
technology sectors in
particular, argued at Senate
hearings in 1969 that United
States firms "could no long afford
to ignore the rapidly
growing Eastern European markets"
(Long,
32
p.

i 98 9)

,

Several business officials in Senate
hearings pointed out
that the content and procedures of
United States export
control program adversely affected
their firms' ability to
compete with the Japanese and Western
Europe.

m

1968 the

"United States controlled 2,029 commodity
categories for
export to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and the Soviet
Union, and 1,753 categories for Poland
and Rumania, while in
that same year COCOM had designated only
552 categories
for

control" (Long,

1989).

31,

p.

Senator Gale McGee expressed the sentiment of
the
supporters of liberalization saying:
I think instead of being anti-Communist
quite so
vociferously, we ought to start thinking precapitalist
or probusmess
I think our creeping capitalism
ought to be unleashed (quoted in Mastanduno, p. 196
.

1985)

.

.

'

.

By 1969 the United States balance of trade and balance
of payments surplus had been eroded.

While an expansion of

trade with the Eastern bloc stood to increase the trade

surplus only marginally, any constraints on exports were
seen as symbolically significant.

The final bill

212

established that controls should
only be imposed if a
product presented "a significant
contribution to the
military potential of any other
nation or nations which
would prove detrimental to the
national security of the
United States" (Jacobsen,
p. 214, 1985).
The legislate.on
also stipulated that controls
should be imposed

only in
cases where no comparable product
could be obtained from a
foreign supplier.
Export restrictions were defined
a:
is
acceptable in six cases: a) Where the
United States economy
would be protected from drains of scarce
materials;
b)

Where the United States would be protected
from the
inflationary impact of foreign demand; c)
Where necessary
to further United States foreign policy;
d) Where necessary
to fulfill international obligations; e) Where
controls

would ensure national security (Long,
exceptions were intended to signal

a

p.

34,

1989).

These

recognition by Congress

that the United States had to maintain some level of

controls in the interest of national security.
In fact the exceptions to the law provided the

Executive leeway in carrying out the Congressional demands
for trade liberalization.

The bill did reflect a desire on

the part of a majority in Congress to move away from the

economic warfare and restrictive embargo of the past and
towards a liberalization program.

The rationale for the

change that was laid out in the 1969 bill included

a

variety
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of arguments already
articulated by tne
Executive b ranc h in
the early l 960s (Jacobsen
,

p.

214

,

1985)

„

.

^

the economic rationale
that ultimately turned
Congress away
£rom the more restrictive
position on export controls
and
the embargo program.
the earlier period of
the Cold War
economic warfare program,
business interest groups

m

resistance to controls had been
minimal.

This was because

first,

Eastern markets were insignificant
in relation to the
growing Western European markets
and secondly, because of
the strong Cold War anti-communist
consensus.
As the

economic state of affairs and the
image of the Sino-Soviet
bloc changed (as the discourse
shifted)
so,

too did the

Place and possibility of interest
group input in policy
formation on this issue.
Nixon-Kissinger's Lin k agezDetent e strate
gy
and COCOM Controls
In 1969 the executive branch
agreed with the reasoning

that led members of Congress and business
officials to
support passage of the EAA, but disagreed
with the

conclusion that the United States should thus
move to
relaxations of controls without using such a move

as part of

a

tactical maneuver in

a

broader strategy of managing

superpower relations.
The Nixon Administration believed that political

concessions should precede trade concessions.

Henry

214

^

^singer

argued that the £xecutive
liberalization because the
Kremlin .-would (first)
have to
show restraint on its
international conduct and
arrange for
Progress on key foreign policy
issues."
.-only after the
Soviet union cooperated
with us in the political
field,"
Kissinger argued, would it
be prudent to extend
economic
concessions (quoted in Jentleson,
p. 133
1986).
,

As a

consequence of these views,
the Nixon Administration
used
discretionary power given to the
Executive in the 1969 EAA
to move rather gradually on
liberalization
of export

controls.

Not until 1972 did the Nixon
Administration
establish the framework for trade
expansion in the
U.S. -Soviet Trade agreement
(Bertsch, 1983; Jocbson, 1985).
The Nixon Administration viewed
trade as a political
instrument, and did not move on the
issue until it was
satisfied that it would receive quid
pro guos that would
fulfill political objectives. The primary
objectives of the

Administration concerned Vietnam, arms control,
Berlin, and
the Middle East. All of these areas involved
strictly
foreign policy issues.

The Nixon Administration, unlike

Congress in the 1970s, was much more interested in
using
trade concessions for compliance on issues in the arena
of
foreign policy and was much less interested in establishing

specific quid pro guos on what it considered to be Soviet

domestic political issues.
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The logic and assumptions
of the Administration
Position and its relation to
the United statesstand on
export controls and COCOM are
complex issues. According
to
Kissinger, the challenge of
American foreign policy
was to
take advantage of Soviet needs
and desires to establish
"a
web of constructive relationships(Bertsch and Mclntyre,
1983).
The Nixon Administration argued
that the United
States had opportunities for
leverage as a result of the
fact that since the early 1960s
the Soviet Union "had sought
to expand trade with the West as
a shortcut to modern

technology and capital development(Bertsch and Mclntyre,
1983).
The fact that Western European states
with

comparable technology were willing to sell
such items to the
Soviets at no political cost, however,
seemed to undermine

any perceived American leverage.

producers still held

a

But the fact that American

significant technological lead in

some areas, such as oil and gas exploration
and production

equipment, and the apparently poorer performance of
the

Soviet economy in the late 1960s seemed to offer

window of opportunity.

a new

The Nixon-Kissinger detente linkage

logic was based on the idea that the Soviet leadership

wanted

a

normalization of trade relations for both symbolic

reasons (Mastanduno, 1985) and to improve civilian sector
production.

Kissinger seemed to believe that by normalizing

trade relations the United States could confer great power
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legitimacy on the SQviet
Unlon (Mastanduno> i985>
the soviet motivation
or incentive, the
Nixon-Kissinger
position represented the
assumption that the Soviet
Union
could be brought to accept
"the constraints
_

^

and

responsibilities of

a

stable world order through

a

sophisticated combination of
pressures and inducements"
(=addis, P-

310,

1982).

caddis says that critics
of the
Nixon-Kissinger view said that
it resembled a B.F.
Skinner
approach to pig e ons where
"there would be incentives
for
good behavior, rewards if
such behavior occurred, and
punishments if not » (Gaddis,
p. 310, 1982).
Perhaps

behavioralist notions and the
conceptualization of the state
as a unitary rational actor
did influence the
pre-

suppositions of the more optimistic
versions of detente, but
calling Kissinger a behavioralist
goes too far.
Kissinger
more than likely had Castlereagh and
Metternich
in mind

rather than B.F. Skinner.
The Soviet leader stated repeatedly
that they would
not accept any linkage of trade to
political issues. The
trade inducement strategy, however, seemed
to result in some
concrete responses by the Soviets in the early
1970s. In May
1971,

the Soviets offered concessions in the SALT talks
by

dropping their demand that an ABM treaty precede any
agreement on a limitation of offensive strategic missiles
(Jentleson,

1986).

Similarly the Soviet Union agreed to
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allow the unimpeded flow
of goods between West
and East
Berlin.
addition, in response to
the United states
bombing and mining operations
in North Vietnam in
1972
the
Soviet union did not walk out
of the Soviet-American
summit
as had been predicted.
Brezhnev in fact promised
the United
States that he would pressure
the North Vietnamese to
make a
serious effort to negotiate a
settlement within a specified
period of time. Marshall Goldman
said that "in

m

the Soviet

scheme of things, the toleration
of the escalation of U.S.
violence in Vietnam was an unfortunate
part of the price the
Soviet Union was prepared to pay to
obtain the American
imports it needed- (Goldman, 1982;
Jentleson,
p.

134,

1986).

While it is difficult to establish
whether or not these
Soviet concessions were related to
their desire to increase
trade, the Nixon Administration responded
by offering trade
concessions.
in response to Soviet signs of
collaboration,
the Nixon Administration pushed ahead
the approval of a

number of export licenses for items that were
subject to
COCOM and United States controls. This included

a license,

denied on three separate occasions, to export
sophisticated
gear- cutting machinery for the Kama River truck
plant
(Mastanduno, p. 211,

1985).

By late 1972 these signs of Soviet willingness to

moderate their position for the sake of maintaining

stability in the broader relationship seemed to satisfy the

.
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Nixon Administration.

During tnat year

^

Nixon

Administration began to move
from selective
relaxations and
concessions to a more general
program on liberalization
A
Joint Soviet-united States
Commercial Commission was
set up
to negotiate an overall
trade
treatment including

a

reciprocal most favored nation
agreement, a program for
government credits, provisions
for the establishment
of
business facilities to promote
trade, and establishment
of
mechanism for settling commercial
disputes
(Hardt and

Holliday,

1973).

Secretary of Commerce Peter

report on these negotiations
offered

economic arguments for establishing
economic cooperation program.

a
a

G.

Peterson's

mix of political and
more comprehensive

After setting out the

familiar linkage position, Peterson
stated:
e industrial and technological
development of
th^o^
the other ma: or economies, the U.S.
no longer has the
monopoly it once enjoyed in the production
of certain
goods
Our overall trade balance is a melancholy
reminder of these changed circumstances.
The
increased availability of high technology
products
elsewhere rendered some of our original curbs
on
exports to the Soviet Union increasingly
anachronistic. The real loser from these particular
restraints would have increasingly been the U.S.
producer and worker, not the Soviet consumer or the
Soviet economy. There comes a point at which we must
face the fact that business is business, and, if it
is going to go on in any event, we might as well have
a piece of the action (Peterson, p. 10, 1973)

The effectiveness of the expansion of U.S. -East bloc

trade depended on Export-Import Bank financing of exports
and MFN treatment for Soviet goods.

These concessions

a
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required Congressional approval.

a9reeaent

The U.S. -Soviet trade

m ° re Particularly the
MFN issue got caught
up

in congressional
reassertiveness to counter the
"imperial

presidency" and the erosion of
foreign policy consensus
over
Vietnam.
The issue of Soviet Jews'
freedom to emigrate
became the focal point as Senator
Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)
led the move to block the
new economic
relationship.

The

Joint Commission and other
Administration negotiations on
this issue had excluded any
Congressional input.
The

opposition to this argument that arose
in Congress reflected
resentment over this fact and the
convergence of a number of
forces and ideas.
The passage of the Jackson-Vanik
amendment reflected
an opposition to the realpolitik
and instrumentalist quality
of the Kissinger-Nixon detente trade
linkage strategy
(Stern,

1979).

what Samuel

P.

The Amendment also reflected opposition
to

Huntington called "laissez faire detente"

which he says was based on an exaggerated sense
of

compatibility (Huntington, 1978).

Through Jackson-Vanik the

old Cold War contingent and a faction that Holsti
and

Rosenau have called the post-Cold War liberal
internationalists expressed their disagreement with what
they saw as an amoral foreign policy strategy.

By linking

MFN status to the issue of Jewish emigration, Henry Jackson
was able to bring together

a

wide range of interest groups,
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ethnic,

ideological, and economic,
that had been

traditionally in opposition
on
groups successfully countered
tactic of the Executive.

a

number of issues.

These

the preferred foreign
policy

In addition

^

Senate
able to pass legislation
that limited Eximbank
financing for
the soviet union to 300
$
million and gave the Congress
veto
authority over all single credits
over $50 million.
Kissinger stated that the Senate
Committee
,

had to

understand that "the domestic
practices of the Soviet Union
are not necessarily related to
detente which we primarily
relate to foreign policy." This

position, he said, was not

a

disregard for moral issues, but

a

recognition "of our

ability to produce internal change in
foreign countries"
(Kissinger, p.
1986)

.

145,

1974; quoted in Jentleson,
p.

The Senate was not persuaded.

142,

When the

Jackson-Vanik amendment was finally passed in
1974, the
Soviet Union renounced the 1972 bilateral
trade agreement.
The passage of this bill reflected the fact
that powerful

elements of the American public, long accustomed to
viewing
Soviet-U.S. conflicts as

a

broader struggle of good vs.

evil, was unwilling to accept openly a full trade

liberalization program without seeing

a

radical

transformation in Soviet society.
Despite Jackson-Vanik, the Nixon Administration's

approach had resulted in greatly expanded U.S. -Eastern bloc
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trade. Exports to the Soviet
Union alone reached
$2 billion
between 1972 and 1974; that
represented 70% more than
had
been exported in the previous
twenty-five years combined
(Jentleson, p. 146/ 1986).
addition the United States
list of embargoed items dropped
from 550 categories to 73
categories by 1973 (Mastanduno,
p. 212,

m

1985).

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment
demonstrated the limits of
the effectiveness of the trade
instrument.
The number of
exit visas for Jewish emigration
issued by the Soviet Union
decreased as a result of the Jackson-Vanik
amendment from
35,000 in 1973 to 13,221 in 1975 (Stern,
p. 121 and 149,
1979; Jentleson, 1986).
The overt tactical linkage to
Soviet domestic political issues was well
beyond the

threshold of diminishing returns for the
detente strategy.
The Nixon-Kissinger approach to detente
was

dashed on

the rocky shores of domestic constraints.

The effectiveness

of Kissinger's vision of trade links was contingent
on

executive control and discretion over offering or

withdrawing concessions.

Despite Kissinger's success in

centralizing control in the NSC staff on

a

number of issues

he was unable to retain such control on the guestion of

East-West trade and export regulations.

The overall

breakdown in the domestic foreign policy consensus resulted
in disarray on the rationale for the policy on East-West

trade controls in the United States.

Because authority over
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export controls was spread
among several agencies
there were
highly divergent opinions as
to the rationale of
the United
States domestic export control
program.
By the mid
1970s

United States policy appeard
to be confused.
At the
inter-allied level the United states
wavered on its position
in COCOM and began to help
undermine the integrity of the
multilateral control program by
giving
procedures.

Western European states in the
late 1960s and early
1970s also began to follow a program
of economic detente.
The conceptualization of detente
by most of the Western
European leadership, however, differed
from
that of the

United States.

There was much less of

a

concern with seeing

political concessions proceed economic
liberalizations
(Jacobsen and Notzold, 1986). Western
European officials,
such as West German Chancellor Brandt,
were willing to
encourage trade with the hope that in the long
run economic
interaction would create incentives to reduce
political
conflict.

During the 1970s Germany increased its trade with

Eastern bloc states tenfold and became the Soviet Union's
largest Western trading partner.

Most Western European

governments were willing to offer

a

variety of programs to

encourage large scale ventures by firms into the Eastern

European market.
The political motivation for opening to the East was

perhaps secondary to the economic pull.

The oil crisis of
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1973 and the recession that
followed until

l 975 provided
strong motivation for
Western European states
to seek ways
of expanding exports
and to find non-OPEC

oil sources.

The

Western European states thus
entered into the Eastern
bloc
market in a big way. The
percentage of trade in
aggregate
t6rmS aPPSarS rather

-^nificant

accounting,

for example,
for around 6% and 4% of
total exports in the
1970s for West
Germany and France respectively
(see table 4:2).
However,
in dollar terms,

in terms of the size of
the joint Venturis

and projects, and in terms of
the percentage of exports
for
particular sectors in these states'
economies, the figures
are quite significant.
The Soviet Union sought
to use

Western technology to modernize its
industrial sectors.

As

result, the Soviet Union's demand
focused on items such as
capital goods and machine tools.
In addition, many Western
a

European firms in the steel, aluminum,
and chemical sectors
signed major contracts for turnkey plants.
France's

Rhone-Poulenc and Technip landed contracts that
totaled $1.7
billion to build chemical plants in the Soviet Union.
Italy's ENI and Montedison also landed contracts totaling
$1.8 billion to build eleven chemical plants.

Britain's

John Brown and Davy Powergas and West Germany's Salzgitter
and Klocker signed similar contracts (Mastanduno,
1985; Zaleski and Wienert, p. 223,

1980).

p.

243,

French and German

consortia also landed contracts for deals to build some of
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TABLE 4.2

Western Trade with the
Soviet Union

1

-L

UK

Q7A
y /u

248

1971

1972

222

225

FRG 356

484

FR

319

313

IT

313

291

US

115

144

1973

1974

237

264

510

($

540

millions)

508

978

1236

689

1037

1838

2700 2627 2366

2880 3483

423

610

718

1110 1224 1226

1426 1826

284

413

714

1093

933 1072

1256 1316

557

1390

747

2027 2657 1711

2340 3793

TOTAL TRADE

UK

713

672

673

971

1116

FRG 604

776

1010

1691

3002

3984

4176

4026 5072 6868

FR

459

529

657

980

1244

1797

2551

2339 2655 4003

IT

524

550

559

843

1504

1977

2352

2553 2884 3288

US

179

204

649

1577

981

2217

2921

2080 2714 4328

1329

1634

1809 2232

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade
Yearbook, 1970-1980 and Micheal Mastanduno p. 230, 1985

2905

225

the largest steel and
aluminum plants in the
world.
These
contracts with the Germans
and the French alone
totaled over
billion.
$2
western European firms also
took advantage of
the United States .ore
restrictive controls to pick
up
contracts that U.S. firms had been
forced to scrap
for

several computer and telecommunications
projects.
Finally,
Western European firms such as
Mannesmann and Cruesot-Loirl
aided the Soviet's in oil and gas
production by building
plants and selling large diameter
pipe.
Between
1970 and

1974 alone Mannesmann exported over
$1.5 billion worth of
steel pipe to the Soviet Union.

All of these states except West Germany
were willing
to provide heavily subsidized export
credits to the Soviet

Union for these types of projects.

This was despite the

fact that the O.E.C.D. countries had agreed
in 1976 to raise
the official rate for large-scale export
credits to the

Soviet Union (Pearce, 1980; Mastanduno,
Crawford,

1988).

p.

247,

1985;

The large contracts for turnkey plants and

the provision of credits for such projects had the
effect of

creating long-term interests in maintaining relatively
normal trade relations between Eastern and Western Europe.

Large and influential Western European firms developed

significant economic interests in the Eastern European
market.

Western European political leaders who pursued

bilateral detente programs argued that the political
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benefits for East-West relatione;
vexations w^n^
would u
become noticeable
over the long term. Western
European economic interests,
however, had seen rather
immediate returns; and these

groups

were no doubt willing to apply
ff-y pressure on n.'
their governments
to recognize the potential
domestic political costs
of

changing their stand on East-West
trade for foreign policy
reasons.
Before we turn to assess the
implications of these
developments on the multilateral export
control program in
detail, a brief analysis of Carters'
version of
detente is

in order because of its contrast
with the Nixon-Kissinger

strategy.

Jimmy C arter and East-West Trade

Many analysis believe that the Carter
administration
had

more comprehensive approach to economic
diplomacy than
the Nixon-Kissinger trade linkage strategy
(Bertsch,
a

1982;

Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson, 1988).

Jentleson and Bertsch

state that Carter's economic diplomacy expanded the
agenda
of political issues linked to trade concessions to
include

human rights and intervention in the Third World.

Mastanduno acknowledges this change, but is more concerned
to point out that Carter's program was based on different

presuppositions about the potential for the effectiveness of
United States economic leverage.

The Kissinger-Nixon

approach was based on the idea that the United States had
leverage potential in symbolic terms because of the ability
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to bestow superpower prestige
on the Soviets by
granting
them equal trade status. The
Carter Administration,
however, attempted to identify
and to manipulate whit
they
believed to be actual United States
economic and

technological advantages.

m

order for the Carter approach

to be effective, the United
States had to have a monopoly
on
items or technologies essential to
the Soviet Union, or it

had to have the ability to convince
allied states with
similar technologies to participate in
a coordinated
tactical linkage strategy to obtain common
interest

political goals.

Carter was not able to convince the
allies

to follow in such a program.

Unfortunately for many United

States high technology firms, however, the
Carter

Administration believed that Western European states
would
follow if the United States showed leadership
by
accepting

disproportionate costs by denying its technology to the
Soviets.
The actual result was that many Western

European

firms picked up contracts for projects that United
States
firms were forced to scrap.

From 1977 to 1978 total United

States nonagricultural trade with the Soviets dropped 32%
from $819 million in 1977 to $562 million in 1978.

In

industrial machinery and transportation equipment the total

decline in only two years was some 33% (Brougher,
445,

1980; Jentleson,

151,

1986).

p.

421 and
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The carter approach to
United States-Soviet
relati,Lons
was set out in Presidential
Directive No. 18 of August
1977.
The economic diplomacy
component was more fully
articulated by ranking NSC
official Samuel Huntington
in a
1978 article entitled: "Trade,
Technology and Leverage:
Economic Diplomacy.' (Huntington,
1978).
Huntington
contended that it was time to
take advantage of United
States economic strength and
technological superiority to
encourage Soviet cooperation in
resolving regional conflicts
and reducing tensions.
short, he says,
.

m

.'economic

capabilities must serve the basic
foreign policy objectives
of the United States- such as
"containing
Soviet

expansionism and promoting American values"
(Huntington,

p.

Huntington also says that the United
States must
use "conditioned flexibility." He
maintained
65,

1978).

that the

Soviet economy was in its worst crisis
since the Revolution.
Rather than reform, however, the Soviets, he
argued, would
continue to turn to Western technology on which
thay had

become increasingly dependent.
In more straightforward terms the Carter

Administration approach differed from the Nixon approach in
three ways.

First,

it differed in terms of the type and the

detail quid pro guos that would be demanded from the Soviet

Union in exchange for relaxations on export controls.

According to Huntington the time had come to demand
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immediate Soviet responses
on

a

wide array of issues

"economic de tente and military
adventurism could not go
hand
in han d for long."
The Administration
believed that
"validated licenses should be
required
for all items of

machinery and technology for
which the Soviets have a
critical need, and for which
they are largely dependent
on
United States supply- (Huntington,
p.

76

,

1978)

.

Tnis VQuld

allow the Administration to
control these technologies
on
foreign policy grounds; "regardless
of the extent to which
they are likely to be used for
military purposes."
The

Administration believed that this would
include, in
particular, oil and gas technology
and equipment and
computer technology.
Secondly, the Carter Administration
wanted to
formalize the centralization of export
regulations and

East-West trade policy in the NSC by forming

a

special

section in the Council to deal with East-West
export control
issues.
This was necessary, argued NSC officials,
in
order

to give the Executive flexibility in using
carrots or sticks
on the Soviets.
In other words, Carter Administration

officials, particularly in the NSC wanted to, acknowledge

formally and to use the fact that East-West trade policy was
a

hostage to politics.

Huntington and Brzezinski, were not

only suspicious of the ability of Congress to formulate an

effective approach; they also viewed the Commerce Department
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as being controlled by
adventurist commercial
interest,-s and
the State Department as
staffed by l iberals
without an
understanding of the nature
of East-West issues.
The se wsc
officials, however, found it
very difficult to maintain
effective control over the
extensive process that had
by
this time come to include
several different agencies
in
Commerce, state, and the DOD,
and several powerful

Congressional Committees.
Finally, the Carter Administration
put muoh greater
emphasis on getting allied states
to go along with controls.
The Sperry computer case is
illustrative of the allies'
response.
1978 the Carter Administration
retracted a
validated license it had granted to
Sperry to export an

m

advanced computer to the Soviet Union.

The computer was

designed to increase TASS data processing
capabilities for
the 1980 Olympics.
The Administration publicly requested
its allies to fall in line and not
allow its firms to fill
the order.
The French and the Germans responded
publicly

rebuffing Carter.

They stated in no uncertain terms that

they would not subordinate trade in commercial
goods to

"political considerations."

Shortly after the

Administration's unilateral action, Thomson CSF of France
agreed to supply the Soviets with
Mastanduno, 1985)

.

a

comparable system (see

In oil and gas equipment the story was

much the same. In response to the Soviet arrests of American
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businessman

F

.

Jay C rawford

,

and Anatoly shcharansky

^

charges of crimes against
the state, the Carter
Administration froze Dresser
Industries' export license
to
export a turnkey rock drill
bit plant to the
Soviets
(Transfer of Tecnnology and
the Dresser Industries
Export
Licensing Actions, 95th Cong.,
2nd sess., October
3, 1978)
It appeared that Carter
was holding fast to

his stand on the
issue and supporting the NSC
staff approach to the use
of
export controls for foreign
policy purposes.

Carter, however, began to
reconsider his position
quite quickly.
September 1978 he reversed his
decision
on the Dresser case and began
to urge the Commerce

m

Department ahead on the approval of
license applications.
for this change.

There are

a

a

number of validated

number of explanations

First, there was arguably an
improvement

in United States-Soviet relations.

There was movement in

the SALT II talks and the Soviets
had agreed to allow
Crawford to leave the country. The most
important reason
for Carter's changed stand was that
it had become apparent
that the allies were not going to follow
United States

leadership on the institution of controls for
foreign policy
reasons.
Western European officials did not share
the

United States view of the nature of the Soviet threat
nor
did they believe it legitimate or effective to demand
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specific

^m^

from the Soviets

^ ^ ^^^^^

when such demands concerned
Soviet domestic issues.
in addition, United
states industry leaders
had
Pointed out in Congressional
hearings that there was
in fact
foreign availability in many
of the types of items
that the
Carter Administration was
attempting to control (Use
of
Export Controls and Export
Credits for Foreign Policy
Purposes: Hearings. 95th Cong.,
2nd sess.
1978).

m

early
1977 many United States oil and
gas firms lost sales as
a
result of the licensing delays
that resulted from inept

processing procedures and the NSC
strategy.
of Texas,

for example,

NL Industries

lost a contract valued at over
half a

million dollars to Technip of France
because of licensing
delays designed to enhance Huntington's
"conditioned
flexibility" strategy. William Verity,
chairman of Armco
Inc.

argued that this lost sale alone cost the
United States
$15 million in capital formation, $225 million in
balance of

payments, and 10,000 jobs (Verity, 1978).

it appeared that

in the face of widening trade deficits and
with the prospect

of continuing lost sales to Western European firms,
the

Carter Administration became willing to abandon its hopes of
effective political leverage, and to allow American firms to

compete for the Eastern bloc market.

The Administration was

willing to do this even if it meant trading strategically
sensitive technologies.

This attempt by the Administration
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to control East-West
trade for foreign
policy purposes was
once again a situation in
which international
economic
competition, a divergence in
understanding of the nature
of
the Soviet threat between
the allies, and domestic
political
pressure undermined the well-laid
plans of tactical linkage
The result of this swing
pattern between the more
liberal
form of detente and the more
close-knit tactical linkage
of
Carter, a pattern George Shultz
called "light switch

diplomacy," was radical fluctuations
in United StatesEastern bloc trade. The consequences
of this pattern also
had a significant and lasting impact
on the COCOM program.
COCOM in The Late iQ7n c

During the late 1970s COCOM became
conflict ridden.
There still seemed to be a consensus on
the part of the

Western allies that

a

control organization of some type was

necessary to prevent West-East trade in
strategically
sensitive technologies with direct military
applications.
The weakening of COCOM as an effective multilateral

export

control organization during this period is evidenced,
however, by the fact that there were fundamental conflicts

over its rules and principles.

There is also evidence of

widespread non-compliance as the Soviets were able to
acquire large amounts of strategically significant
technologies.

This was no doubt due in part to effective

Soviet Acquisition networks.

Finally, COCOM member states
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accused each other of not being
genuinely interested in
maintaining the control program.
This weakening of COCOM,
during the 1970s, has
been
explained by Micheal Mastanduno
as a consequence of the
fact
that the United states became
unwilling to exercise
leadership in the COCOM program.
He argues that once the
United States indicated its was
willing to relax its
restrictions on strategic trade,
other Western powers
followed.
This was because they saw the
United States
behavior as a justification of
strategies of trade
liberalization.
There is certainly some truth in
this
interpretation in that the United States
did compromise the
integrity of COCOM. Once the United
States began to move
away from the broader economic denial
or economic warfare
program in the 1960s its position in COCOM
became confused.

This process, as we have noted above, began
in the Kennedy

Administration. In addition, like so many other
elements of
United States foreign policy, once the number of
domestic

players involved increased in the late 1960s, the export
control system became more complex and at points paralyzed.
Mastanduno' s explanation falls short, however, in that
it does not include a full consideration of the importance

of the intensification of intra-Western trade competition as
a

factor that helped to undermine strong commitments to

COCOM.

In addition,

his explanation does not include a
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consideration of the changing
perception of the Soviet
bloc
and the belief, held by
Western European
officials, that

trade relations could produce
Soviet moderation or
concessions.
It is arguable whether
or not the other COCOM
states would have even followed
if the United
Stat,
:es was

willing to exercise strong
leadership for
embargo.
The Carter example is
a

a

more extenisive
:

case in point.

During the
1980s the United States was willing
to provide leadership
for strengthening COCOM.
Soviet actions and the

international environment, however, had
brought clear
changes in the perceptions and beliefs
of the Western
European leadership.
in addition the United States
signaled
its willingness to use leverage if
persuasion
failed.

During the 1970s the United States
requested more
exceptions to multilateral controls than any
member of
COCOM. in 1974 a total of 1,380 exception
requests were

submitted to COCOM.

Of this total 567 requests were

submitted by the United States.

In 1975,

1,798 cases were

submitted and the United States requested 798 of these
exceptions.

During these years 32 exception requests were

denied and in each case this was
opposition.

In some years

a

result of United States

(1976-1978) the United States

requested more exceptions than the total of all of the other

member states combined (Mastanduno,

p.

260,

1985; Export

Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review, 94th Cong. 2nd
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sess., March 15,

1976)

.

^

This number did

^

"administrative exceptions" of
lower end technologies
at
national discretion.
By 1977 C0C0M was
granting exceptions
to controls on strategically
significant technologies at
a
rate of over $300 million
per year.
The great majority of
exception requests that were
submitted during

the 1970s were

approved.

When asked why the United
States had begun to
submit more requests, the Director
of the State Department's
office of East-West trade said
that this reflected the
"growing commercial interest among
American companies in
developing the Communist country
»
market
.

.

.

(Export

Licensing of Advanced Technology: A
Review, 94th Cong., 2nd
sess., March 15, 1976).
1974, for example,

m

of the 1,380

exception requests submitted to COCOM,
343 of them were for
United States computer sales.
In addition and perhaps ironically,

it was the United

States that led in using its veto to deny other
COCOM
states' exception requests.

On several occasions the United

States allowed its firms to export high technology
items to
the East bloc states while opposing exception requests
for

comparable exports to the same countries by COCOM partners
(Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review, 94th
Conq.

2nd sess., March 11,

1976).

In addition the United

States took longer than any COCOM state to respond to

exception requests.

In 1974,

the United States
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representative in COCOM postponed
taKing action on some
25
exception requests by Western
European

-nths.

m

states for several

highly competitive
international economic
environment such delays in many
cases resulted in lost
sales.
This pattern was detrimental
to maintaining the
multilateral consensus and added
to the perception that
the
United States was willing to use
COCOM and export controls
to serve its own commercial
interests.
Western European
states reacted strongly against
what they perceived as a
misuse of the veto power by the
United States
a

in COCOM.

The

French on several occasions threatened
to withdraw from
COCOM altogether if the United States
did not approve
certain exception requests. As a
consequence, the United
States reversed its position on two
exception cases covering
the export of semiconductor equipment
to an Eastern
European

country (Export Licensing of Advanced
Technology: A Review,
94th Cong. 2nd sess., March 11, 1976,
p.

6).

it was also

reported that the "United States had reached
an

understanding with COCOM countries that the United
States
objection (s) (to exceptions) would be merely for
the

record

as opposed to censure intended to stop the
transaction"

(Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review, 94th
Cong.

2nd sess, March 11, 1976, p. 47).

The fact that the multilateral export control program

became the victim of growing intra-Western export
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-.petition was aiso reflected

in the types Qf
technQlogies

ana ite ms that allied states
were willing to allow
fi r ms to
sell to the East.
The most widely
wxuexy Known
known cases involved
the
participation of numerous United
States firms in the
construction and outfitting of
the Kama and zil vehicle
Plants. These plants significantly
increased the Soviet
Union's ability to produce heavy
trucks, and it was known
that the vehicles produced in
these plants were to be used
by the military.
United States high technology
f irms were
also permitted to export computer
systems and state of the
art equipment to the Zil plant
where missile launchers were
produced (Proposed Legislation to
Establish an Office of
Strategic Trade, 96th Cong., 2nd sess.,
September 24, 1980).

^

In a perhaps more significant
case the United States allowed

the Bryant Grinder Corporation to
export machine tools used
to make precision anti-friction bearings
to the Soviet

Union.

Some critics of detente had argued that
these

bearings were essential to developing effective
guidance
systems for Soviet MIRVed ballistic missiles (Gufstafson,
PP

.

10-14,

1981).

By obtaining these machines the Soviet

Un ion acquired the capability to mass produce these

precision bearings.
In addition to these cases,

it should be pointed out

that the Soviet Union was able to use intra-Western economic

competition to its advantage.

Many of the East-West trade

.
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promotion programs developed
in the 1970s included
visits by
Soviet technical experts to
the
plants of

bidding for commercial ventures.

f irms

that were

DOD officials claimed
that

Soviet technical experts were
able to acquire sensitive
information in the course of such
visits.
Miles Costick
from the Institute on Strategic
Trade claimed before a
Senate hearing that in one case
Soviet technical
experts

that visited, the Boeing plant in
the 1970s wore "special
soles built on their shoes in which
they were picking up
various alloys used in the construction
of aircraft.
These
were to be taken back to the Soviet Union
to be analyzed"
(Proposed Legislation to Establish an Office
of Strategic
Trade, 96th Cong., 2nd sess.
September
,

25,

1980, p.

153)

Also in the context of the increased competition
for Eastern
bloc markets, Western firms often provided
strategically

significant technical data on the proposed project.

The DOD

was highly critical of this state of affairs and
claimed

that the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s had baen
able to

acquire strategically sensitive technical know-how from
firms eager to sale.

Despite the fact that the United States entered into

competition for Eastern bloc markets its domestic export
control licensing program seemed to be designed to do

anything but promote an expansion of East-West trade.

Matanduno argues that the complexity of the process to
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obtain an export license for

particularly suited to
bogging down

a

a

controlled item was

tactical linkage strategy.

By

proposed project in an extensive
bureaucratic
process officials could stall
on approval until
political
concessions were obtained.
Officials fro, Western European
firms and states, however,
viewed delays and denials on
export license requests as
products of commercial
a

and

intra-Western leverage considerations.

Holding up

a

license

or exception request application
could conceivably give
competitors time to undercut deals.
For United States
firms, however, these delays were
viewed as commercially
detrimental.
The delays resulted not from
cooperation

between the central state actors and firms
wishing to move
into Eastern bloc markets, but were
rather

the result of an

inept and overly complex bureaucratic
process.

As a result

of the nature of the export control
program there were

several layers of agency and inter-agency input
involving
the NSC, the State Department, the Commerce
Department, and
the Defense Department.

This weighed the system down and

led to delays of months on export license and exception

requests.

In a fast moving,

narrow, and highly competitive

market these types of delays were mortal. Steps were taken

throughout the 1970s to remedy this situation:
review deadlines were established,

a

mandatory

Technical Advisory

Committee (TAC) system made up of industry and government
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representatives was e^ahUcK^
established and mandatory
deregulation
based on foreign availability
was
enacted.

None of these

solutions seemed to solve
the licensing and
exception
request processing delays
in the 1970s.
Despite
congressional attempts to make
the process more conducive
to
trade liberalization, the
export control program
remained
under the firm control of the
Executive
(see Long,

1989).
It is true that this made
the export control system
more or

less subject to the foreign
policy agenda of the president.
The export control system,
however, also remained a
hostage
to entrenched bureaucratic
interests. As Graham Allison

pointed out:
Siti ° nS t kGn by each of the
^ncies appear
f
Caricature;
De fense officials vetoing any
he Can ? et a h andle on, if even
to delay for a
,
; years
couple
of
Communist acquisition of the
gy reflecting their earlier commitment to
Warfare against Socialist states; State
and
the White House, especially in the
Nixon period,
prepared to make an exception for almost
any item as
long as it appears in some way to
contribute to
detente: Commerce generally making
American firms'
S1 Ce
e technol °gy i* going to be sold
*nvh™ the nUnited States should at least
anyhow,
reap some of
the benefits from making the sale (Export
Licensing of
C
T e c hnolo 9Y 94th Cong., 2nd sess., March
11,

I^n^

^"°°

'

^

^

19?r

>

p

11

)

Conclusion

Each of the four theoretical explanations set out
in

chapter one contributes to our understanding of the dynamics
of alliance collaboration on East-West trade policy
in the

1964-1979 period.

From the vantage point of the modified
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structuralist view we see that
there was a shift in
issue
specific capability. The
United Statesdisproportionate
share of high technology
production began to be eroded
in
the mid to late l 960s
From the vantage point
of the market
explanation we see that intensified
economic competition led
Western firms and political
officials to believe
.

that

expanded East-West trade and
significant reductions on
export controls would serve their
interests.

Finally,

superpower strategic relations began
to change in the 1960s.
All of these factors came together
to undermine the

power of the absolutist discourse at
the domestic level.
Discourses that had been submerged
during

the 1950s in the

United States re-emerged.
involved

a

The late 1960s and early 1970s

clash of discourses in the United States
where

alternative policy visions were offered by
various groups.
Executive officials, beginning with the Kennedy
Administration, came to have

a

confidence in the

instrumental value of United States economic and

technological advantages over the Soviets.

The shift from

economic warfare to economic diplomacy was initiated by
elements in the Executive branch.

Congress and domestic

interest groups were divided, however, between those who

continued to adhere to an absolutist position and those more
inclined to

a

neo-kantian position.
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The policy vision of
the executive during
this period
legitimated a linkage
approach to East-West
trade.
Oespite
the sanguine hopes of
some members of the
Executive
however, factors at both
the alliance and domestic
level
undermined their program. By
1969, for example, the
continued intensification of
market competition helped
establish the conditions in
which the neo-kantian
discourse
camp gained the upper hand
in Congress.
The result
of this

shift was the passage of the
Export Administration Act.
The White House and the NSC
during the Nixon and
Carter Administrations remained
committed to linkage and an
instrumentalist discourse while the
Commerce and State
Departments became somewhat more
neo-Kantian.

At the intra-

allied institutional level it appears
that State Department
officials worked with Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
and

Ministry of Economics officials from
various European
governments to minimize conflicts. Recall
that COCOM

representatives began reaching tacit agreements
that the
vetoes in COCOM would only be for the record.
United States policy on East-West trade became

confused during this period.

At the international level

White House officials encountered opposition when they
attempted to get the Western Europeans to go along with an
instrumentalist linkage strategy.

At those points when

executive officials believed that they had domestic support
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and that a linkage strategy
would work with the
Soviets
they were unable to gain the
necessary cooperation
fror/the
allies.
This was not simply a
result
Qf

^.^

States leadership, but also
resulted from the fact
that
Western European leaders did
not share the American
understanding of the appropriate
relationship between EastWest trade and Western security.
one camp in Western
European had a policy vision that
was driven
by a neo-

kantian discourse.

The plausibility of this
discourse was
reinforced by the Soviet's peaceful
coexistence line and
complementarity of economic interests.
On the other hand
the policy vision of some Western
European groups was in
fact driven by an instrumentalist
discourse.
This linkage
vision was, however, limited in ends to
national interest

concerns as in the case of the Germans and
the French
instead of more comprehensive issues.
In conclusion then the shift in issue
specific

capability, intensified global economic competition,
and the

gradual change in the East-West strategic balance enhanced
the plausibility of the instrumentalist and the neo-Kantian

discourses in the United States.
absolutist discourse declined.

discourse camps emerged.

The result was that the
In this context contending

These camps drew on conflicting

images of the Soviet Union and divergent understandings of
the relationship between East-West trade and security.

They
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also advocated conflicting
policy packages. As
these groups
struggled to gain control
over the domestic
policy process
the United states position
became confused.
Attempts by the
executive to construct a common
purpose for Western policy
in the context of this
divergence of discourses
failed.

The

dyna mi cs of collaboration
that this situation
produced was
best expressed by Robert Wright,
Director of the Office of
East-West Trade in the state
Department in his testimony
before a 1976 Senate hearing:
there have been continuing
differences in th»
10
° f th6Se risks
the
Soviet
union
trade
S?^
with the ^
East bloc) internationally so that and
»
.
other countries in COCOK have not
Len
as
enthusiastic
about continuing a tight system of
control.
.

.

.

5

^

<

Over the years the scope and extent
of the COCOM control
has reduced.
We feel that by-and-large this
reduction
has been one that is justified in
terms of a realistic
evaluation of the essential items that
under control, while taking account of should be kert
the commercial
interests that other countries have and
that we have been
q, allY in recent years
(^rt
Licensing o?
c
Te
R ° view 94th cong " 2nd sess -'

!dv™TV

^%i

ii

,

$?^ui

'

Despite this assessment, the United states
turned in
the 1980s, to the use of compliance rents
and surveillance
in an attempt to bring allied states and
firms into line

with a more restrictive position on East-West
trade policy.

CHAPTER V

ADMINISTRATION:
POWER, INTERESTS
INSTITUTIONS, AND DISCOURSE

'

Following the invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 the
Carter Administration attempted
to gain allied collaboration
on economic sanctions against
the Soviet Union (Mastanduno,
1985).
The nature of the United States
initiatives and the
reluctance of the allies to follow
rested on a divergence of
opinion over the appropriate scope
and function of export
controls and over the relationship
between East-West trade
and Western security. As in the
past, this inter-allied
divergence of opinion resulted from conflicting

interpretations and representations of the nature
of the
Soviet threat to Western security.
These differences led to open inter-allied
conflict

during the Reagan Administration when an absolutist

discourse began to regain preponderance in United States
domestic debates over East-West trade and Western security
policy. The Reagan Administration moved to renew
of economic warfare against the Soviet Union.

a

strategy

This program

involved first an extensive reinvigoration of surveillance
on West-West high technology transfers.
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Defense Department
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and

Coerce

Department officials within
the Reagan
Administration also advocated the
use of coercive
instruments to bring allied states
into line with a
coordinated and more restrictive
export control strategy.
However, turning to these
instruments in the context
of a
radically changed global political
economy had far-reaching
economic and political repercussions
for United

States-Western alliance relations.
The purpose of this chapter is
threefold.

The first

part of the chapter reviews attempts
by the Carter
Administration to reinvigorate the United
States and the
COCOM export control program in 1980.
This part also

analyzes the sources and the nature of
United States
intra-governmental divergences of opinion on the
issue of
East-West trade in the 1980 -s. The second
part examines the
way in which some Reagan Administration
officials attempted
to bring allied states to accept a policy of
economic
warfare.

This includes an analysis of the instruments that

were drawn on to strengthen the United States position
in
negotiations, with the allies, particularly during the COCOM
list review in 1982-84.

During the Reagan Administration the inter-agency

balance of power in the export control system shifted away
from the State Department.

The State Department's

traditionally more conciliatory approach to negotiations

'
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with the allies was eclipsed
by an activist
alliance between
hard-line, unilateralist
officials in the Defense
and
Commerce Departments.
"Hard-line" in this context
refers to a belief that
nothing could be gained, in
econo»ic or political terms,
from East-West trade.
For hard-liners ending
East-West
trade was not vu±y
«=+->onlv in tne
i„
thp strategic
interest
of the West

but,

moral issue as well
wen. nff^^i.
Officials in this camp believed
that the West should use its
resources to isolate
economically the Soviet bloc states.
These officials
articulated an absolutist discourse
which they believed
legitimated an economic warfare strategy.
a

•

"Unilateralist" refers to

a

belief that the United

States should formulate an overall broad
export control and
embargo strategy and attempt to impose such
a strategy on
the allies.
Unilateralist officials believed
that if

necessary the United States should go it alone in
restrictive export control program.

I

a more

will show that during

the first Reagan Administration officials in this camp,
from

the DOD and the Commerce Department, were able to influence

decisions about negotiating tactics in COCOM and with

Western firms.

The United States in the early 1980s thus

turned to a coercive compliance extraction strategy with the

Western allies and some Western high-technology firms.

.
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use selective individuals
as representatives
of the
hard-line unilateralist
position that was held
more widely
by officials in the Reagan
Administration.
I refer here to
Casper Weinberger, Richard
Perle, Lawrence
I

Brady, and

Stephen Bryant.

These men not only most
clearly articulated
this vision, but they organized
and domined United states
policy on East-West export
controls.
The third part of this chapter
evaluates the
consequences and costs of turning
to such a strategy.
Advocates of East-West trade denial
and of tighter West-West
export control regulations generated
opposition at both the
domestic and inter-allied level. By
1985 East-West
strategic relations began to shift.
As the political,
economic, and competitive costs of the
more restrictive

United States position became apparent,
the Reagan

Administration attempted to repair damages by
turning to
more conciliatory line with the allies.

a

Hard-line

unilateralist officials in the Executive branch
began to
lose some power as a result of rising domestic

constraints,

allied opposition, and changes in overall East-West
relations
The Roots of the Attempt to
Expand COCOM After 1979

The Carter Administration met resistance when it

applied economic sanctions in response to the Soviet
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invasion of Afghanistan.

Domestically agricultural
and
high-technology interests addressed
the Carter move
(Bertsch,

At the alliance level
Western European
officials disagreed with both
Carter's response and with
his
view that the Soviet action
represented "the greatest
threat
to world peace since World
War II." Most leaders
shared
1985).

West German Chancellor Schmidt's
view; their governments
would not permit "ten years of
detente to be destroyed by
Afghanistan" (Mastanduno, p. 371
1985; Jacobsen,

1988).

The breakdown of consensus in
the United States
foreign policy community during the
late 1970s resulted in
intense debates over the detente
linkage approach to

East-West trade (Gaddis, 1984; Destler,
Gelb and Lake,
1984).
The invasion of Afghanistan served to

shift the

inter-agency balance of power on this issue
from officials
in the State and Commerce Departments
who supported

liberalized of linkage East-West trade policy to
officials
in the Department of Defense and the National
Security

Council who were critical of such economic interaction
(Bertsch,

1985).

Many State Department officials believed that the

Soviets could be manipulated with economic levers.

These

officials continued to draw on arguments put forward for

expanded East-West trade articulated during detente.

The

arguments were rooted in sets of representations and images

.
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of the soviet leadership
as "tameable"
through the
cultivation of mu tual economic
interests.
The expansion of
trade deals rested on faith
in the malleability
of Soviet
perceptions of interest. United
states- policy in the
early
1970s had been defended through
a language that was
partly
an instrumentalist and partly
a neo-kantian discours
e

East-West trade was seen to have
political and economi c
value.
As long as this image of the
Soviet Union and the se
representations of superpower relations
'

were authoritative,

then detente trade-linkage arguments
seemed plausible.
Within the DOD images and symbols of
an absolutist
discourse had had greater authority
throughout

the 1970s.

DOD officials were convinced that liberalized
trade,
particularly in high technology sectors, had
been

detrimental to Western security interests.

They believed

that lax controls eroded Western qualitative
superiority and
technological lead times. The actions of the Soviet
Union
in the early 1980s seemed to confirm the
hard-liners'

interpretation of the nature of the Soviet threat to Western
security.

The Soviet action in 1979 became the occasion for

an attempt by critics of detente to move export control

policy in
Jentleson,

a

more restrictive direction (Mastanduno, 1985;
1986)

.

Criticisms of the detente trade-linkage approach

advanced by the DOD and by several Congressmen in the

.
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after.ath of the invasion
of Afghanistan were
based in part
on a particular reading
of a set of proposals
articulated by
the Defense Science Board
Task Force
in 1976.

This DOD
study, known as the "Bucv
Ke P° r t
y Rennn-"
(after Taskforce chair
j
Fred Buoy) reflected an
atte.pt to establish a
more cohesive

national policy on technology
export controls, it was the
most significant and explicit
attempt to articulate
systematically a set of principles
for the entire United
States export control program
(see Mastanduno,
1985).

since

1949 one aspect of the rationale
for the export control
program had been that Western security
was enhanced by

maintaining qualitative lead-times
through restrictions on
Soviet bloc access to advanced
technological goods.
The

Bucy Report centered on this issue.

three areas of concern:

The Report focused on

efforts to control the transfer of

technological -know-how" as opposed to goods;
efforts to
develop more extensive mechanisms to maintain

United States

lead-times in technological advances; and efforts
to develop
means of providing for greater scrutiny of intra-Western

transfers of state of the art technology (see Mastanduno,
1985)

The intentions of the authors were trampeled under by

the force of events. Bucy, in 1976, argued that the

principles set out in the Report could serve to rationalize
the United States' system, and also remove the burden of an
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overly extensive control
system

trora hi gh -tec h nolo

gy fi r ms
of the Rea g an Administration
ooo, houever
were ablg
to appropriate the ideas
contained in the Report
to serve
their own ends. As Buoy put
it, "they took a
Report
intended to rationalize controls
and created a control
list
as thick as the New york
phone book" (quoted in
MacDonald,

Meters

,

p.

78

,

1990)

.

The Bucy Report established
concepts that became part
of the official lexicon of the
export control establishment
in the 1980s.
The Report differentiated between

technological products and technological
"know-how," between
"active" and ..passive- transfers of
technology, and between

evolutionary and revolutionary technological
advances.
Bucy explained these differentiations

to the House

Subcommittee on International Trade and
Commerce in March
1976 [Subcommittee on International Trade and
Commerce

(hereafter SITC)

,

March 11-30, 1976].

Technological

"know-how', is design and manufacturing
knowledge.

This type

of knowledge was described "as the heart of
a nation's power

capability."

in the Congressional hearings Bucy said:

"if

the United States were forced to sell all of the
products

that it had available, high technology all the way to the

lowest technology, we would recover from that.

But if we

were forced to divulge all of our design and manufacturing

know-how to any nation that wanted

it,

we would not recover

.
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from that blow"
in Mastanduno,

fqTTr
(SITC,

r.^w p.
Bucy,

214f

March 30

^

1976

.

.

c ted

1985)

The first part of the Bucy
Report argues that
knowledge is power. The Report
then moves on to explain
the
forms and avenues through which
such knowledge is
transferred. According to the
recommendations of the Report,
greater emphasis should be placed
on controlling the
transfer of information necessary
to produce technical
products.
This included design, operating,
and application
information and sophisticated maintenance
procedures.
Central to this position was the concept
of -process
know-how"; defined as the knowledge, methods,
and skills

generally associated with industrial production
on
scale (Mastanduno, p. 321, 1985). The Report

a

mass

also called

for greater controls on "keystone" equipment;
unique

equipment essential to completing

a

production process.

For

example, a manufacturer can produce most of the parts
of a
jet aircraft with widely available multi-purpose machinery.

Completing the construction, however, requires unique

titanium forging equipment.

The titanium forging equipment

is thus the "keystone" in the process of jet aircraft

production. Finally, the Bucy Report emphasized the control
of process "know-how."

In short, the product and its

application were not as significant as the capability
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Provided through the transfer
of particular
products in
terms of technological
"know-how."
The Report called for
tighter controls on "active.,
as
opposed to ..passive" transfer
mechanisms.
As B ucy pointed
out in the Congressional
hearings, this meant that
the
United states should not be
concerned as much with the
transfer of specific products.
Rather it was essential to
regulate -active relationships,
characterized by an
intensive teaching effort by the
donor company and by
frequent and specific communications
between donor and
receiver" (SITC, Bucy, p. 215, March
30, 1976).
Active
technology transfers, Bucy argued,
involved communication
between a company and a nation, and this
always involved
design and manufacturing "know-how"
transfers.
Such
relationships, the Bucy Report maintained,
improved the

technical capability of

a

nation's population.

This

approach is revealing in that the target of the
controls
then moves away from military systems capability
to the

civilian population. Along these lines the Bucy Report
was
highly critical of the sale of turnkey factories - entire
factories complete with extensive personnel training and

ongoing maintenance arrangements.
The United States, the Report suggested, should also

attempt to identify and to control technologies that would

allow competitors to make revolutionary advances in
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technological capability.

certain advances or
discoveries
represent "quantum jumps that
are based on conceptual
departures from current practice"
(SITC,
Bucy,

p.

217

,

The protection of United
States lead-time required
that these kinds of advances
be identified and
controlled.
The Bucy Report was unique
in that it dismissed
end-use
guarantees as useless.
other words, it was insignificant
whether or not a state diverted
a particular product
to
military applications. what was
important was the value of
a product or system in terms
of "know-how"
1976)

.

m

and its form of

transfer.

After the Bucy Report some officials
in the DOD
came to believe that intelligence
should not
focus on

whether or not Soviet bloc states abided
by end-use
assurances (Mastanduno, 1985). The key was
how the

"know-how" obtained from active transfers of
certain

technologies increased

a

particular state's technical and

manufacturing capability.
The Bucy Report was unique in other ways.

articulated and expressed in

a

it

clear form certain attitudes

that had been the backdrop to United States export control

program since 1949. One of these was the belief that
technological knowledge had been and would be the key both
to United States economic power in the global political

economy and to its strategic superiority over the Soviet
bloc.
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Second, the Bucy Report
,as used in the
1980s to
articulate an argument for a
clear break with the
ideas of
detente.
The arguement maintained
that transfers of Western
technology into the Soviet bloc
would not result in a
"crisis of rising expectations"
in the general populations
of these states, but that such
transfers would allow the
Communist party to avoid making
choices between fulfilling
civilian needs and military outlays.
The Report held that
there was no instrumental value in
exchanging technological
"know-how" for political suid pro guos
(Mastanduno,
1985).

Finally, the Report dismissed the notion
that communication
between Western firms and Soviet bloc
economic officials
would result in an interdependence with
the potential of

bringing about liberalizing transformations.
The findings and recommendations were highly

controversial for

a

number of reasons.

The recommendations

included a call for greater restrictions and
surveillance on
certain West-West technology transfers. The Report

expressed

a

skepticism about the integrity of allied COCOM

member states' and firms' assurances that United States
technology would not be re-exported to controlled

destination (SITC, Bucy,
a

p.

229 1976; Mastanduno,

1985).

consequence of the arguable unreliability of the Western

allies in this regard, the Report argued that:

"Any COCOM

nation that allows such technology to be passed on to

As

"
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Communist countries should
be restricted from
receiving
further [U.S. ori gin]
strategic Know-how

(Mastanduno, P

306,

1 985)

The implication o f
this position was
enormous
for United States-Western
western p„-,,_
European economic
interdependence
imposing West-West restrictions
and sanctions could
interrupt transactions between
United states firms and
subsidiaries or joint-venture
activities where there was
dependence on a parent,
parent firm for *~
design and manufacturing
"know-how.
.

•

The Bucy Report recommended
even more restrictive
controls on transfers of United
States technology to neutral
states.
some neutral states such as
Sweden, Switzerland,

and Austria had always expressed
a reluctance to accept
United States re-export control
authority.
Their national
export control enforcement programs
were minimal or
non-existent. Given this fact" the Bucy
Report stated that
the United States should only allow
transfers of technology
to these states that "we would be
willing to transfer

directly to Communist countries" (Mastanduno

p.

307,

1985).

Even in 1976, DOD officials used the Bucy Report
to

argue for much more extensive vigilance on West-West

technology transfers.

While the rationale for this

increased surveillance was set out in terms of national
security, there were strong neo- mercantilistic undertones
(Baranson,

1976)

.

The Report expressed a concern over the
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increased intensity of
global economic competition
in ni gh
technology sectors, over the
erosion of the competitive
position of united States hi
g h-tech industry,

and over the
rapid and relatively unregulated
diffusion of United States'
origin leading edge technology
into the global market.
Many corporate and government
officials believed that
United States firms aggravated
this situation by regularly
and liberally transferring state
of the art design and
manufacturing techniques (Mastanduno,
p.

326,

1985).

The
fact that some firms were readily
willing to sell, trade, or
barter leading edge technology with
foreign affiliates
and

firms was seen by some officials as
aiding foreign

competition in ways that worked to the
disadvantage of
United States industry as a whole. in

some cases state of

the art technology was bartered for
finance capital as in
the IBM-Fujitsu case or was traded for
concessions in

particular domestic markets as in the General
ElectricSMECMA France case (Baranson, 1976). Given these

issues and

the nature of the Bucy Report's recommendations,
many allied

officials believed that the primary target of the Bucy
Report was intra-Western trade (Interview, Brussels, January
1990)

.

In the late 1970s the Department of Defense (DOD) was

given the task of implementing the overall recommendations
of the Bucy Report. This task included responsibility for
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developing lists of critical
technological "Know-how
identifying revolutionary
technological

»

advances, and

setting out for m al criteria
to distinguish active
fro m
passive transfers
rers.
Thic
This 3 ob was given over

to the Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense
for
1 Research
»
research and
*nH Engineering
(DRE) and the Office wo.
of the
uik Assi^
3 nf Secretary
assistant
for
international Security Affairs
(ISA)

(Mastanduno, p.

310,

The approach developed by
the DOD out of the Bucy
Report recommendations came to
be called the "critical
technologies approach." The Department
of Defense argued
that United States lead-time in
a number advanced technology
areas had been eroded by the liberal
policies of detente.
The Department of Defense in the
late 1970s begin to push
for a much greater role in the export
control licensing
process based on this approach. The Bucy
Report became
1985)

.

ammunition in this inter-governmental competition.

DOD

officials attempted to gain ground with the White
House, the
NSA, and in Congress by arguing that the
critical

technologies approach would result in

a net

number of products subject to control.
there was

a

reduction of the

The DOD argued that

limited category, at any one time, of

identifiable state of the art technological "know-how" that
should be placed under transfer surveillance and control.
In practice,

finding a way to implement the Bucy

Report proved to be almost overwhelming.

The DOD spent

)
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enorrcous amounts of time
and resources developing
a

"militarily critical technologies
list"
consisted of fifteen
irreen classes
rla^oc „ P

(„ CL)

of technology:
.

network technoloav;
9Y,

2)

software technology;
technology;

4)

.

The list

,

computer
ar
no
o«*«v«,+.
large computer system
technology;
l)

i

3)

automated real-time control

composite and defense materials
processing
and manufacturing technology;
6) directed energy technology;
7) large-scale integration and manufacturing
technology;
5)

8

military instrumentation technology;
technology;

10)

9)

telecommunications

guidance and control technology;
H)

microwave component technology;

12)

engine technology;

advanced optics and fiber optics technology;
technology; and
225,

)

15)

14)

sensor

underseas system technology (SITC,

1976; Mastanduno,

13

p.

Within each of these broad

1985).

categories the DOD was to identify which particular

technology was of critical military value.

Then DOD

officials were going to determine what technologies were
keystone state of the art, and revolutionary technologies.
Finally, DOD would have to determine for each specific

technology, the present level of Soviet capability in terms
of "know-how," alternative suppliers in the global market,

and the rate and sources of transactions in these

technologies in intra-Western trade.
DOD-DRE along with the DIA set up

called "Socrates."

This was

a

a

To accomplish this the

classified program

massive data gathering effort

.
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and computer systen, established
to m onitor break-throughs
and technological advanoes
in Western sooieties
and global
transfers of those technologies
(Interview, Washington D.C.,
1990)

Western European officials were
skeptical of the Bucy
Report recommendations. They
did not believe that the
United States would be willing
to allow
the export of high

technology items to the Soviet bloc
that were going to be
used in military systems simply

because those items did not

transfer critical technological
"know-how."

They also had

reservations about the implications of
such an approach for
the free exchange of information.

m

addition, Western

European officials were skeptical of the
practicality of
enforcing technological "know-how" controls.

Finally, the

Bucy Report generated resentment because of
its allegations
that Western European COCOM states disregarded
re-export

control arrangements (see Mastanduno on these issues,
1985).
This Report was significant for the domestic politics
of East-West trade for three reasons.

First, the Report

helped to swing the bureaucratic momentum on the issue of
export controls away from the State Department to the DOD
and the office of the National Security Advisor.

provided

a

The Report

coherent conceptual framework from which the

detente trade linkage policy could be challenged. It also
and perhaps more significantly, resulted in greater resource
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outlays for the

evasion

control program in the DOD.

of the United states
export

This put the DOD in
a better

position to challenge other
agencies.
Secondly, the Bucy
Report helped to shore-up a
disparate coalition of
actors
who were advocates of tighter
restrictions on export and
technology transfer controls. This
alliance included,

conservative members of Congress
(such as
were concerned with national
security

H.

Jackson) who

issues; members of

Congress who were concerned with the
erosion of United
States economic and technological
competitiveness

(such as

Garn), critics of detente in the
Department of Defense,
and Commerce Department officials
who believed that United
States firms were being disadvantaged
by Western European
firms' disregard for export control
regulations.
Thirdly,
the Bucy Report brought the issue of
technology transfer
J-

controls to center stage and provided

a

symbolic ground on

which to critique the implications of liberalized
East-West
trade in the 1970s.
The Carter Administration Takes Action

The 1979 version of the Export Administration Act
(

EAA)

did not adopt the Bucy Report's harsher

recommendations.

The Report did, however, provide the

framework for debate over the EAA legislation.

The invasion

of Afghanistan in late 1979 provided the opportunity for

groups that supported

a

harder line to gain the high ground.
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President Carter ordered

review of the United
States
export and technology transfer
control program and a
review
of the Un.ted States position
on COCOM controls.
Advocates
of a more restrictive policy
used this as a forum to
move
the administration away from
liberalization and
a

linkage.
in the context of this
inter-agency review the DOD

clashed with representatives from
the state Department over
how to reform policy strategy.

m

a

series of hearings

before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affair's
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
in
1980,

DOD

officials outlined their position and
the goals of what they
called a long term strategy on export
controls [Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee
on
Governmental Affairs [hereafter PSI], Feb.

1980 and Sept.

1980].

in response to questions posed by
Senator Henry

Jackson at the February hearing, Under Secretary
of Defense
William Perry asserted that the approach to East-West
trade

followed in the 1970s had been

Western security, and that

a

a

mistake detrimental to

reconsideration of the entire

export control program was long overdue.

Perry stressed

that the most important areas for renewed restrictions

included intellectual property, technological "know-how"

embodied in items, and process "know-how" that could
indirectly aid Soviet military strength (PSI, pp. 25-59,
Feb.,

1980).

Throughout 1980 DOD officials appeared before

.
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this committee to argue
that technologies
and goods
contributing to the industrial
base of the Soviet
Union
supporting military manufacture,
should be strictly
controlled.
As several scholars have
pointed out, this
position was a significant shift
away from a limited
strategic export control strategy
(Jacobsen,

or

1985;

Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson,

19 86;

Long,

1989)

.

It was part

of an attempt to move policy
to a broader program of

economic warfare or economic isolation
with the Soviet Union
(Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson, 1986;
Elliott,

1988).

it also

represented the beginning of the
re-emergence and growing
re-legitimation of what we have called
the absolutist
discourse.

Senator Jackson drew on the symbols,
images, and
language of this discourse in his attacks
on past approvals

of high-technology sales to the Soviets.

m

particular he

attacked the Administration for selling high
technology
items to the Zil vehicle plant; a plant
known

to be used in

the production of missile launchers.

Soviet Union is
down to it?"

a Zil complex.

He said "the whole

Isn't it really when you get

He then evoked the image of the evil-other by

saying that approving export licenses for sales to Zil was
"like selling to the Krupp works under Hitler" (PSI,
Feb.

,

p.

49,

1980)
In these and other statements Senator Jackson

articulated some of the fundamental perceptions rooted in an
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absolutist discourse
course.

pj-^
First, individuals
who supported
,

.

.

the

hard-line perspective saw
the Soviet civilian
economy and
Military production as being
tightly integrated.

Technology
sold for use in the civilian
sector, according to
this view
was bound to end up in the
military sector (Parrott,
1985
in addition, within the
terms of the absolutist
discourse,
there were no grounds for
peaceful coexistence or
strategically insignificant
commercial relations.
)

.

Many Western European officials
and some United States
officials sharply disagreed with
these

perceptions.
They
did not believe that the Soviet
Union "was one big zil
complex.- Western European analysts
in general believed
that Soviet military production was
isolated from

the rest

of the economy.

They were also much more skeptical
of the

ability of the Soviets, given the central
planning system
and the archaic infrastructure, to quickly
or
effectively

diffuse Western technology (Woolcock, 1982; Schaffer,
1985;
Rode and Jacobsen, 1985).
In addition, most Western

European policy elites believed that when it came to the
question of East-West trade, there were ways of separating
political or strategic issues from economic issues (Bertsch,
1988)

.

These areas became major points of disagreement

during the Reagan Administration.
The Carter Administration, after 1979, did break with
the detente strategy of trade-linkage (Mastanduno, 1985;
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Bertsch,

1985)

.

A "no exceptionsp ol i cy prohibiting

exceptions for the export of
controls goods to the Soviet
Un.on was instituted as the
official United states
position

m

in COCOM.

addition, export licenses
for the transfer of
technologies to industries that
could indirectly improve
Soviet military strength were to
be denied indefinitely.
These moves represented a significant
shift in the focus of
the United States position on
export controls
(Bertsch,

1985; Mastanduno,

1985; Jentleson,

1986).

The focus of the

control system was expanded by this
action to include
technologies with indirect military
potential.
The allies' reactions in COCOM were
mixed.

They were

receptive to the Carter Administration's
suggestions on the
need to strengthen the strategic multilateral

export control

program.

In the early 1980s,

some allied officials had come

to share the perception that too lax

a

system of controls on

transfers of state of the art technology to the
Soviet bloc
could be a detriment to Western security interests.

Western

European officials were unwilling, however, to see the
COCOM

program turned into

a

forum for the continuation of Carter's

use of export controls for foreign policy purposes.

Attempts to move the COCOM program beyond the control
threshold of

a

narrow strategic embargo met with stiff

resistance (Bertsch, 1985). The allies did accept the "no

exceptions" policy, but under the condition that it applied

.
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oniv to the soviet Union
ana that it induced
"exceptions to
the no exceptions"
(Mastanduno, 1985)
They alsQ
an atte.pt by the United
states to get COCOM to
accept
criteria that would restrict f 0 nh^i
technologies with indirect
military significance and a
proposal that any export
of
technology to the Soviet Union
with a value
.

of over $100

million be subject to full COCOM
review (Mastanduno,
1985).
This resistance to the Carter
Administration
initiatives had several sources.
Most of the allies had

much more at stake economically
in East-West trade than
the
United States.
Yet unwillingness

to harm their own economic

interests was only part of their
motivation for resisting
the proposals. While there was some
political consensus on
the need to increase the efficiency
of a strategic embargo,
the resistance to the broadening of
COCOM that the Carter

Administration encountered was indicative of
more
fundamental divergences of perception in the

alliance

(Hoffmann,

1981)

This divergence of perception was bound up in long

standing differences in national experiences of trade
with

Eastern bloc states.

It stemmed immediately from growing

divergence of discourses; in representations of the Soviet
Union.

There was a divergence in the construction of the

nature of the Soviet threat to Western security and in the

relationship between East-West trade and Western security
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interests.

There were important
differences
"iiierences between and
within the allied states in
these areas.
The divergence Qf
dxscourses at both the domestic
and intra-European
level,

however, was never as great
as it has been between
the
United States and Europe at
points in the past (Agnelli,
1980)
French Foreign Minister Claude
Cheysson would later
describe the United States-Western
European conflict over
East-West trade in the 1980s as "a
progressive divorc
.

e"

because "we no longer speak the same
language" on the
of East-West trade (Jentleson,
p. 195, 1986).

i ssue
'

West Germany's position, for example,
was bound up in
its greater political stake in
East-West trade
due to the

division of Germany.

This situation helped to shape

a

particular conceptualization of the relationship
between
East-West economic relations and Western
security in the

1970s.

Perceived successes on intra-German issues
with the
Ostpolitik trade inducement program meant that
FRG
officials, more than any within the alliance,
believed

economic ties with Eastern European states could
achieve

positive political results
1988)

.

In addition,

(Stent..

there was

a

1981; Jacobsen,

1985 and

strong and broad based

consensus that the expansion of commercial ties with Eastern
Europe was in the economic interest of
the FRG.

a

number of groups in

In early 1980 the SPD was reluctant to take steps

to alienate these groups.

As an absolutist discourse
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legitimating

a

broader economic warfare

w

^

^

ng

authority in the Unite, states
foreign policy
establishment
in the FRG an instrumentalist
and a conservative

neo-Kantian

discourse remained the basis
of
East-west trade policy. This

a

national consensus on

consensus

legated

both a

strategy of trade inducement
when possible to encourage
concessions on intra-German issues

and a liberal East-West

trade policy qualified by an
acceptance of the necessity
of
a limited strategic embargo
of goods with direct
military
significance (Stent, 1985)
.

British and French officials were
much more skeptical
about the potential political
benefits of East-West economic
ties (Bertsch, 1988).
fact, in both of these states

m

since 1979, but for different reasons,
it appears that a
type of conservative neo-Kantian
discourse de-linking
political and economic issues has had more
legitimacy in
debates over East-West trade policy. France's
Gaullist

traditions and perceptions of autonomy from the
political
affairs of the superpowers, has provided the
ground
for

opposition to
1988).

a

renewed economic warfare program (Labbe,

The strong French support of liberalized East-West

trade throughout the 1970s was, however, modified somewhat
in the early 1980s.

French intelligence obtained the

"Farewell Papers" from a high ranking KGB agent in the early
1980s. This documented in detail Soviet bloc high technology
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acquisition networks in the
West,

omcers,

soviet KGB line "x"

technology acquisition
specialists, had huilt
up
extensive networks in France
through the 1970

s.
Thus by
the early 198 0s, the French
were open to strengthening
domestic enforcement of controls
on the transfer of
militarily significant technology.
French intelligence set
up the "Surveillance"
committee and organized DST Direction de la Surveillance du
Territoire - to counter the
Soviet network (Tuck, 1986).
They expelled 47 Soviet
diplomats involved in attempts to
obtain controlled
technologies in 1983.

The British historical tradition
of advocating a free
trade system provided a ground on
which several of its
officials argued in opposition to the
United States attempt
to expand COCOM in the early
1980s.
These officials
maintained that trade with all states should
be viewed as a
right and not a privilege (Bertsch and
Elliott,

1988).

British officials were resistant to conflating
political
with economic issues when it came to questions

of East-West

trade.

The British expressed

a

willingness to strengthen

the strategic embargo, but strongly objected to
the

expansion of the multilateral export control program to
include items of indirect military significance (Jentleson,
1986)

.
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^3an_Ad^^

Iil§-£

and f hQ o

^^U^t__Discourse

^

The divergence in these
discourses in
the stage for an ail out
aliiance conflict in
the early
1980s.
This conflict became
fuU _ biown
discourse gained preponderance
as the guide-post
of the
Keagan Administration policy
on East-West trade.
Reagan's
campaign rhetoric, the images
and symbols he

^

^ ^ ^^^^
evoked, the

success of the neo-conservative
movement's public relations
and lobbying programs, and
the actions of the Soviet
Union
were all factors that helped
to revive a Cold War
absolutist
discourse (see Fred Holiday,
1986,
In campaign speeches
Reagan referred to the Soviet
Union
.

as the "evil empire" and

said that "the Western world
should quarantine the Soviets
until they decided to behave
like a civilized nation"
(quoted in Jentleson, 1986)
The appointment of Richard
Perle as Under Secretary of Defense
for International
Security Policy and Lawrence Brady as
Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Export Administration were
clear signals about
the direction the Reagan Administration
would
.

go on the

issue of East-West trade (Bertsch, 1985; Root,
1984).

Both

Perle and Brady had earned reputations as virulent
cold
warriors.

Perle, Henry Jackson's chief aide in the 1970s,

did "as much as any American to doom detente in drafting
and
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engineering the .acKson-Vani*
1986; see Fred Holiday,

a m en dm ent..

(Jentleson

,

p

.

1986).

The appointments of critics n f
*
of detente
to key posts in
the export control apparatus
assured energetic
implementation of particular
policies designed to
economically isolate the Soviet
Union.
it was also part of
an overall administration
strategy to remove remaining
supporters of trade inducement from
the American foreign
policy establishment (Mastanduno,
1985; Lowenfeld, 1987;
Jentleson, 1986).
Perle called for
the end of the

legitimacy of the instrumentalist-trade
linkage and the
neo-kantian positions in the United
States domestic

debate,

saying,

trade

"it is simply no longer convincing
to suggest that
(in any form) will moderate Soviet
behavior or deflect

it from its build up of military
power"

1982; Jentleson, p.

173 1986).

(Defense '82, Feb.

Administration officials

publicly construed the export control situation
of the last
decade as having resulted in a loss of lifeblood,
saying

that there had been

a

"massive hemorrhaging" of U.S.

technology (Bertsch, 1985). The construction of
representations of technology as having organic and

life-sustaining value were often curious elements of the

absolutist discourse.
Early in the first Reagan Administration some
officials, led by Secretary of Defense Wienberger, became
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1980s offered a grand strategic
opportunity.
According to
Wienberger the Soviet industrial
base, "without constant
infusions of advanced technology
fro m the West, would
experience cumulative obsolescence
that would eventually
constrain the military industries"
(Annual Report to
Congress Secretary of Defense,
FY, 1983; Mastanduno,
l 985
;

Jentleson 1986).

Wienberger argued that by
allowing the
Soviet Union access to advanced
Western technologies,

the

United States helped to preserve

a

totalitarian dictatorship

and allowed Soviet leaders to
avoid the choice between its

military-industrial priorities and the
civilian sector.
Hard-liners within the Administration
became

uncompromisingly committed and relentless
in their policy
stand on the desirability of a broad

embargo on industrial

technology and equipment to the Soviet bloc
(Bertsch, 1985).
Economic and technological competition was
represented as

a

peacetime surrogate for military struggle (Mastanduno,
1985)

.

Most shocking for Western European leaders was the
fact that some of these officials advocated forcing the

allies to comply with the United States position.

Wienberger suggested that the allies should be forced to
chose between their economic interests in the East and their

loyalty to the United States (Bertsch, 1985)

.

In early 1981

275

the hard-liners had not
yet gained full
control in the
intra-governmental struggles over
export control policy
inter-agency conflicts centered
on whether or not,
and if
so, the extent to which
the United States would
pursue a
strategy of economic warfare
(Mastanduno, 1985).
Hard-line
officials, however, began pushing
policy in this direction
on a number of fronts at both
the domestic and the
inter-allied level (Jentleson,
1986).

Early on, these Reagan
Administration officials sought
to obtain compliance with their
views from the allies
and

from Western firms.

They sought to achieve their
goals

through persuasion in bilateral
diplomatic missions and in
multilateral fora that included not only
COCOM, but also

NATO and the annual economic summits
(Bertsch, 1985). At the
Ottawa summit in July 1981 Reagan wanted
East-West
trade as

a

central topic of discussion.

consent on

He was able to obtain allied

proposal to hold a ministerial-level review
of
COCOM controls in January 1982. Some hard-line
officials
a

believed that this ministerial-level meeting and
the COCOM
list review negotiations scheduled to begin in
November

1982

would be fora in which the allies could be brought
in line
with their overall strategy (Mastanduno, 1985).

They also

turned to attempts to strengthen the export control license

application review process and thereby to place pressure on

Western firms that were subject to the United States system.

276

in January 1982
Richard

the Presidents Export
Council

Ministration, expressed
argument and pressure

.

^

^

^
^

the view that .

„. goQd

have applied in the past"

^

-

^

^^

should be

afele

^

^

^^
bring

the fact that the
Administration decided to
p ursue an
economic warfare strategy
bought the United States
into
direct conflict with the
allied states over the
Soviet
Pipeline deal. The Fall
1981 declaration of
martial 1,-aw in
Poland provided the excuse,
but the real root of sharp
Reagan Administration
reaction to allied refusals
to scrap
the deal was tied to the
rise of the absolutist
discourse
and its legitimation of a
strategy of economically
isolating
the Soviets (Jentleson,
1986).
At the domestic level
Administration officials sought
to expose the extent of Soviet
intelligence networks set up
to illegally acquire Western
technology.
They took steps to
broaden the scope and substance of
items subject to control
and also to reform administrative
enforcement and

surveillance programs to monitor individual
firms' and
states' compliance with United States
and

COCOM controls.

Several means were used to achieve these
goals.
"To elevate the level of public consciousness
on the

issue," the Commerce Department asked the CIA to
release

a
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de-classified version of its
1980-1981 comprehenslive
analysis of Soviet technology
acquisition
Methods.

The

Commerce Department under Brady's
direction also set out to
develop an extensive data base
to document "information
(technical data) and technological
capabilities in free
world and communist countries(Committee on Governmental
Affairs, p. 275, May, 1982).
addition, the Commerce
Department instituted an organizational
restructuring
designed to improve enforcement.
A "special analytical
unit" in conjunction with the
Customs Service

m

was set up to

enhance the capability of identifying
firms engaged in
diverting controlled technology to the
Soviets and to
uncover diversion routes (Committee on
Governmental Affairs,
p.

206, May 1982)

.

The DOD, Defense Intelligence Agency,
and the Defense
Technology Security Agency, under Perle's
direction also
launched several new surveillance programs.
These included
the "Ramparts" and the "Socrates" programs;
unprecedented

expansions of United States' vigilance on intra-Western
and
East-West transfers of high technology. The role of the

DOD

in the export control program was expanded greatly.

The DOD

was given the power to review COCOM and non-COCOM neutral

states license applications (Freedenberg, 1987).

The DOD's

input in developing United States positions for COCOM

negotiations was also increased (Root, 1984)

.

The
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Administration launched

„

Customs Operation

^

extensive domestic personnel
and overseas
of the attempt to increase
incrpa<? 0 enforcement
effectiveness through
monitoring the compliance of
COCOM and non-COCOM free
world
states, firms, and individuals
(Committee on Governmental
Affairs, p. 206, May, 1982).

^

Use of the name ..Exodus"
to desoribe the outflow
of
Western technology to the
Eastern bloc was expressive
of the
hard-liners belief that there
were massive movements of
illicit items. Each discovery
of a new case of ..violationseemed to be used as evidence
that more authority should be
ceded to enforcement agencies
within the intelligence
community, the DOD, Customs, and
the Commerce Department.
These agencies would then be able
to ensure that
"straegically significant technology"
did leak out of the
West.

The narrative of the loss of what was
represented as
the life-blood of the West, in the form
of "strategically

significant technology," articulated and reinforced

a

particular conceptualization of the source of United States
power or advantage over its superpower rival. Stories of
uncovering plots to transfer controlled technology illicitly
were often set out in the press with

a

James Bond

adventurism; with spies, cops, and robbers (see MacDonald,
1990)

.

These stories would build up to

a

final moment when

.
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the combined forces nf
„fv,
of aauthority,
from the West/ would
uncover the plot of the
forces of evii,
evil and r
recover the
technological device Mncf
„
Dust in the nick of time"
(MacDonald
P- 75, 1990)
Tne use value of these
dramatic narratives
and the notion of guarding
"strategically significant
technology" was increased by
the fact that often the
details
of cases were classified.
'

.

Perhaps the most notorious
story along these lines
is
that of the West German
businessman Richard Mueller.
Mueller
attained a type of mythical status
in high-techno-bandit
theater (MacDonald, 1990). For
a time in the 1980s, he
was
like "Carlos The Jackel" in
terms of terrorism, a symbol
of
the ubiquitious threat of the
techno-trader Since 1976
Mueller used front corporations in
South
.

Africa, Austria,

and Sweden to acquire large amounts
of controlled

telecommunications, computer equipment and
chemical weapons
technology for the Soviets and other
target states. In 1983

Meuller attempted to obtain
for the Soviets.

a

Digital Corporation VAX-ll-782

Western authorities finally tracked it

down in Sweden just before the shipment
was to be

transported to Moscow, but Meuller escaped (see
NAS, 1987;
accounts of this and other cases can be found in:
U.S.

Soviet Acquistion of Militari ly Significant Western
Technol ogy; An Up d^rp,

1985)

DOD.
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Many of these violations
were uncovered as a
direct
consequence of massive
increases in the authority
and
budgets of united States
agencies responsible for
enforcement.
The operations of these
agencies was not
limited to uncovering ili
icit acquisitions

and sales of
Products, but enforcement was
also extended to the
transfer
of controlled information
and know-how.
The United states
barred foreign nationals from
several conferences on a
variety of technical and
scientific topics.

m

addition,

the DOD began demanding that
American academics who were
presenting papers at conferences
on technologies which were
subject to controls apply for export
licenses
71,

1990).

m

(MacDonald, p.

one case, DOD officials in 1982
insisted at

the last moment that over 100
papers be withdrawn from the
26th Annual International Technical
Symposium of the Society
of Photo-Optical Instrumentation
Engineers,
other

enforcement agencies during this period launched
awareness
programs to sensitize the business community and

the public

to the need to guard "strategically significant
technology."

For example, the Commerce Department sent out elaborate

packages of information to high technology firms instructing
employees on what to look for regarding violations of the
export control regulations.

They even, it appears, sent out

awareness material to their fellow agencies in Western

European countries.

In the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

.
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in London stickers,

courtesyY of
or the Cnr™
Commerce Department,
are
pasted on the secure
carets that contain top secret
files
They read "Techno-Busters,
We Si ,t Afraid of
no Sples;
you Remem ber To Lock „
p?
(observed by
1990,
The FBI also launched its
"Library Awareness
Program through which they
encouraged librarians to
"report
frequent use of specialist
collections (particularly
technical and applied science,
by suspicious aliens"
(quoted
in MacDonald, 1990)

^

^

.,

.

Some European officials pointed
out that during the
early 1980s, DOD wanted to cast
the debate over United
States and multilateral national
security export controls in
strictly technical terms (Interview,
Bonn, January, 1990).
The DOD seemed to share the view
of some scholars that
"political scientists should be wary of
pontificating on the

implications of lists of controlled items
whose contents
include things such as: "coaxial cable
with the
outer

conductor electro-plated directly on spirally
grooved cable
dielectrics- or "tubes in which space charge
control is

utilized as the primary functional parameter
including but
not limited to triodes and tetrodes" (P. Hanson,
1981;

quoted in MacDonald,

p.

14,

1990).

All COCOM lists are

classified, but the British list of controlled items

published by the DTI is thought to be

a

copy of the COCOM

lists (Interviews, Brussels and Bonn, September, 1990).

By

282

accepting such

a

hard-line
6

offio-i=i
offl
cials may have wanted
to
silence broader social,
poxitical, and economic
'

questions
about the costs of an
expansion of the export
control
program.

^ e^llied_Xonfli c^

Ii

The United States failed
in its attempt
xii
att^t- +to persuade
and finally to coerce the
allied states to stop the
Siberian
Pipeline deal. The details of
this conflict are familiar
by
now (Jentleson, 1986; Lowenfeld,
1987).
The dynamics of the
conflict are complex and undoubtedly
deserve more than the
passing glance given to them in
this chapter.
The conflict
is significant for the analysis
of COCOM, however, because
it demonstrated the nature of
the dynamics of the United
States domestic politics and
inter-allied politics on the
East-West trade issue.
At the Ottawa summit in July 1981,
President Reagan

attempted to use American prestige as the
alliance leader to
get Western European heads of state to stop
pipeline

contract negotiations with the Soviets. Despite
success in
getting allied officials to agree to hold a ministerial
review of COCOM, Reagan failed to cajole the heads of state
away from the energy trade deal.

All of the companies

involved in the Siberian pipeline deal had trade connections
to the United States either "as subsidiaries, technology

licensees, or parts users" (Jentleson,

p.

194,

1986).
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Desser of France was an
s

Msthom Atlantique

and Thompson-CSF used
United Stat,
:es
licensed technology, and
Italy's Nuovo Pignone,
West
Germany's AEG-Kanis and
Britain «s John
Tnhn nBrown
Engineering all
used parts supplied by GE
(Jentleson, 1986). The
Soviet
Union lacked the technological
''know-how.' to produce
25-megawatt turbines, compressor
stations, and computerized

control equipment for the
pipeline.

The Reagan

Administration believed that it could
stop the pipeline by
getting allied leaders to agree to
block export contracts
for these technologies.
addition, the Administration
argued that contracts to import gas
from the

m

pipeline would

not only increase Soviet hard-currency
earnings, but that
such an arrangement was also a threat
to Western security.
This argument was based on the idea
that the deal would make

Western European states dependent on
Soviet energy supplies.
The economic stakes were very high for
Western
European firms.

Many of the firms involved had experienced

sharp declines in earnings in the early 1980s.

Mannesmann suffered

a loss of

For example,

nearly $52 million in 1981,

AEG-Kanis, a subsidiary of AEG-Telefunken, had not shown

a

profit since 1978, and almost all of the firms that signed
contracts for wide-diameter pipe had not shown profits for
least three years.

a

The general contractors were Mannesmann

Anlagenbau (West Germany)

,

Creusot-Loire (France)

,

and Nuovo

.
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Pignone (Italy)

(Jentleson, v
p.

i 90
^u,
i
98 6^
1986).

signed contracts valued at
$2.! billion
manufacturing subcontractors

mu
These

firms had

The major

.

for the 25- m egawatt
turbines

were dohn Brown Engineering
and AEG-Kanis
the manufacturing and supply

.

m

addition, on

ppxy siae
side of the deal
*
n
were hundreds

of subcontractors and
suppliers scattered across
Western

Europe.

on the gas import side of
the deal, large stateowned utility f irm s negotiated
»ajor contracts with the
Soviets

When the attempt at diplomatic
persuasion failed, the
Reagan Administration tried to
put together a compensation
package.

Administration representatives were
sent to
Western European capitals with offers
of increased supplies
of United States coal and with the
suggestion that Norwegian
gas could be substituted for Soviet
gas.
This compensation
package was a blunder for a number of reasons.
it was

unrealistic because the United States could not
have

produced or delivered the necessary amount of coal.
Secondly,

it was ill planned because not only were the

Norwegians unwilling to increase their gas production, their
gas would have cost more than Soviet gas to tap and to
deliver.

Thirdly, the package was misdirected.

It would

not have compensated, in the midst of a global recession,
for "the loss of exports or their favorable effects on
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e mP lo ym ent,

balan ce of payments, and
industrial production „

(Jentleson, p. 188,

1986).

The declaration of martial
law in Poland intensified
the conflict as the United
States increased its
pressure on
European firms. The Administration
became increasingly
frustrated with the failure of
persuasion or compensation to
sway allied leaders.
The conflict went back and
forth from
January until June 1982. At the
Versailles summit in June,
the heads of state failed to reach
an agreement on

collective sanctions on the Poland issue.
Reagan Administration turned to coercion.

On June 18, the

The

Administration imposed extraterritorial
export controls on
retroactive basis. The sanctity of existing

a

contracts was

ignored and the Administration threatened
criminal penalties
and additional sanctions for violations.

Western European firms were reluctant to act
against
the Administration due to the potential
consequences for
their access to the United States market and
technology.

This move back-fired, however, as the British, French,
West
German, and Italian governments all invoked national
laws

that ordered their companies to fulfill contracts.

The

first violation occurred when Dressor-France and Creusot-

Loire shipped compressors to the Soviets on August 26, 1982.

President Reagan reacted by issuing an executive order

prohibiting all U.S. exports to these firms and their

.
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salaries.

From August

^

unta

^^

imposed sanctions on British,
Italian, Fre noh, and
West
Ger m an £ ir ms that violated
the exterritorial
United states
controls
At the inter-allied level
this conflict represented
more than simply a divergence
of economic interest.
it was
a result of a more
fundamental conflict over the
Western
alliance foreign policy strategy.
Allied leaders were
willing to agree to deploy Pershing
and cruise missiles to
counterbalance Soviet strategic
advantages in Europe. They
were unwilling, however, to link
economic and strategic
issues by agreeing to a coordinated
alliance economic

warfare program.

As Bruce Jentleson points out,

"allied

leaders were dismayed by what they considered
to be the
extremes and excesses of the Reagan approach-

to the Soviet

Union (Jentleson

p.

190,

1986).

This divergence of opinion

was based on differences between the way top
Reagan

Administration officials and Western European leaders
perceived the Soviet Union.
Western European officials disagreed in particular

with the Administration's assessment of the consequences of
the pipeline deal for Western security.

believe that the Soviets would gain

supplying energy to Western Europe.

a

They did not

strategic advantage by
In addition,

they

.
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argued that the fldministration
overestlmated
sfgnificence of increasing
Soviet hard . currency
Many of the Western
European officials
argued that the
Pipeline deal could serve to
sta b ili ze East-West
relations
(Mastanduno, p. 424
1985

^

,

,

Perhaps nore importantly<

.

Reagan Administration's public
action challenged the
prestige of Western European
leaders who h ad resisted
domestic pressure by deploying
medium range nuclear

^

missiles.

Finally, the extr a territori
a l epplic.tion of
United States law was an offense
uense ro
to Fnmno,
European sovereignty.
At the domestic level the
decision to impose sanctions
was a victory for the hard-line
in the Administration.

National Security Advisor William
Clark and Secretary of
Defense Wienberger worked to bring
reluctant officials
around in support of sanctions.
Secretary of state Haig was
"cut-out" of the NSC meeting where
the decision to impose
sanctions was made. This was the issue
over which he
resigned.
Stopping the pipeline deal came to be
seen as
essential to the overall success of the
economic warfare
program (Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson,
1986).
Preventing
Soviet hard-currency earnings from gas sales
was considered
essential
The United States backed down from the imposition
of

sanctions in November, 1982 by claiming that Western

European officials agreed to

a

"plan of action"

(Mastanduno,
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1985)

This plan was nothing
me man
than an .agreement
y more
not to
S1 gn new contracts
untn . series of studies
w
on East-west trade
and Western security.
what
attest at economic coercion
implied about the
erosion of
Unite, states power was
pronounce, because o f
the heated and
public nature of the conflict.
The consequences
.

^^

^ ^^^^^

of the

conflict in fact threatened
to undermine the ability
of
hard-liners, to extract compliance
and concessions from
the
allies on strengthening the
multilateral
export control

system (Root, 1984; Jentleson,
1986).
The costs of this
strategy and the domestic
opposition to restrictive
export
controls it generated, as
discussed below, helped to
eventually erode the hard-liners'
strength
in the

Administration.
When it became apparent that
Western European
officials were not going to be
persuaded by the argument
that stopping Soviet access to
hard-currency
was in the

interest of Western security, expanding
technology transfer
controls became even more of an imperative.
if hard-line
officials could not control Soviet capability
to buy, they

reasoned that the next best thing was devising
better ways
to control what the West would sell.
In ministerial level COCOM meetings,

in the list

reviews that began in November 1982 and through bilateral
initiatives, hard-line officials attempted to bring the
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allies in line with

broader
a
der «,f„f
st ^tegy
of economically
isolating tne Soviets. These
officii began to pressure
the
allies over the objections
of the state
Department and
despite the fact that there
continued to be inter-agency
conflicts.
Their initiatives were
unsuccessful on a number
of fronts.
united States proposals to
elevate COCOM
a

to

formal treaty status and to
establish

a

permanent military

subcommittee in the multilateral
organization, however, were
resisted (Mastanduno, 1985). More
significantly for the
economic isolation strategy the
allied states consistently
resisted United States proposals
in 1982-1984 to broaden
COCOM control criteria to encompass
technology
that would

indirectly contribute to the improvement
of Soviet military
capability (Bertsch, 1985; Mastanduno,
1985).

When it came to getting COCOM member
states to agree
to strengthen their domestic
enforcement programs and to
agree to expansions of the control list,
the United States
met with more success. The 1982-1984
negotiations extended
controls in telecommunications, on certain
classes of

computers and software, and on robotics (Mastanduno,
1985).
These extensions entailed economic costs for
alliance

firms

that had landed contracts and had begun to develop
Eastern

markets in these areas.

For example,

in the tele-

communications sector the British firms Plessey and GEC were
forced to scrap $200 million contracts they had signed with
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"^^^ ^

3

°f

^ «« Visions.

have argued that this
was an

^

see

scholars

^

^

part o f alliance states
to strengthen t he
multUateral
export control program d es
P ite economic costs
(Mastanduno,
1985).
This assessment is based
on the argument that
there
was agreement on the need
to make the multilateral
strategic
embargo more efficient.
This is an accurate

characterization of the view of
only some Western European
officials, particularly the
French.

Achieving concrete commitments
and reaching agreement
on particular issues was
difficult.

The first round in 1982

established tighter controls on
electronic grade silicon,
printed circuit boards, commercial

spacecraft, some oil and

gas technology, large floating
dry docks, and industrial
robots (Mastanduno p. 477, 1985).
The final round from

1983-1984 was

a

battle over computers, software,
and digital

switching tele-communications equipment.

There is evidence

that the final compromises made in the
1984 talks were
reached as a result of more than just "the
persuasive power
of sound technical arguments" by the United
States.

Several

scholars have argued that the compromises resulted
from
implicit and explicit threats by the United States to

withhold access to military technology, defense contracts,
and other rents from states and firms that did not go along

with the United States interpretation and position about
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particular controversial
ite.s in the COCOM
list
negotiations Cra„ £ or d ana
(

Lenwav,

1985; Schaffer

Bertsch and Elliott, 1988).

,

^

While the United States
did agree
aqree to some
in™. compromises
(i.e. microcomputers), top
Reagan Administration
official s
expressed a willingness to use
instruments available fo r
leverage to bring reluctant
allies into
line.

Thi s was

particularly the case for classes
of items in which the
United States accounted for a
disproportionate share of
global production. Allied officials
stated that their

ability to resist United States
proposals for restrictions
on particular items (i.e.,
telecommunications)
was often

curtailed by the level of their industry's
dependence on
U.S. technology (Bertsch and Elliott,
1988).

This seems to

have provided U.S. officials the
upper-hand in negotiations
over particular items in the COCOM talks.

Richard Perle personally directed initiatives
to apply
pressure on the allies. He indicated that
United States

military technology was withheld from certain
allies until
they agreed to strengthen their domestic export
control

programs (Mastanduno, 1985; Bertsch, 1985).

In a

particularly undiplomatic move, Assistant Secretary Brady
threatened that the "United States would reconsider military
commitments to Western Europe" if full cooperation on trade
controls was not forthcomming (NYT,

p.

l

April 24,

1983

;
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cited in Jentleson, 1985)
1985).

m

,

a> qjuaddition,
Defense Department

officials under Perle
pprlp'cs direction
usurped state Department
negotiations on a number of
occasions by sending
delegations
directly to Western European
capitals.
•

This led to a

pubUo

conflict between Perle and
William Root, the state
Department's long time chief
COCOM negotiator and head
of
the Office of East-West Trade.

Root resigned in the midst

of the protracted negotiations
alleging that the DOD had
made agreement impossible.

The United States also used
leverage to attempt to
extract compliance with controls on
particular items from

non-COCOM states and firms.

Austria was told that they

would be left with only "pastries and
1950s machinery" if
they did not tighten restrictions on
controls in compliance
with COCOM (Mastanduno,

p.

500,

1985).

Similar pressure was

placed on Sweden and Switzerland.
Executive officials, during this period, were also
actively involved in protracted negotiations on the

renewal

of the 1979 EAA (discussed below; Freedenberg,
1987).

sought, among other things,

a

They

strengthening of Executive

power for extraterritorial extensions of U.S. export
controls.

This power was to include the ability to impose

import sanctions on firms that violated U.S. and COCOM
controls. This invigoration of the United States

surveillance program, the strengthening of Executive power
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to Withdraw access
t0 technology

attests to strengthen
instruments

^

u

for leverage.

^^
The

relationship between these
instruments can be
explained by
tawing on the an en f oroement
rent compliance
extraction
-de!. The expansion Qf
surveUlance

^

systems
occu
under the Reagan Administration
increased United states
capability for guaging
compliance and detecting
defectors
in addition, the
fortification of the ability
to apply
sanctions for non-compliance
gave United states
officials
bargaining chip for negotiations
with the allies.

Costs

a nd

Rectifying domestic

a

Consgguencps
surveillance and enforcement

programs and broadening executive
powers for extraterritorial sanctions did strengthen

the instruments at the

United States- disposal for attempting
to extract compliance
from COCOM and non-COCOM states
and
firms on specific

controls.

This, however, was done in the
context of a

divergence of discourses at the inter-allied
level and in a
situation where the distribution of
global high-technology
production had shifted. There was a pronounced
divergence
of perception over the nature of the
Soviet threat
to

Western security in relation to the issue of
East-West
trade.

By using coercion in the pipeline case and by

attempting to extract compliance for its position in COCOM

.
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the United States
incurred high
hm>, economic
and political
costs
The cost of being
subject to the United
states
leverage an d surveillance
svste m led Western
European states
and fi rms to see, ways
of reducing exposure.
After the
Siberian pipeiine confiict
Western European states,
with the
encourages of the EC and following
the exa m ple of
Britain, began developing
extensive legislation to
prevent
firMs fro, copying with
the extraterritorial
extension of
U.S. law (Schaffer
iqrk\
natter, 1985).
t~
^
addition
COCOM and non-COCOM
firms began to factor in the
cost of being exposed to
the
United States compliance
extraction system (National
Academy
of Sciences (hereafter HAS),
1987). Consequently many
Western European firms begin to
consider designing around
United States technology and turning
to Japanese and German
technology so that they would not be
subject to re-export
I

m

>

•

.

.

controls (HAS, 1987; Bertsch,
1988). Western European firms
also turned to joint ventures to
develop technology
production capability to reduce reliance on
U.S. products

and know-how.
Finally, the experience with United States
economic

leverage and with the extensive surveillance system
led to
an emphasis on broader intra-European multilateral
efforts

to counter exposure.

An example of this is the ambitious

EC-ESPRIT (the European Strategic Program for Research and
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Develops
1982

in Information
Technology)
^yy;

(Jacobsen,

1988 )

.

Tnis $1

designed to aid European
firms
joint ventures to d eveiop

.

3

^

project
proiect launched in
.

^

,

bilUon program

^

^

^

commercial programs in
computers
tele-communications and related
technologies,
clearly there
were many factors that
inspired this project,
not the least
of which was a desire
to help Western European
firms to
break into capital-intensive
markets.
y et one broader
consideration was to develop a
program that could aid
western European firms in their
desire to reduce exposure
to
United states economic leverage
(Interview, Brussels, EC,
1990)

Hard-line officials' ability to
hold sway in domestic
debates over East-West trade
policy began to slip after the
failure of coercion in the pipeline
deal.
1983 when the
1979 EAA came up for renewal, business

m

groups and some

members of Congress concentrated
efforts on opposing the
Administration's hard-line. Throughout
negotiations on the
renewal of the legislation, business
groups lobbied for

a

greater relaxation of controls on West-West
trade and
consistently objected to the economic and
competitive costs
of such controls.
Over 300 high technology firms
joined

forces in the Industry Coalition on Technology
Transfers to
lobby for relaxations of controls. In addition,
groups such
as the Business Roundtable, the Computer and Business
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Equipment Manufacturing
Association, the Electronlies
Association, and the
Electronics

Industry Association,
all
put pressure on tne
Administration for greater
relaxations.
There had been both hidden
and overt costs to the
Pipeline sanctions. For
example, Caterpillar
Tractor
suffered a S300 million loss
as ,
Qf
Fiat Allis lost over 500
S
Million in contracts; and
GE, one
of the principle suppliers,
lost ,ajor contracts as
a result
of the trade sanctions
(Jentleson,

^
p.

^

207,

1986).

m

addition, business groups argued
that the Reagan
Administration action increased the
perception that United
States firms were unreliable
suppliers.
this context Don
Bonker (D-Washington) sponsored
a revision of the EAA that
reflected the belief that the export
control program should
be scaled back significantly. His
version of the bill was
supported by business interest groups.
The bill would have
limited the role of the DOD and the Customs
service in the

m

export control program and would have reduced
regulations on
intra-COCOM trade in controlled items.
The DOD and other executive officials attempted to

counter this opposition by working through the Senate.

The

Senate version of the bill was sponsored by Jake Garn
(R-Utah)

and John Heinz (R-Pennsylvania)

.

The bill was in

fact a compromise between the more liberal and conservative

camps in the Senate.

The more liberal camp pushed for

297

measures designed to limit
executive *>
discretion in the
imposition of export controls
for roreign
foreian policy
nnH
reasons.
The bill also included a
sanctity of contracts
provision
designed to satisfy the concern
with
U.S.

supply

unreliability.

Conservatives, along with
the DOD, pushed
for a significantly expanded
national security export
control program.
The bill provided for
greafcly

surveillance program with more
oversight given to the DOD
and customs.
The bill also stipulated
closer screening of
export license applications by
the Commerce Department and
the DOD.
The differences between the
House and

Senate bills

and the intensity of the conflict
on the issue bogged
negotiations down in conference committee
for three years.
During this period the 1979 EAA
expired.
The Reagan
Administration only maintained export
control authority by
invoking the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act.
The outcome of the Congressional imbroglio
was mixed.
The Senate prevailed on the issue of
maintaining
and

strengthening Executive authority for extending
controls
extraterritorially.

The final bill reaffirmed export and

re-export control authority and established statutory

authority to impose import sanctions on firms that violated
United States and COCOM controls.

The House prevailed in

its attempt to establish requirements to increase the

efficiency of export license application processing.
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It is difficult to
establish precisely
when
hard-liners in the Reagan
Administration begin to
lose

^

control over thp
nnn„„ process
the policy
on East-West trade
and over
the administration of
export controls. The
pipeline
conflict did help
P to disrrpH^
discredit *-v,
their position, but a
number
of factors came together
in late 1985 and
early 1986 to tilt
the intra-governmental
balance of power. Continuing
declines
the united States share
of high-technology
markets and
•

m

lent support to arguments
for

a

reevaluation of the United

States program and for
relaxations on controls.
B y the
beginning of the second Reagan
Administration there was also
a vocal and organized
opposition to an economic warfare
strategy and particularly to
tighter restrictions
on

West-West technology transfers.

An absolutist discourse

still guided the perception of
some officials in the
agencies charged with oversight on
export controls. The
authority of symbols and images representing
the United
States as having lost the strategic edge
to the "Soviet
Threat, « however, began to wane. The image
of the United
States in economic and technological decline
vis a vis its

Western competitors gained wider circulation.

The dynamic

of this trend became a growing focus of analysis
among

scholars and policy elites.

A sense of urgency to reverse

the trend of decline took hold in the policy establishment.
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President Reagan delivered
need for the

f o rtif ication

a

speech in 198 7 on the

of econQmic

strengthening commercial
competitiveness
in addition, in early
1987 the

(

w SJ Feb.,

6

1987)

National Academy of Science

released an influential study
entitled

^^-^nmi^mj^u^

(nas,

Mlan^g^

i9 87; wsj Feb.

6

,

i 987)

.

This study had been Commissioned
by the Congress as a
result
of the protracted conflicts
over the renewal of the
1979
EAA.
The NAS study brought together
an array of business
and government officials and
academics.
The
NAS sent

delegations to all of the alliance
states and some non-COCOM
states to collect information and
opinions on the entire

Western export control program.

The final analysis

estimated that the direct, short-run
economic costs to the
United States economy associated with
U.S.

was $9.3 billion in 1985 alone (NAS

was based on

a

,

p.

export controls

264,

1987).

This

complex calculation of administrative costs

of compliance for firms ($500 million),
revenue loss for

West-West and East-West exports, and associated
GNP loss.
This did not include a measure of the competitive

costs to

United States firms and affiliates.

The investigations

revealed deep resentment by Western European government
and

business officials of the United States export control

program and re-export control authority.

It was found that

300

of the United states
export control

m

'

,

were recipients of
nf it
c
U.S.
controlled technologies
and goods.
Long processing times
for license
*
applications
and the
inefficiency of the overall
system were found to
have
created competitive
disadvantages in situations
;

„h ere

alternative Western foreign
availability existed. Thi s
was
significant given the fact
that in 1985 over 40
percent approximately $ 78 billion - of
United states
'

exports of

nonmilitary manufactured goods
required a validated license
Associated with lost United
states exports was also a
reduction in U.S. employment
of
1987).

m

1 88

,

00 0 jobs

(NAS p.
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short the study exposed the
real economic cost
associated with the United States
more restrictive position
on export controls.
The study did not consider the
more
intangible, but no less significant,
long term political
cost of attempting to extract
compliance.
The key

conclusion was that in the context of
the transformed
international economy, the United States
had

to find ways to

balance national security export controls
with the demands
of global economic competition.
In February 1987 new White House staff members,
such

as National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci and
former

Ambassador Robert Dean, appeared to be more open to
industry's position on the economic and competitive costs of
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^

COntr ° 1S (WSJ

Feb

«'

'

'

"

bUSi

- SS

W

Canucci,
instituted a Nationai

Security Council study that
was expects to o
ffer proposal s
for relaxations on West-West
controls.

At the December lg86

COCOM meeting United states
officials had pressed the
alii es
to strengthen domestic
control programs in exchange
for a
shortening of the list of items
subject to control and in
exchange for relaxations of the
strenuous licensing
requirements on intra-COCOM re-exports.
The NSC study was

designed to set out concrete
proposals for the July
COCOM meeting.
addition to

m

19 87

the steps taken by the

Executive some members of Congress
began proposing
amendments to the EAA designed to
reduce impediments to
West-West trade flows.
Hard-liners in the Pentagon and in Commerce
reacted by
portraying the movement toward any relaxation
as a

willingness to trade long term security away
for short term
economic interests (WSJ, Feb. 6, 1987).
They
called the

proposals "The Soviet Technology Relief Act of
1987" and
argued that the long term R & d costs of having

to make up

for losses in lead time gaps would require
a high price
(WSJ,

July 22, 1987).

Again Perle became the point man.

public declarations he drew on

a set of images

In

reflective of

the absolutist discourse in an attempt to counter the
rising

tide of demands for relaxations in the export control
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p rogram

short

.

He critlci2ed those
uho he said

tern, co„, m ercial

interests.

dri

^^

He

clawed that guard!.ng
the vital organs of the
body politic by way
of technology
transfer controls was still
para.ount to Western security.
Perle said, "We've
ve sewn
spwn up
im the patient!
Nobody wants to rip
him up again" (WSJ Feb.
6,
,

1987).

Administration opponents of
export control relaxation
proposals sought to maintain
their position by using
their
alliances with like-minded
members of
Congress. Just prior

to the July 1987 COCOM meeting
the DOD released reports
that
Toshiba Machine Co. of Japan
had been shipping COCOM

controlled machine tools, used to
make ultraguiet submarine
propellers, to the Soviet Union.
in
addition, the report

revealed that Kongsberg Vaapenf abrikk
of Norway had been
shipping COCOM controlled computer
software to the Soviet
Union to run the machines. During the
Spring of 1987 there
were additional disclosures of illicit
sales of controlled
technologies to the Soviet bloc by French,
Italian, and

United States firms.
These revelations resulted in

a flurry of

Congressional activity out of which several proposals were
put forward to impose import sanctions on Toshiba and
Kongsberg.

Senator Jake Garn introduced

a bill that would

have barred the two firms from the United States market for
five years.

House bills called for barring the firms from

.
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bidding on OOD and government
procurement contracts.
Both
Houses demanded compensation
from Norway and Japan
for the
cost of developing technology
to counter the guieter
Soviet
submarines.
The Pentagon barred Toshiba
Corporation from
participating in any new defense
contracts until Japanese
officials had completed full
investigations.
The timing of the revelations
was clearly designed as
an agenda setting move and were
intended to give the United
States diplomatic leverage in the
July COCOM talks. The NSC
study and the Congressional amendments
for relaxations were
far from calls for total liberalizations.
They called for
the elimination of re-export licenses
for intra-COCOM
transfers of low end technologies.
in addition, by

submitting to

a

United States audit of internal safeguards

against diversion, some COCOM firms were given
pre-approved
cosignee status eliminating the need for a
re-export
license.

Re-export licenses were still required to transfer

items incorporating United States origin technology
to third

countries.

Re-export licenses were also still required for

the transfer of goods "with U.S. technology content over
10%
for the East and over

2

5% for the West"

(Bertsch and

Elliott, p. 234, 1987)

Over the summer hard-line control of the policy

process on East-West trade and export control issues began
to erode.

Brady had been removed from his position in

304

point man in intra-governmental
battles, left the OOD
for
the American Enterprise
institute.
Upon his departurg
rarled once again against
the aliies.
He said that for
seven years the administration
"had urged"

^

and "had

implored" the aiiies to
strengthen the multilateral
control
program.
" Almost without
exception „ he
continue(J _

allies have resisted our
efforts, sidetracking our
initiatives or watering them
down; delaying,

^

diminishing,
and deflecting us with every
dilatory tactic and
bureaucratic maneuver they could
devise" (WSJ, Ju i y 22/
1987,
Even though Perle left the
DOD was able to hold onto
most of the ground it had
gained in the early
.

1980s.

Perle's staff, particularly
Stephen Bryand, his sucessor,
had the will and the capability
to guard the DODs position.
It was not until 1989 that the
Commerce and the state

Department began to gain some renewed
power at the expense
of DOD (See Chapter 6)
.

Policy Co nfusion and Negotiations
With The Al ies After 1987
l

Out of the domestic conflicts of 1987 the United

States strategy on multilateral export controls became

dominated by two broadly related goals aimed at making
strategic embargo more efficient.

a

The first was to get

allied states to shore up domestic enforcement programs and
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to harmonize their
control criteria
ria

*

T
ho se cond was
The
to find

o
remove restrictions on
intra-coco M trade.
Throughout lat
138V the Unite, states
pressed COCOM states
to strengthen
their domestic control
programs and to toughen
statues for
punishing violators (Post
Oct. 17, i 987; Post
Nov
1987,.
In October 1987 nigh
ranking United
.

^
u

_

administration officials, Allen
Wendt from the state
Department and Undersecretary
of Defense Stephen
Bryen
conducted a series of bilateral
initiatives

to generatl

support for these two policy
goals.
sought allied agreement on

These officials also

the need for a high-level

multilateral meeting on export
controls to be held in
January 1988 (Post, Oct. 17,
1987).

in the bilateral 1987 talks
and at the January 1988

high-level COCOM meeting at Versailles,
the Reagan
Administration was able to gain allied
commitments to
strengthen their domestic control
programs.
The ToshibaKongsberg case did raise the
consciousness
of allied

officials.

Representatives from allied states warned
the
Reagan Administration, however, that
any sanctions

such as

the "Garn Proposal" would do harm
to United States

commercial interests.

Taking such an action they pointed

out, risked undercutting Western European
political

commitments to COCOM (NYT, Jan. 26, 1988).

As a result of
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Uus

case, however, COCOM
states expressed a
strong interest
in upgrading their do m
estio oontrol programs.
Norway
Japan, and other COCOM
states praised to
shore up their
do m estic oontrol program
by costing additional
resouroes
and personnel.

During the January 1988
COCOM meeting United states
officials consistently maintained
opposition to applying
retroactive import sanctions on
Toshiba and Kongsberg and
stated that "unilateral steps
li ke the sanctions
proposed in
Congress would not work- (Post
Jan 29, 1988).
This
demonstrated that the Administration
was more committed to a
multilateral solution to strengthening
COCOM.
The January
meeting was one of the highest level
COCOM meetings ever
held.
It was announced as a success
in that it reconciled
American concerns over stricter domestic
enforcement

programs with member states' criticisms of
the problems
posed by trade inhibiting regulations on
intra-COCOM

(re)exports (NYT Jan. 27, 1988).

The principle "higher

fences around fewer goods" in East-West trade and
"no fences
on intra-COCOM trade" emerged as the ground for
commitment
to continued collaboration on the multilateral export

control program (Interview, Bonn, 1990).
Despite these pledges, action was slow on the part of
both the United States and the allies.

United States

officials thus continued to press allied states to harmonize
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control criteria and
to strengthen
Member states
n^>-H-i^,,i
tes, particularly
Great Britain and
West Germany
Pressed for a faster paced
streamiining of controls.
In
1988 tension between t h e
United states and the
allies begin
to mount again as orders
for machine tools,
industrial
equipment, computers, and
telecommunications equipment
poured into Western Europe.
Chancellor Kohl, who took
prominent German business
officials with him to the
Moscow
economic summit, announced
new trade agreements
with the
Soviets in October 1988.
other Western European
officials
began to ,ove policy in
directions that would allow
their
countries' firms to take advantage
of the commercial

opportunities presented by perestroika.

Thus the

transformations in the East and the
continuing United states
intra-governmental divisions set the
stage for another

inter-allied conflict over the
relationship between
East-West trade and Western security.
The Reagan Administration left
office with the
Secretary of state calling for greater
relaxations and the
Secretary of Defense warning allies to
"beware of repeating
the experience of the 1970s" and arguing
that "we need to
prevent our technology from flowing into the
Soviet military

machine" (CSM, June

7,

1988; WSJ, Nov.

4,

1988).

After

nearly eight years of inter-agency conflict,
experiments
with economic warfare, endless Congressional reviews,
and in

.
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the face of rapid
changes in Eastern
»
EaStGrn Euro
P e the dilemma of
United States export
pynnr-i- „
control policy
resembled the myth of
Sisyphus
r j

•

,

<

,

Conclu^i nn

The

£ our

theoretical perspectives
set out in chapter
one provide a framework
out of which we can
explain the
complex dynamics o f United
states export control
policy and
inter-allied COCOM negotiations.
Rea gan Administration
officials came to office
"ice dei-o™;„,^
determined -to reverse what
they saw
as the mistake of detente.
They believed that the
Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and
the apparent swing right
in the
do.estic political scence
provided a strategic opening
in
which the plausibility of
the absolutist discourse
could be
revived.
Hard-line officials believed
that the absolutist
discourse would
uia serve
servp as the
i-v,~ ^.-.-t-i
rationale and legitimacy for
their preferred economic warfare
policy.
Reagan
Administration officials who orchistrated
this policy hoped
that the power of this discourse
and the leadership ability
of the Reagan Administration
would do two
things:

first,

silence counter discourse camps and
override any substantive
criticism at home; second, persuade the
Western European
governments to follow the United States lead.
If this

failed to bring the allies along, however,
Administration

hard-line officials believed that compliance could
be
extracted.
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The assumptions of
Reagan Administration
on this issue
were wrong.
As a result the stQry
Qf

^

^

is about how the attempt
to revive the
absolutist discourse

and an economic warfare
program failed. At the
level of
issue specific capability
the United Statesrelative
economic power and its share
of global high technology
production declined through the
1970s.
The technological
lead that the United States
had held in areas such as
radar,
sonar, microcomputers, and
semiconductor manufacturing was
eroded.
This meant that compliance rents
available to the
United States were generally reduced.
I am defining rent
here then as simply granting to
firms and states relatively
free access to high-technologies
that the United States
considers to be strategically significant.
'

In this context of rent decline
Reagan Administration

officials strengthened surveillance systems
for both EastWest and West-West technology transfers.
This increased

vigilance included

a

closer scrutanity of export license

applications and an increased DOD role in the review
of
license applications.
it also involved greater

resource

outlays for data collection and special intelligence

operations to map technology transfers.

These steps

enhanced United States' capability to detect violations of
its unilateral and the COCOM export control program.

The

United States also increased its ability to withdraw rents

.
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by re-affirming the
claim of extraterritoriality
addition, the Executive
was g iven greater
authority to
-Pose sanctions on fir s m and
states for violations
of
United states and COCOM
export controls.

^

Through the contested
exchange model
relationship between the

instructs used

States to attempt to ensure
Western firDS
restrictive controls and in an
attempt

,

I

demonstrate the

by the United

compliance with

to extract

concessions from allied states
in COCOM negotiations
,fig ur e
5:1).
Hard-line Reagan Administration
officials
believed

that compliance with their
policy vision could be obtained
by the combination of rents,
rentq surveillance,
b,,-..)!!,.
and the threat of
the withdraw of rents for
non-compliance.
What is

significant here is that as rents
available declined the
outlays and the intensity of
surveillance were in fact
increased
This strategy had two significant and
inter-related
consequences.
First, due to the increased bureaucratic
burdens surveillance and exposure to United
States

extraterritorial claims Western firms perceived an
increasing cost in compliance.

This accelerated the fall of

rents as Western firms turned to next best alternative

suppliers of high-technology (see National Academy of
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leV
of co ngruence or incogurance in the
°
discourses
SJ! Paries in
the transaction.
°
As
the
shared
discourse
h p J
breaks
down actors turn to these instruments to attempt
to
extrace

^

.

or ensure compliance.
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Science,

1987).

Western European
y^n fi
nrms
rms

m

in m
many cases began
to design around United
States technology.
The second conseguence
was that this leverage
strategy
began to entail high
diplomatic costs. The
insistance on

strengthening these compliance
extraction instruments, by
hard-line DOD officials, began
to alienate Western
European
officials and had the potential
to lead to an alliance
rift

The greatest irony in the
entire strategy was that
carrying
through with the threat of
rent withdraw could have
theoretically undermined Western
security by denying
alliance states access to
technological items that were
considered to have strategic
significance.
Perhaps there
were some individuals in this
camp, namely Richard Perle
and
Lawrance Brady, who favored this
path if it would keep
advanced technology out of the hands
of the Soviets.
The
absolutists' policy vision and their
prefered strategy for
bringing the allies in line was ultimately
undermined,
however, by considerations of broader
diplomatic costs and
the domestic resistance that this strategy
generated.

The first Reagan Administration's more restrictive

stand on export controls and the strengthening of

surveillance programs on West-West technology transfers met
with important opposition at home.

Business interest groups

were quick to recognize the potential competitive cost of
the more restrictive United States position.

As a result of
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the global diffusion
of high-technology
promotive
capability western firms
increasingly had alternatives
to
relying on United states
teohnology.
In the context of
increased and intense global
economic competition the»se
United states business groups
were unwilling and perhaps
unable to absorb losses that
might result from the

absolutists compliance extraction
strategy.
This situation
sparked the domestic opposition.
Unable to launch a frontal
assalt on the absolutists' policy
vision, high-technology
business interests focused their
efforts on
issues such as

the sanctity of contracts and
finding ways to decrease the
processing time for export license
despite the increased
vigilance. The revived Cold War language
of the absolutists
was not strong enough to silence
counter discourse camps.
In an earlier time,

as in the 1950s, United states
business

interests might have lived with this
increased vigilance
because their customers did not have next
best alterative
suppliers. The state of the world economy in
the 1980s,

however, meant tht these groups were less
willing to accept
the policy vision of the absolutist discourse.
The state of

market competition helped to undermine the plausibility
of
the absolutist discourse.

For a short time in the first

Reagan Administration, however, the hard-line did gain the
upper hand.

.
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The institutionalist
analytical
ytlcai n
,t shows
ck
cut
us how the
ab o lutists camp from
the dod was abie tQ
coionize
^
the Commerce and state
Departments.
Western European
Ministries of Economics an
d Ministries of
Eoreign Affairs
had always determined
their states' COCOM policy
stands
Officials from these Ministries
did not share the United

^

of the fact that the
Ministries and the DOD had
divergent
organizational routines and
missions,
addition, DOD did
not have ongoing
trans-governmental links with these
Ministries. The DOD kept trying
to get Western European
Ministries of Defense more involved
in the process, but to
no avail.
DOD officials in bilateral and
multilateral talks
put enormous amounts of pressure
on the allies to conform to
their policy vision. The institutionalist
perspective gives
us insight into why DOD dominance
on the COCOM issue in the
United states helped to produce discord
at the alliance

m

level
By analyzing issue specific capability and
market

competition we can see how the material conditions for
the
prescriptions of the absolutist discourse were wrong.

The

power of the terms of the absolutist discourse, as the
vision that was to provide the purpose behind the economic
warfare policy, was curtailed by material conditions that
resulted in strong and effective domestic and alliance level

315

opposition.

content

discourse camps

^^^

hoid groU n d untii changes
in broader superpQwer
reiatiQns
lent grea t piausibUity
to tneir discourses
and alternaUv£
policy visions.

CHAPTER VI

MUD
no^nn
DODO":

TROUGH

MUTATION OR "THE WAY OF
THF
COCOM TRANSFORMATIONS
1989-1990
,

Revamping K aR t-w a ef

^

Trnrj^_piill

The multilateral export
control program entered a
critical phase just when the
Bush Administration came
to
office.
Radical transformations in
Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union were fundamentally
altering the East-West
strategic balance.
this context it was inevitable
that
the content and the logic of
maintaining the COCOM program
would come under increased criticism
by Western commercial
interests and by some political leaders.
The Bush
Administration faced the chore of responding
to demands for
immediate and broad liberalizations of
controls on West-East
trade, particularly technology transfers.
Yet many members
of the Administration believed it necessary
to try to

m

maintain an effective alliance consensus on the
need to keep
an effective multilateral strategic embargo
intact in the
interest of Western security.

As the political transition

of the Eastern bloc proceeded, however, it became

increasingly difficult for the Administration to explain the

rationale for the continuation of the extensiveness of the
embargo on East-West transfers of industrial dual-use items.
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The fluidity of the
situatlon

Hasten Europe made forming
difficult task,

.

^

^^^
^

UniM

a

^

a

on the whole Unite,
states official s were
cautious about opening
East-West trade. They
argued that
it
the liberalization of
export controls should
be done in a
deliberate fashion.
addition, many officials
in thle
united states DOD and
intelligence community
regained
skeptical of Grobachev and the
durability of the changes
They argued that liberalizations
would prove detrimental
to

m

Western security if the hard
line reemerged in the
Soviet
Union or if the Soviet Union
fell into chaos.

Some of these

United States officials believed
that differentiations
between the Eastern European
states should be made with
regard to the terms of liberalizations.
Many Western
European officials did not share
this skepticism
about

changes in the East.

They wanted more immediate and

comprehensive changes in the nature of
the multilateral
control program.
The compromise alliance solution
eventually worked out
at the June 1990 COCOM talks was
facilitated by several
factors:
first, effective diplomatic pressure by
European

officials, particularly the British and the
Germans;
secondly,

a

shift in the U.S. inter-agency power balance on

this issue away from remaining hardliners in DOD;
and third,
the pressure of commercial interests.

The actual solution
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was

product of close diplomafcic
collaborat on betw£en the
united states and creat
Britain.
The plan served to Keep
political comments intact
for the June 1990
a

.

C0C0 M

Meeting.

It is not clear,

however, that United
states

determination alone
one can mnf^
n ^
contain
forces and pressures at
work
that have the potential to
undermine coordinated efforts,
in addition, the effective
enforcement of controls will
require a more concerted
multilateral effort.
This chapter examines the
consequences of the changes
in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union for the continuation
of the multilateral export
control program.

In so doing it

focuses on analysis of the reasons
for the relative decline
of United States leadership in
the orchestration
and

enforcement of the multilateral export
control program.
Several factors have helped erode the
United States
position.

First, the United States' ability to
offer rents

to states and firms for accepting its more
restrictive

position on COCOM or COCOM type controls, and for
compliance
with these controls, has decreased. This is a
result of
the

growing relative decline of United States' economic power
and the wider global distribution of dual-use high

technology productive capability.

Secondly, the United

States' ability and willingness to maintain

a

conservative

stand on the extensiveness of the multilateral East-West

export control program and

a

cautious pose on deregulation
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has weakened.

This resulted

f

_^^^

^^

Perceive, decline in genera!
economic competitiveness
strengthened the position of
domestic commercial
interests
actively seaking export
control programs less
restrictive of
their access to potential
Eastern markets.
The understanding of national security
in Washington D.C.,
has also

been broadened to include
economic and technological
competitiveness (NAS, 1987). This
allowed agencies,
sympathetic to commercial groups'
demands, to improve their
inter-governmental power position at
the expense
of the

traditionally "control minded" DOD.
erosion of

a

common discourse

-

Finally, there was an

shared images and symbols

-

of the nature of the Soviet
Union and the Soviet threat to
Western security. This hindered
United States' attempts to
formulate a new consensus on the nature
and rationale of

COCOM controls, in 1988.

While the phraseology of an

absolutist discourse shifted to constructions
of Iraq, there
remains an alliance divergence of perception
on appropriate
East-West trade policy.
The first part of the chapter reviews the
history of

alliance discussions of East-West multilateral export
controls in 1989 and 1990.

An analysis of the outcome of

the June 1990 COCOM talks will show how the United States

begin to lose, and then attempted to regain, its position of
leadership in COCOM.
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The second part deals
with problem areas
that pose
significant challenges to
cocom-s future and to
the future
of United states
leadership in maintaining
any type of
multilateral export control
program.
These areas includedisagreements about the content
of the international
lists
of items subject to
control and the structure
of the core
list negotiations, the
revision of enforcement
programs, the
-pact of German unification,
and the impact
of the EC

l 992

Program.

This section analyzes the
present role of the
United States in these areas,
in the COCOM program in
general, and in enforcing
controls on COCOM and non-COCOM
firms.
addition, it assesses the degree
to which
commercial competition and the
growing foreign availability
of high technology are likely
to undermine political

m

commitments to COCOM.
The third section of this chapter
examines those
factors that are helping perpetuate the
multilateral export
control program. These include the United
States perception
of the Soviet Union, bureaucratic inertia,
and recent calls
for shifting COCOM from an East/West to a
multidirectional
gaze.

Finally, the section considers some proposed methods

to increase the flow of technology to promote
economic and

political reform in Eastern Europe, and at the same time

maintain control and management systems to protect Western
security interests.
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During 1989 inter-allied
tensions in COCOM
multiplied
Alliance leaders pressed
for a reconsideration
of the
rationale of the program
At the very
revisions and broad relaxations
of the international
industrial list, procedural
and institutional reform,
and a
reassessment of the categorization
of Eastern European
states subject to controls
(WSJ, Aug. 4, 1989;

^ ^^
Interview,

Bonn, January,

Rudolf,

1990; Interview,

Brussels, January,

19 90;

1990).

Despite continued pressure,
the Bush
Administration did not respond to
these demands in any
substantive way until January 1990.
The April 1989 COCOM
meeting was stalled because Bush
had yet to appoint
individuals to oversee policy on
strategic exports (NYT
April 14, 1989; Interview, Bonn,
January 1990). The
inter-allied conflicts and stalemate thus
continued

throughout 1989 and the first half of
June 1990.
The Bush delay proved significant to
the inter-agency
balance of influence in the United States.
Stephen Bryant
left his post in the DOD as the Bush
Administration came to
power in early 1990. Bryant had been Richard
Perle's

successor in the Pentagon heading up the Defense
Technology
Security Agency (DTSA)

.

Bryant was a formidable

inter-bureaucratic warrior and was known unaf f ectionately in

European circles as "Dr. K(no)w" (Interview, Europe,
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October,

1990)

.

Bryant had apparenuy
been

the 19 sos in the inter .
agency power baiance
control issues.
In early
199b>

^^

^

^

^

appointed a temporary
replacement for Bryant
^
decision could be made on
a more permanent
replacement.
That decision was bound
up in the broader
issue of the
direction of United States
policy in
this area.

Bryant's

temporary replacement was
not as adept at
interagency
politics and was unwilling
to engage in pressure
tactics
with the Western Europeans
(Interview, United

states Embasy

London, October,

1990,

.

The slow presidential
transition

and the effectiveness of
United States commercial
interestspressure on the administration,
gave State and Commerce
Department officials room to
maneuver in Washington. Over
the course of 1989 they were
able to improve their positions
in the complex United states
inter-agency export control
structure.

At the April COCOM meeting, however,
the

Administration was unwilling to move. Alliance
officials
pressured the United States to agree to remove
the "no

exceptions" policy on the Soviet Union in
response to its
removal of troops from Afghanistan. Allied
officials also
began applying pressure on the United States to
liberalize
the control lists in the area of telecommunications,

.
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precision machine-tool.!
tools, and computers.
The British and the
Germans, in particular
beg an to app ly
pressure
States by claiming unilateral
discretion to license
items
for export on qrounds
unas that
thai- the
i-h»

m

^

items were not subject
to
; <.

y

COCOM controls.

^

In many cases United

with the unilateral action
of these states led
to heated
disputes
in May,

the Bush Administration
did agree to lift the
no exceptions policy that
had been in place since
19 79 (WSJ
Nov. 20, 1989).
Then over the summer, the
Administration

announced liberalizations on controls
of computer exports to
the Soviet Union and Eastern
European
states.

The new

threshold set by the United States
nearly doubled the
performance level of computers and
computer operated devices
that could be shipped East (WSJ
July
,

31,

1989).

Sales of

IBM's PC/AT and its clones, Digital
Equipment Corp.'s PDF
11/44, 11/60, and 11/84-P, Hewlett- Packard's
number 9000
desktop computer series 200 and 300 to
the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe were all permitted (WSJ,
Aug.

4,

1989).

Perhaps more significantly, the United States
agreed to
allow the sale of portable computers to the
East, including
laptop computers. This meant that Toshiba, NEC,

Compaq, and

Zenith all stood to benefit from the liberalizations.

The

Commerce Department announced the changes amid much fanfare,
but maintained that the changes were the result of foreign

.

.
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availability determinations
and that rney
thev did not
„ represent

a

concise

or a shift in overaU

"69,.

^^^

^

This ch an ge was
significant in that the
computer
threshold issue had heen
one o f the DOD-s
pri.ary concerns
under Perle and Bryant.
Secretary of Defense Cheney
disagreed with the changes
in the control threshold
for
computers and publicly announced
that the DOD opposed the
changes

Most Western European
officials claimed that the
United States decision to
liberalize in the computer
category while not moving on
machine
tools, tele-

communications, or other areas
where questions had been
raised was driven by commercial
interests (Interview,
Europe, October, 1990; Interview,
Brussels, September,

1990)

Several United States firms such as
IBM, Data
General, and Digital did stand to
benefit from these
deregulations (NYT, Dec. 17, 1989).
addition, there had
been pressure on the Administration over
the threshold on
computer export controls throughout the summer
.

m

of 1989

(Interview, Washington, April, 1990).

Whatever the actual

motivation, the perception of the commercially motivated

nature of these changes among Western European officials
increased the growing tension.

It began to show signs of

undermining alliance commitments to the multilateral
process
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The allies were

deterged

tQ

^^^

toward a comprehensive
reconsideration of thg
confcroi
program.
They continued to
argue
a

-chine tool.

^^^^^ ^

an d telecommunicates,
ana they wantea a
reconsiaeration o f states
subject to control.
Tne British
and the Germans were
the key
players in nnH'
i F-Lciyers

putting extensive

pressure on the United
States.

m
1

the ssoring
tne
Pnng and„ summer of

1989,

European governments and
f irms began tQ
show a
willingness to defy the
United states an d ignore
the
multilateral prooess. The
British, over strong
United
States' objections allowed
Simon-Carves Ltd. to go ahead
with a deal to build a
plant to manufacture factory

automation equipment and
industrial microcomputers in
the
soviet union, similarly,
the French government
supported
Alcatel's development of a
project contract to manufacture
telecommunications equipment in the
Soviet Union,

despite
the fact that the Unite d
States maintained that the deal
woul d violate COCOM (WSJ, May
3, 1989).
These openly
announce d decisions were ind ications
that some Western
European officials were rea d to
y
risk a major diplomatic
confrontation with the United states
over this issue. Some
Western European officials stated
that they believed in the
summer and fall of 1989 some COCOM
members were ready to
consider withdrawing from cooperation on
maintaining the

international industrial lists if the United
states
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continued to stall (Interview,
Brussels, September,
l990
interview, Europe, October
mo)

^

,

^^

.

^

such an eventuality in the
press beca.e a means by
which
Western European officials
and perhaps see United
States
agencies, applied pressure
on the Bush Administration
(Interview, Brussels, September,
19 90; Interview,
Washington, April, 1990)
It should also be said
British officials interviewed,
claimed that the Simon-Carves
case was not intended as a
diplomatic pressure move
(interview, London, October,
1990).
it,

^^

.

however, was

interpreted by United States
officials as such (Interview,
Washington, July, 1990; Interview,
London, October,

1990).

The fact that many Western European
firms were moving
ahead on major deals in the East
resulted in increased
domestic pressure in the United States
(Interview,

Frankfurt, September, 1990).
fall 1989,

m

the late summer and early

it appeared that an open intra-governmental
and

intra-alliance disagreement was about to erupt
once again on
the pace of liberalizations.
Domestic and Western
European

high technology business lobbyists "turned up the
heat" on
the Bush Administration. As in the past, disagreement

between the Commerce Department on one side and the DOD and
the intelligence community on the other began to appear, but
this time in

a

less intense form because extreme hardliners

no longer dominated the DOD.

The task of the NSC in the
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«11

of 1989 appeared to
be heading off
such a

for-ulating

a

policy option

^

wQuid

all agencies involved.

^

^

^.^^ ^

As dissatisfaction grew
among the allies United
states
leadership was threatened.
Moreover, there was concern
in
Washington that some European
allies might begin to
ignore
COCOM agreements on industrial
items altogether

(Freedenberg,

1989).

m

September 1989, President
Bush sent
letters to all of the leaders
of the COCOM states

admonishing them about apparent
laxity in enforcement of
COCOM controls and urging them
to "tighten-up on controls
until issues could be resolved"

(Interview, Bonn, January,

1990; Interview, Brussels, January,

1990).

m

1990; NYT, Oct. 9,

addition, the Administration sent
Ambassador

Allen Wendt and the new head of the
Defense Technology
Security Agency, William Rudman, to
European capitals in an
attempt to establish a framework for the
October 1989 talks
(WSJ,

Nov.

20,

1989).

As part of this mission, Rudman

announced dramatic new figures on illicit
machine-tool deals
with the Soviet bloc. Such announcements by

now, had become

a

standard practice. Just prior to every political
level

COCOM meeting throughout the 1980s, the United States,
usually someone in DTSA, revealed new cases of allies'
failure to prevent or detect the illicit transfer of

sensitive technology (Interview, Brussels, January, 1990).
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Perle and Bryant's
practice in
in +u
the past was usually
to li ne
up Senators, such
as Jake Garn
Garn, 1-n
h
to help publicize
the iss
ssue
u
by making statements
in Congress
S
9
on
fhi
occasion, Rudman
° n thls
stated that since 19 83
European C0CQM
Slivered more than 6 ,ooo
embargoed machine tools
to thle
Soviet union (WSJ, Nov
20
1989)
,

<

^^^^

*

.

,

.

-chine

tools, he argued, had
been used in projects
run by
the Soviet Military
ry Indu^i-ri
*
i
n
industrial Commission.
The most
critical case involved
the Italian firm, Ing
c Olivetti
that sold machine tools
to a Soviet aeronautics
factory
where they were used to
build the YAK-41 fighter
bomber
(WSJ Oct. 16, 1989)
president Bush confronted
itai an
President Francisco Cossiga
himself over the issue when
he
.

'

,

.

visited Washington in October
(WSJ

.

,

Oct.

16,

1989).

These disclosures seemed to
be designed to blunt and
slow down western European
demands to relax the multilateral
export control program until
the changes in the East had
solidified and until the United
States could regain
the

diplomatic advantage (Interview, Bonn,
Jan., 1990).
public criticisms raised by President

The

Bush also seemed

designed to allow the NSC time to find

a

way to forge an

inter-agency consensus on an adjusted policy
stand.
The United States delegation to the October
1989 COCOM
meeting was lead by Under Secretary of State
Reginald

Bartholomew, Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,
and
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Under Secretary of

Coerce

sources in Paris, the

Dennis Kloske.

St^et

Re i ying on

Jp^ and

Xi^

^^

the

reported that the United
States delegation had
been
outnumbered 16 to 1 in its
opposition to immediate action
on
comprehensive changes in the COCOM
program
(WSJ

1989; NYT Oct.

27,

1989).

,

Nov.

20,

However, Stephen Saboe a
United

States official in Ambassador
Allen Wendt s office, denies
that this was the case.
He stated that there was
greater
consensus in October than the Western
Europeans were willing
to disclose, particularly, on
the need to slow down
the pace

of relaxations.

He also said that public statements
of

opposition to the United States position
"were
screen and, in fact that they too wanted

a

smoke

to slow the pace of

relaxation- (Interview, Washington, July,
1990).
in Bonn stated, however, that there
was general

Officials

dissatisfaction with the United States' position
on the pace
of relaxations at the October 1989 talks
(Interview,
Bonn,

January,

1990)

.

This perception was shared by leaders in

other European capitals (Interview, London, October,
1990;
Interview, Brussels, September, 1990; Rudolf,
1990).
Great Britain and West Germany led in applying strong

pressure on the United States to alter its position on
relaxations.

Representatives of both states made public the

intensity of their commitment to see

a

general

liberalization of the multilateral control program

(

The Week
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in-anm.

""^

6ct.

27,

1989)

qUeSti ° n ° £ heth
"

viable organization

German officiais

.

-

Th-i<= tIae
^
ThlS
was an
attempt to pressure the

Bush Administration (NYT,
Oct.
WSJ, Nov.

1989; Rudolf,

20,

or not COCOM was any
ionger a

9,

1989; CSM,

Nov.

1989;

2,

1990; Rummel,

1990).
One German
official stated prior to the
October meeting that "in an
age
where, via dialogue and
cooperation, we try to assist
reform
processes in Poland, Hungary, and
the USSR, COCOM is
outdated- (NYT, Oct. 6, 1989).
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Genscher also stated just after the
meeting that "COCOM had
become outdated" (CSM, Nov. 2,
1989).
The Social Democratic
spokesman on economic matters, Wolfgang
Roth, called on the
West German government and other EC
member states to "no
longer follow the COCOM program even if
this would risk a
trade conflict with the United States"
The Week in
(

r^ny

,

Oct.

27,

1989).

Finally Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to

seize the opportunity of the growing transatlantic
rift and
told a meeting of the European Parliament in
Strasbourg that

"COCOM should be dismantled so West and East can join

together in

a

common European home" (WSJ, Nov. 20, 1989).

The October meeting ended in

a

stalemate.

The Bush

Administration was able to delay immediate action in COCOM
by agreeing that the Western European proposals and the

changes in the East reguired
(NYT,

Oct.

27,

1989).

a

review of the entire program

The United States indicated at this
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meting that

it was

wining to consider the
possioiiity of

moving Eastern European
states into a category
separate fro m
the Soviet Union (Interview
interview, Rnnn t
Bonn, January,

meant that they would he
placed in
lowering the threshold of

a

1990).

This

-china type category-

control (WSJ

,

Nov.

20,

1989).

The

United States delegation,
however, registered strong
criticisms of other COCOM states'
enforcement programs and
issued warnings about actions
against firms
found in

violation of controls.

The standards and strength
of

enforcement, Bush Administration
officials pointed out, were
not uniform among the COCOM states.
Several members did not
have satisfactorily rigorous
administrative processes or
systems for surveillance on compliance
with controls in
place (NYT, Oct. 9, 1989; WSJ Nov.
,

Bonn, January,

1990; Interview,

20,

1989;

Interview,

Brussels, January,

1990).

It is generally recognized that this
criticism was directed

at the so called Southern tier states (Italy,
Spain,

Portugal, Greece)

(Interview, Brussels, Jan,

1990).

in

addition, some United States Congressmen once again

brandished the threat of withdrawing compliance rents from
Western high technology firms that violated controls by
stating that Olivetti might be prohibited from government

procurement contracts and access to the United States market
for its violations (NYT, Oct. 27, 1989).

332

nnrUd_stateslDT^ide
The European reaction
to the United states
criticisms
at the October feting
was highly critical.
By December
1989 United States officials
began to realize that they
might see a collapse of COCOM
as a whole or at least
an end
of collaboration on the
industrial list items if they
did
not adjust their position
(NYT, Dec. 17, 1989; Interview,
Bonn, January, 1990; Interview,
Brussels, January, 1990/
interview, Washington, D.C.,
1990).
According to European
officials, at the mid-levels in
DOD and the intelligence
community, advocated withholding
as much Western technology
as possible from the Soviet
Union.
They wanted to hold out
until "the economic crisis had fully
undermined the position
of the communist party." These
individuals maintained that
"transfusions" of Western technology would
only prolong the
life of communist rule. They saw Gorbachev's
policies as

shrewd tactical moves to save the position
of the party
(Interview, Bonn, Jan. 1990; Interview, Washington,
April,
1990)

.

Most Western European government officials disagreed

with the hardline view and stated their determination to
move ahead with deregulations on East-West trade controls in
no uncertain terms.

As one German stated, "streamlining

will occur with or without the United States" (Interview,
Bonn, Jan,

1990)

.

Western European resolve to move ahead
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with encouraging economic
ties
was a consequence of

technoiQgy

^^^^^

several factors.

First, there was a
general perception that
the
security issues in East-West
trade policy had beg un
to
change.
The quest ion had begun
to shift fro, how to
prevent
such trade fro, enhancing
Eastern bloc military
capabilities
to how to use offers of
access to Western economic
and

technological capability to
induce further refer, and
stability.
Thus there was a renewed
conviction that
increased trade and technology
transfers

had an instrumental

value (Interview, Bonn, January
and September 1990;
Interview, Brussels, January,
1990).

Secondly, there was a perception,
initially at least,
that the economic liberalizations
in these countries held
vast commercial opportunities.
This resulted in domestic
commercial pressure on these governments
to oppose the
United States desire to slow the pace
of liberalization.
Thirdly, Western European officials seemed
to be less

willing to cling to Cold War-informed images
and suspicions
(Interviews, Brussels and Bonn, Jan, 1990;
Interview,

Washington, April, 1990).
Several export license cases in the fall strengthened

Western European perceptions that United States discussions
on relaxations of controls were driven by its own commercial

interests.

While Secretary of Defense Cheney continued to
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voxo, concerns ove r the
pace and the scop£
Qf
the Pentagon a rove d
PP
license

appUcatlons

international Inc. to transfer

»

a

colter

^

^

'

asse mbly techno logy

oint venture with the
Soviet Ministry for the
Radio
Industry (NYT, Dec. 17,
1989)
Th
±y»9).
This was significant
since
it involved a trade
that could improve Soviet
computer
manufacturing capability because
it transferred process
know-how and unassembled computer
components.
the past,
DOD officials had successfully
prevented the issuance of
such licenses on grounds that
such transfers would
indirectly contribute to Soviet
military potential. The DOD
also did not prevent a license
issue for a Data General sale
of a 32-bit MV 2000 minicomputer
to the Soviets.
Several
other United States high-tech firms,
such as Control Data
Corporation and US West, began pursuing
more vigorously
contracts with Eastern bloc states for
more extensive
3

,

i

<=

,

m

telecommunications and computer system projects
(NYT, Dec.
17,

1989; Interview, Bonn, January 1990).

it is difficult

to establish whether these changes signaled
some flexibility

among DOD and intelligence officials or whether
it was an
indication of the overall inter-agency power shift

away from

DTSA in the DOD on this issue to the Commerce and State
Department.

What is clear is that cases such as these added

to Western European suspicions and resentments.

This was

because the United States was unwilling to move in other
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areas such as machine
tools and telecommunications
(interviews, Brussels and
Bonn, Jan
1990; Interview
London, Oct, 1990).
it shnniH
k
should be
) It
pointed out, however,
that
the DOD did not obiert+-o some
o«
object to
significant license issues
to
European firms in the
colter area, such as Siemanns-ASEA's
deal to sell 300,000
personal colters to the
Soviet Union
,

,

•

(CM, Nov.

2,

1989;

.

interview, Bonn, Jan

,

1990,.

The united States more
restrictive stand on relaxation
of controls was being
undefined by several factors.
First
the rapid pace of changes
in the East and a growing
perception that they were more
than superficial was
undermining this position. The
drive to alter policy on the
multilateral control program was
obviously in part a
response to changes in the strategic
situation brought on by
the political and economic
trans-formations in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union.
However, the move to alter
policy was also a direct result of the
domestic and alliance
level pressure being exerted on the
Administration. An
official in Bonn informed this author that
his government
was "placing hope in the effectiveness a
combination of

allied pressure and pressure from the United
States high

technology lobby to force the Administration to raise
the
control thresholds" (Interview, Bonn, January, 1990).
Perhaps more significant than the domestic factors
that helped to shift the Bush Administration policy position
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were the factors that
threatened the United states
leadership position in COCOM
The
.

stalling on

first factor was the 1989

policy shift that had lead
to resentment.
Secondly, Western European
governments and firms seemed
to
have come to believe that the
costs of being exposed to
the
whims of the United States Congress
and the potential costs
of being cut off from compliance
rents, in whatever form,
did not outweigh the potential
benefits that could result
from moving ahead with trade
liberalization.
a

Thirdly,

Western European leaders were not
confident that the United
States could successfully negotiate
agreements

with or offer

effective compliance rents to, non-COCOM
suppliers of COCOM
controlled items or technologies (Interview,
Bonn, Jan,

1990)

.

The adage "he who hesitates is lost" seems
initially

to have characterized the thinking of some
Western European

firms when it came to entering these new markets.
The United States Policy Shift

The shift in the United States position on the multi-

lateral export control program came in two stages.

The

first policy shift was announced in January 1990 and the

second in May 1990 just prior to the June COCOM talks.

Following

a

meeting between President Bush and President

Mitterand on St. Martin in late December 1989, the

Administration announced that it was going to recommend

a

reorganization of domestic constraints on East-West trade
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and a substantial shorting
of the COCOM list
,NVT, Deo
1989; NYT Jan.
1990)

17

.

were to he worked out
through
the end of January 1990.

a

NSC stu dy to he
completed by

The January shift was
based on
"differentiation" among oountries.

a

oonoept of

The polioy did not

affect oontrol criteria to be
applied to the Soviet Union
but it did call for a phased
easing of controls for
the
Eastern European states. First
Hungary
and Poland, then

East Germany and Czechoslovakia
and finally, perhaps,
Rumania and Bulgaria would be
placed

in a "china type"

category (NYT, Jan. 23, 1990,.

This would give those states

access to a much greater array
of technology than in the
past when they were categorized
with the Soviet Union.
In
order to qualify for this recategorization,
Eastern European
states would have to agree to develop
safeguards against
diversion of technology into military
applications.
This

meant that they would have to establish legal
and
administrative frameworks similar to those imposed
states.

by COCOM

In addition, this would include agreements
for on-

site inspections by United States officials (NYT,
Jan. 23,
1990)

.

The proposal also included significant reductions in

controls over computer technology and machine tools and some

liberalization on telecommunication eguipment.
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The United States
proposal of January,
Tan
1990 met with
strong and by now familiar
criticise
riricisms Particularly
from
West Germany and Great Rrif^in t-r *
Britain (Interview, Bonn,
September
1990; interview, London, October,
1990)
The proposed
shift, European officials
argued, did not adequately
reflect
the changes that had and
were occurring in the GDR,
'

.

Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet
Union.
Western European
firms had begun to move into
these newly liberalized
markets.
The prospect of not easing
controls on the Soviet
Union and only gradually easing
controls on Eastern
Europe,

beginning with Hungary and Poland
where United States firms
had begun to conclude contracts
for major projects, struck
the Europeans as unnecessary due
to the political changes
that were occurring. The proposal
also appeared to be
driven by commercial interests rather
than strictly security
considerations (Interview, London, October,
1990).

Many

major European project deals would have
been placed on hold
by the criteria of this new policy.
West Germany's Standard

Elektrick Lorenze AG, for example, had been
developing
massive joint venture with the GDR to construct
a

a

plant in

Arnsadt to install SEL's system-12 digital switching
technology to replace East German telecommunications
equipment (WSJ, Mar.

12,

1990).

The result was once again a stalemate.

The Europeans

rejected differentiations between the various Eastern

.
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European states ana to
retention of existing
oontro ls on tne
Soviet Union. The united

states attested in
bil aterai
talks to convince the
anies to go
allies
rro along
=i
with the program,
but to no avail (Interview,
Brussels, September, 19
90)
In
light of the opposition,
the United States
established an
inter-agency working group
to produce a new more
workable
proposal before the COCOM
talks set to begin in
June
(Interview, Washington D.C.
April 1990).
April,
iQQm
The new position
announced on May 2, 1990
called for what seemed to
be the

most radical reorganization
of multilateral export
control
collaboration in the history of
COCOM.
The May initiative
appeared to be a diplomatic
success for the United States
(Interview, Bonn, September 1990;
Interview, Brussels,

September 1990).

one German official told this
author that
with this move "the United States
exerted effective

leadership in COCOM and put itself
back into the driversseat" (Interview, Bonn, September
1990).

The United States

had been, however, working closely with
the British on the
proposals for the June talks. in all likelihood,
what
emerged was a collective British-United States
policy

proposal (Interview, London, October, 1990). As
one United
States official in London put it, "what was finally
agreed

upon could be called British wine in an American bottle"
(Interview, London, October,

1990)
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The Key change was that
the United states
changed its
position on differentiation
and also agreed to a
certain
degree of relaxations on
controls for the Soviet
Union.
The
United States agreed that one
single streamlined list
needed
to be created.
return, the other COCOM
member states
agreed to compromise on the issue
of differentiation between
the Soviet Union and the Eastern
European states by
establishing a "special procedure."
This special procedure
allowed some Eastern European states
to apply individually
for exceptions in order to allow
controlled items to be
transfered in specific cases. The
compromise solution broke
the stalemate and effectively renewed
the allied

m

states'

commitment to the COCOM process to negotiate
the particulars
of the changes in the multilateral
control
program.

At their Paris meeting in June 1990, the
COCOM states

agreed to sweeping liberalizations.
talks was complicated.

The outcome of the

The COCOM states agreed to fully

rework the list of controlled items,

in the interim they

agreed to drop 30 of the 116 product categories from the
list as it existed prior to the June talks.

Member states

agreed that the international lists, particularly the
industrial list, should be redrawn "from scratch"
(Interview, Paris, November, 1990).

The goal for the

industrial list of controlled dual-use items was to

establish by the end of 1990

a

"core list" of eight
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categories, each comprised
of . number Qf
Bonn, September, 1990;
Intervi

^
^^^^

».o). The industrial core
Ust
co^unications; computers;

^
uere

^

^

teie _

navigation and

Propulsion systems; sensors
ana sensor systems and
lasers;

electrons

design,

develops,

and production; advanced

-terials and material processing;
and marine technology
(interview, Paris, November,
1990).
The list would be
subject to ongoing assessments
so that items would be
removed when and as soon as
foreign availability

determinations were made (Interview,
London, October, 1990;
Interview, Paris, November
uvemoer, isgo).
iqqm
t
in January
1991 the new
core list was to be presented
at
,

a high level political

meeting for approval and was to
be implemented in each state
by April 1991.
The streamlined core list was
designed to apply to all
of the target states, but Hungary,
Czechoslovakia,
and

Poland were given the "special procedure"
right.

This gave

these states the opportunity to appeal to
COCOM for
exceptions to the core list controls. Exceptions
would be
granted on a case-by-case basis and would be decided

on the

grounds of end-use assurances and the verification of
safeguards that these states would establish against
diversion.

Thus these states would be required to establish

COCOM like procedures and enforcement mechanisms.

According

342

to German officials
the

vision

can be int erpreted
as
allowing Eastern European
states to be taken
off of the
COCOM list of proserin
destinations if they
instituted
systematic and effective
safeguards (Interview, Bonn
September, 1990
The British delegation
only that these states would
given favorable treatment
in
case-by-case requests for exceptions
to
,

^^^^

.

the lists

(Interview, London, October,
1990).
In addition to the core
cor? list
ii C f -i-k^v—
there was an agreement to
.

harmonize each governments individual
enforcement,
administrative, and licensing
procedures by April 1992.
Finally, an agreement was reached
on an "interim regime" on
the issue of the united Germany.
The Continu ation nf COCOM Consensus *n H
the Issue of United States t***^*
j

r

While the June talks were successful
in terms of
establishing a framework out of which states
could negotiate
there exited a number of areas of
potential
conflict.

One

German official told this author that while
the United
States broke the stalemate in May, "there
is still the

potential for a stalemate by January and there will
no doubt
continue to be terrible fights at the technical level"
(Interview, Bonn, September, 1990).

Aside from the

conflicts that might arise in the process of deciding on

Eastern European exception requests in

a

number of areas
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United states leadership
has been

-sue,

^^

^

in these area s could
potential!, underline
effective

Multilateral collaboration.

The areas that pose the

greatest challenge to continued
commitment to COCOM and to
United States leadership
include: the details and
content of
the core list; the difficulty
of hanging,

standardizing,
and enforcing controls and
enforcement procedures; the
tension between intra-COCOM
controls and EC 1992 full
integration; and the problem cf
COCOM and German
unification.

The Core List Neg o tiations

The core list discussions involved
intense conflicts
over the threshold of technologies
in particular categories
of items that should be kept under
control.
The transformations that occurred in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet

Union have made it imperative that
upon as soon as possible.

a

common list be agreed

Friction between the COCOM states

and the United States centers on the fact that
"there will
be competitive disadvantages for nations that
take a more

restrictive, comprehensive approach to controls" (see

statement by Kloske; FT, July

13,

1990).

As to be expected, many states came to the core list

discussions with proposals for very minimal lists.

Under

Secretary of Commerce Dennis Kloske stated that many COCOM
states want only a select few items to be retained on the
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industrial core lists.
lists

T h P r Q have been
There
disagreements ove r a
number of items such as
supercomputers, cryptographic
equipment, and telecommunications.
It is important fco
bear
mind that the United States
has often been able to
maintain the upper hand in
discussions over the addition
or
deletion of an item from the
control lists.
This has been
explained in earlier chapters
in terms of the
micro-economic
model of contested exchange
and in relation to the
United
States' preponderance in
intelligence information and
technical expertise on the military
applicability of
v,

m

particular technologies.

in the context of the present

negotiations, however, the United
States finds itself in a
difficult position for several reasons.
First, the United
States agreed to the European proposal
to rewrite the core
list from scratch (Interview, London,
October,
1990;

Interview, Paris, November, 1990).

list discussions begin with

COCOM operates on

a

a

This means that the core

blank slate.

principle of unanimity.

an item on the list requires unanimity.

Recall that
Thus, placing

Prior to this

agreement, the United States was able to control,
to some
degree, the pace of relaxations because unanimity
was

required to remove an item from the international list.

The

United States could also often effectively get items added
to the list by threatening to hold "items hostage on the

list" that other states wanted to decontrol (Interview,
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Paris, November,

1990).

The present arrangement

significantly alters the
bargaining position of the
United
States in negotiations.
DOD officii
uvu
*=
orricials have
expressed
extreme frustration with this
situation.
one
DOD official

stated that the individual
who agreed to this idea,
at a
Spring meeting in London,
"was either
emner asleep or is an idiot"
(Interview, Paris, November,
1990).

One particular item of
contention on the control list
bears analyzing in some detail
if not for the irony of
the
case then for the dynamics
of the negotiations that
it
exposes.
At points there have been
intense conflicts
between the United States and Great
Britain, France, and
West Germany over the control
threshold that should be

established for telecommunications
equipment (Interview,
Bonn, September, 1990; Interview,
London, October
1990).

DOD officials, throughout the 1980s
maintained that the
threshold should be relatively low and that
by providing the
Eastern bloc states with sophisticated
digital-switching

equipment and fiber optic technology, the West would
increase Soviet bloc military command and control systems.

Now that the perceived threat from the Eastern bloc has
diminished, the United States has been unwilling to move on
the telecommunications issue, despite the fact that there

has been extensive pressure from European officials.
reason:

The

Sophisticated telecommunications technology makes
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eavesdropp ing difficult
(Intervi
interview, Brussels,
September,

October,

1990)

^
1990

^
;

^

i nterview

,

_

London

The united states
intelligence c
ity
and the DOD have strongly
opposed liberalizations on
teleco*
equipment.
While see ministries of
defense in Europe share
this DOD view, most continental
European COCOM members would
like to see extensive
liberalizations in this area
(interview, Bonn, September 1 990
Interview, London, October
.

;

1 99 0)

.

Several Western European firms,
however, have begun to
develop extensive, large scale
contracts to produce and
install entirely new up-to-date
telecommunications systems
in central European states.
in many cases these systems
were ancient. Officials in Bonn, for
example, could not in
many cases get through on the regular
phone lines to the
GDR.

Aside from the commercial interests involved,
some
European officials have pointed out that in
order to

establish

a

pluralistic society, there must be an effective

and operational telecommunications system.

The United

States, however, has been unwilling to move on this
issue.

The United States believes that it is not in the security

interests of the West to allow these states, particularly
the Soviet Union, to import sophisticated telecommunications

equipment that would allow them to put together effective
national communications networks.

Effective tele-
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communications svqtpmc
= v-~
u
systems are,
however,
seen by Western
European officials as a
key tactor
Key
factor in
in *
*
fostering
pluralistic
societies in these countries
untnes. one
nn a «
exasperated German
official said "we have to
find a way to balance
the
eavesdropping interest with
the pro-democratic
and

commercial interp^t-Qii
/t**-~~
interests
(Interview,
Bonn, September, 1990).
Given the new structure of
the international list
negotiation process, the issue
could prove to
•

be
for future dynamics of core
list disagreements.

a

test case

Enforcement Issues
Each COCOM state after the
June talks was required to
report on the nature and extent
of their legal and

administrative procedures for enforcement
of export
controls.
Some COCOM states have extremely
divergent state
bureaucratic traditions and histories
as well as resources

to commit to developing effective
regulatory procedures.
This is particularly the case for the
so-called Southern

tier COCOM member states:
Portugal.

Greece, Turkey, Spain, and

Since the June talks, Under Secretary of Commerce

Dennis Kloske has invited representatives of these
states to

Washington to demonstrate the operations of the United
States Bureau of Export Administration.
There have been conflicts over the approach that the

United States has taken in its attempts to get these states
to strengthen their enforcement systems (Interview,
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Brussels, September, 1990)

.

one problem is that the
United

States has in many instances
offered its export control
program up as a blueprint for
these Southern tier states
(Interview, London, October
1990).

This is not only

unrealistic for these states, but
often United States'
"evangelism- verged on cultural elitism
because officials
did not take into consideration
the divergence in cultural
traditions (Interview, London, October
1990).

As of the

fall 1990,

there was a political will on the
part of these
states to develop enforcement programs,
but United States
prodding has produced resentment that
could undermine such
commitments (Interview, Brussels, September,
1990).
Many of
these states' representatives have also
argued that they
lack the technical capability and the
resources to establish
such an extensive enforcement program (Interview,
Brussels,

September, 1990)

.

m

addition, even if there can be a

standardization in terms of administrative procedures,
there
are serious guestions left about eguivalency and
performance
standards.

For example, will there be common penalties for

violators and will all of these states pursue surveillance
on enforcement of compliance with the same vigor?

It

appears that here once again United States' vigilance and

surveillance systems might have to stand in for states that
have ineffective regulatory and enforcement procedures, but
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the question

renins

as to whether or
not the nature of

united states actions
will aiienate these
governments.
in addition to attempting
to achieve a harmonizing
of
COCOM control standards,
Secretary
Kloske set up a fund to

help Eastern European states
develop safeguards and
legal
and administrative systems,
to prevent controlled
technology
from being diverted to military
use or from being reexported to the soviet union.
This fund of some $1 million
is to provide for consulting
services for setting
up an

enforcement and licensing structure.

The issue of whether

or not these states have
established effective regulatory
procedures and can therefore be
legitimately given certain
favorable treatment or removed from
the COCOM list of

proscribed destinations will no doubt be
an enduring source
of friction between the United States
and the other
members

of COCOM.

British MOD officials have expressed concern
over

the fact that extensive networks still
exist by which such
dual-use technology could be guickly transferred
to the

Soviet Union (Interview, London, October 1990).

This view

is shared by the United States, but the Germans
are much

more sanguine about the prospects of these states being

removed from the proscribed list within the near future.

(')()

^^^^-^-Compjj^nce^^
The United States still
perceives itself as
responsible for ensuring
compliance with multilateral
export
controls.
For example, the United
states continues to
insist on its right to impose
its unilateral export
control
program extraterritoriality. As
pointed out in other
chapters, firms that use or
incorporate United States origin
technology or access to controlled
items are subject to
United States re-export control
authority and in addition
are subject to Commerce Department
inspections and reviews
of internal company enforcement
systems.
Present versions
of the revised Export Administration
Act, now under

consideration, are actually designed to
strengthen the
extent of United States discretion in using
extraterritorial
controls and in imposing sanctions on individuals
and firms

that violate United States and COCOM export
control
regulations.

These penalties involve threats to withdraw

what we have called in other chapters compliance rents
(i.e., government procurement contracts, access to United

States technology)

.

This means of insuring compliance with

the export control program was criticized throughout the
1980s by Western European business and government officials.
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Recall that Western European
governments have no 1,.aws
that require their national
firms or firms operating
in
their countries to comply with
United states extraterritorial export control claims
(Interview, Brussels,
September, 1990; Interview, Bonn,
September 1990; Interview,
London, October 1990).
Officials in Great Britain and
Germany said, however, that they
advise their companies to
"strongly consider their own commercial
interests when
deciding whether or not to comply
with United States
re-export control authority or with
United States demands to
audit firms to inspect enforcement
systems"
(Interview,

Bonn, September 1990; Interview, London,
October 1990).

British officials stated that if one of their
firms

protested to United States extraterritorial claims
they
would "stand by that firm because our government

is opposed

in principle to extraterritoriality, but these
firms must be

pragmatic" (Interview, London, October 1990).
The Commerce Department and the DOD continue to

maintain a "grey list" of firms and individuals that are
believed to be risks for diversion of controlled items,
technology, and technical data (Interview, Europe, October
1990).

If a firm refuses to comply with United States'

extraterritorial claims or with multilateral control
agreements, then it is understood that this can be grounds
for being placed on the "grey list" (Interview, London,

.
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October 1990; MacDonald,
1990).
)•
perception, on the part of

once thic
unce
this occurs, the

grey
firm.
y «y listed firms,

firms,

is „u
that other
•

out of their own
commercial interest and
in the
interest of seeing their
license applications
processed
through the Commerce Department
in a timely fashion,
will be
reluctant to do business
(Interview, Frankfurt,
September,
1990).
This practice is criticized
by the British in
particular because firms and
individuals gain grey list
status simply on the grounds
of suspicion or on the
grounds
that they are seen to be not
cooperating fully with United
States extraterritorial claims
or COCOM controls.
During
the early 1980s, as discussed
in chapter five, there were
several intense public conflicts
between the United states
and Great Britain over this issue
(see Cahill,
1988;

MacDonald, 1990)
If a firm or an individual is
actually discovered to

be involved in illicit transactions
in violation of the

United States or the COCOM export control
program, then they
are placed on a blacklist called the
List of Denials.

Once

placed on this blacklist it is:
Unlawful
for any such person to order, buy
receive, use, sell, deliver, store, dispose of,
forward, transport, finance, or otherwise service,
or
participate in any transaction which may involve any
commodity or technical data exported or to be exported
from the US or any re-export thereof (Denial Orders
Currently Affecting Export Privileges, 1987;
MacDonald, p. 58, 1990).
.

.

.

'
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As argued in previous
chapters, the instructs
of
extraterritorial cl aims
compliance rents, and
surveillance
to monitor compli ance
have been central
institutions in the
Unrted States' enforcement
program directed at COCOM
firms
These instruments have even
been more central in attempting
to ensure compliance by
non-COCOM firms. This has been
particularly the case with firms
in newly industrialized
countries (NICS, where there are
often extremely ineffective
domestic export control enforcement
systems.
,

In chapter five

I

discussed the competitive and the

economic costs to the United States
that resulted from the
use of these instruments. At
present several significant
factors are eroding United states'
ability to ensure
compliance with multilateral export
controls.
First a
general and growing proliferation of
advanced and dual-use
technologies means that the number of actual
and potential
suppliers of controlled items has been expanded

(Interview,

Paris, November,
In addition,

1990; see Bertsch and Elliott-Gower

,

1990).

the United States technological lead in many

areas of advanced and dual-use technology has been eroded
by
the expansion and development of sophisticated productive

capabilities by COCOM and non-COCOM firms.

Bertsch and

Elliott-Gower point out that the United States lead has been
eroded in areas such as: aircraft, radar, sonar,
microcomputers, transformers, semiconductor manufacturing,

.
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and radio and television
teohno logy (Bertsch and
Elliott-cower, p. 8 1990).
This means generaUy
United states co mp iianoe
rent of uninhibited
access to
advanced technology is no
longer
^^•i.
effective
ciiettive tor
for „n
f
enforcing
instruments controls
ontrois.
r^v-^~
order to verify empirically
this
more general claim it would
be necessary to assess

^

,

•

m

*.

specifically the relationship
between those sectors where
the United States lead declined
and the relationship between
particular enforcement rents,
surveillance and compliance.

Unfortunately such data is difficult
to obtain at this
point
There
conclusion.

is,

however, evidence to support this
general

The United States,

for example, has experienced

difficulties in the past few years in
its attempts to gain
compliance from non-COCOM supplier firms
with COCOM controls
(Interview, Paris, November, 1990).

United States'

representatives to COCOM also stated that it was
becoming
much more difficult to offer incentives to
some firms and

states for compliance with the United States
position
(Interviews, Paris, November, 1990).

The use of government

procurement contracts as compliance rents has also been
undermined to some degree by Congressional initiatives for
so called "buy America" legislation (Interview, Paris,

November,

1990)

.

.

355

The basis of united
states leadersh
n enforcement
p
efforts has also been
harmed by the way in whioh
.

.

the

American officials have
sought
uyrn. to
co extract compliance
in the
past.
The political cost of
the claims of extraterritoriality and of attempts
to unilaterally enforce
multilateral controls, according
,

•

to EC officials,

"have

accumulated to a critical point"
(Interview, Brussels,
September 1990,
The harmonious relationship
between the
allies has been stretched to
the breaking point so many
times over this issue in the
past ten
.

years that it has left

permanent marks.

As one British official put
it "We have a

deep collective memory of United
states activities in this
area" (Interview, London, October,
1990).
As one American
official stated: "The Toshiba case
sent a loud and clear
message to Western firms about the
potential consequences of
ignoring COCOM and United states controls"
(Interview,

London, October, 1990)

The United States, by insisting on its
claims of

extraterritoriality, expresses a distrust in the
enforcement
programs of its allies. This has done lasting harm
to

cooperation on enforcement in some cases.
official involved in

a

One European

domestic export control program

stated that his government had become reluctant to share

information about their system or intelligence on diversions
with the United States because of the potential repercussion

.
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for his agency and
for his country s
firms (jnterview
Europe, October 1990).
,

_

in addition, the
perception on the part of
Western
European f irras renins one
of deep distrust of
the entire
system of united states
extraterritorial oontrols and
enforcement efforts. Some
European business officials
still
express the view that the
information the

Commerce
Department obtains through the
re-export licensing process
and from audits or inspections
could be used to do
significant harm to their commercial
interests (Interview,
Bonn, October, 1990).
Despite the fact of whether
such
misuse of information has ever
taken place, the significant
issue is that the perception
exists
(Interview, Brussels,

September, 1990; Interview, Bonn,
September 1990; Interview,
London, 199 0)
In addition to these intra-allied
factors, United

States domestic level pressures have
helped erode its
position as the leader in the enforcement
of a restrictive
multilateral East-West export control program

(Freedenberg,

1990; Vogel,

1990).

High technology firms, having organized

over the past ten years, were effective
in 1989 in pushing
the Bush Administration toward a streamlining
of controls
(Interview, Washington, April, 1990; see Freedenberg,
1990,

and Bertsch and Elliott, 1990).

United States firms at

a

The prospect of placing

disadvantage in entering into the
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central Europ e a n market
was also a consideration
in the
coerce Department's position
on liberalizations
of
controls (see statements
by Dennis KlosKe, FT,
Ju iy 13
1990)

.

in addition to these
factors,

the ability of the

United States to enforce
compliance is weakened by the
fact
that there continues to
be an intergovernmental
and
intra-allied divergence of
discourses regarding the
relationship between East-West
trade, the nature of the
Soviet threat, and the
requirements of Western security.
Contrasting images of the Soviet
reform program and of
Gorbachev are used to bolster
conflicting positions on
whether or not the West should
offer its advanced technology
and economic power to aid reform.
COCOM and

There is

a

t-hg

vjC in 1QQ?

potential for a head on collision between

COCOM controls and the EC goal of full
integration.
The
goal of the 1992 program is to remove all
impediment to the
free flow of goods and services among
member states. Unless
all facets of the multilateral control regime
can be agreed
upon by all of the COCOM members that are EC members,
then

controls within the community will not be fully removed
(Interview, Brussels, EC, September 1990).

Agreement must

be reached on the criteria for determining an items'

strategic significance, the actual content of the lists,
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standards and procedures
of enforcement, and
the
destinations that are subject

to what type of control.

there is

divergence of opinion in any
of these areas,
states may be unwillina
iiing 1-0
to f„ii„
fully _
remove intra-COCOM
controls.

I£

a

see

The first issue that confronts
the EC Commission in
dealing with this problem is
that Ireland one of the members
of the community, is not a
member of COCOM Because Ireland
is neutral, but has developed
a COCOM state equivalent
export control program, it has been
granted special status
by most other EC states and the
United States, but not by
all of them. Secondly, there are
wide variations, as stated
above, in Community members' control
procedures and

enforcement programs.

The Commission shares with COCOM a

desire to see the harmonization of these
programs succeed.
Within the Commission there are two schools
of thought on

how this should be accomplished and how

a

community wide

system of controls, regulating the transfer of items
that
flow out of the community, can be maintained (Interview,
Brussels, September, 1990).

The first is a "maximalist"

school advocating the creation of one grand community wide

export control enforcement and processing system

administered from Brussels.

Conceivably, this would mean

that all member states would turn over control authority to
a

Commission bureau made up of export control experts from
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all member statpq

then and the

T nf^,
mtra-co^unxty
controls would be

remove(J

Mission

"export control office"
would
Process "EC export licenses"
for controlled items
snipped
outside of the EC.

The European Round
Table of Industries
recently
published a report that
calls for such a program
The
report states that the
Commission from Brussels
should
operate the strategic embargo
"as the government of
the USA
does rather than by the
governments of all the US
states
individually" (ERTI p. 10
1990)
There afe very
people in Brussels these days,
however, who even entertain
the idea of the emission
assuming such a role.
Commission
members are not excited about
the prospect of having to
figure out how to process the
thousands of licenses that
would be needed if such a community
wide system was
established (Interview, Brussels,
September 1990). EC
,

,

.

^

member governments are also unwilling
to see the Commission
be given competence in this area.
The contrasting "minimalist" school of
thought would
like to see the issue worked out through
informal agreements
between the member states (Interview, Brussels,
September,
1990)

.

They thus would like to see harmonization between

the EC states on all levels of the export control
programs.

This harmonization from within might then mean that since
all of the states have confidence in each others' programs,

.
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they all would
ia bp
be w
willmg to remove any
intra-CQCOM-EC
controls. Th e key lssue nere
of
is confidence>
in order to attempt
to facilitate such
confidence, the
EC Commission embarked
on an ambitious project
to collect
data on all member statescontrol and enforcement
programs,
ironically, Commission members
encountered problems,
i

1

4-

.

,

due to

government stonewalling, obtaining
information from member
states on the particulars of
their programs.
As a result,
the Commission has now turned
to relying on multi-national
firms for information on particular
control programs
(Interview, Brussels, September,
1990).
At one point a
Commission member who was involved
in collecting data on
member states control programs stated
that "the variations,
in administrative procedures,
control criteria, and
enforcement systems were so great at points
that they did
not even appear to be part of a common
program- (Interview,
Brussels, September, 1990)

Reconciling these divergences will take time and as
one EC official remarked,

"We're running out of time in

resolving these problems before 1992" (Interview, Brussels,
September, 1990)

.

As a result of the cross comparative data

that the Commission collected, officials there are in an

excellent position to provide an information service to

member states.

Commission officials could provide

administrative and technical assistance on how to improve

361

and harmonize en£orcement

^

^

southern tier states
for example, it might
be nec£ssary
Provide some type of
financial assistance to
enable tn,iese
states to upgrade enforces
program and to upgrade
licensing systems.

^

It has often been
suggested that the EC

emission

should participate in the
COCOM process.
This maxes sense
gxven the fact that these
control systems have a
direct
bearing on the emission's
directives.
Many

members favor the proposal
to make the EC
but they are emphatic
that

a

Mission

member of COCOM,

there should not be EC input
with
regard to the content of the
control list or in the

designation of destinations subject
to control (Interview,
Brussels, September, 1990).
There should be observer status
given to the EC so that Commission
officials could provide
advice on how COCOM controls and
EC full integration can be
worked out.
If harmonization of enforcement
programs cannot be

worked out to the satisfaction of all of
the EC states in
COCOM, a two tier system might be the
result.
This would
mean that some states in COCOM might treat
others

differently or might maintain tighter controls until
certain
states can develop adequate enforcement systems. The
Germans,

for example, might not have confidence that Greece

could adequately prevent some items from being transferred

362

to controlled dp^^n^f
destinations.
^

Consequently,

if Germany
maintained controls3 onn the «i
„
£low ° f items from Germany
°
to
Greece, it would do harm
.

to the goals of 1992.

Despite all of these
difficulties and potential
problems, the mo vement to
full integration is an
additional
factor that will undermine the
United states position in
COCOM.
once internal controls are
removed, it will be mU ch
more difficult to maintain
surveillance on the flow of
technology within the community.
This will no doubt present
problems for the United States
enforcement agencies.
The German Quest inn

German unification poses some
particularly complex
problems for the maintenance of the
multilateral export
control program. The problem is that
the GDR
has had in

place

a

series of contractual agreements to
supply the

Soviet Union with high technology items
that were on the
international lists as of the June 1990 COCOM
talks.

June talks,

a

At the

so-called "interim regime" was established

whereby the GDR would continue to fulfill its
contractual
obligations until the core list discussions had been
completed.

FRG officials initially hoped that the GDR issue

could be solved before unification.

With unification

occurring far faster than expected, they now hope for either
of two changes.

First,

the threshold of controls could be

raised high enough that the items under supply contract in
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the GDR would no longer
be subject
(interview, Bonn, September,
1990)

^
.

cqcom
secondly, these

arrangements be allowed to
remain in place due fcQ
availability determinations.
Th e level o f GDR teohnol
og i cal
sophistication in militarily
significant technologies
however, was much higher
than Western analysts
expected

^

(interview, Bonn, September,
1990 ,
It now appears
items the GDR is supplying
to controlled destinations,
.

namely the Soviet Union,
will remain subject to
control
after the core list discussions.
This means that Germany as
a member of COCOM
will be contractually obliged
to supply
these controlled items to the
Soviets.
There is some
indication that the United States
will put pressure on the
Germans to break or to not renew
contracts
(Interview, Bonn,

September, 1990)

.

The United States ability to
persuade the

Germans on this point is questionable,
but there will
certainly be demands that prohibitions
be placed on
upgrading and modernizing the technology.
A United States
official in Bonn said that as a result of these
demands he
wondered when "the Germans would have enough and
say,

your COCOM" (Interview, Bonn, September,

1 99 0)

.

stick

The United

States does seem, however, to have COCOM member state
support that the German question needs to be resolved in a

multilateral forum.

Some European officials have stated

that they believe the Germans should be reguired to bring
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the GDR contracts before
COCOM on

a

case by case oasis for
a

multilateral determination
(Interview, London, October,
1990; Interview, Paris,
November,
1990).

German officials have stated,
however, that the Soviet
Union should not be punished
for supporting German
unification.
Thus, they would rather see
some sort of
comprehensive agreement worked out.
One possible solution
is that the Germans might
offer a replacement of some type
or some form of compensation
if the Soviets agreed to drop
contracts.
This might make some sense given
the Soviets'

need for supplies of basic goods
over highly sophisticated
technology.
it is unlikely, however, given
Soviet security
interests.
in all likelihood most of the GDR
agreements
will remain intact for a specified period.
This might mean
a situation exists where firms from
the former FRG would be
prohibited from trading in certain items while
firms in the

former GDR would be allowed to continue to supply
equivalent
items to the Soviets.

The issue will prove to be an ongoing

source of tension between the United States and Germany.
The Future of COCOM: Survival
Mutation, or Dodoism

r

While all of these issues are at work in ways that

might pull alliance commitments to COCOM apart, particularly
on the industrial list, there are a number of factors that

work to hold the organization together.

First,

is the
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legacy of the perception
of the threat posed
by the Soviet
Union.
A British Foreign
Office official stated
that "as
long as the greater
proportion of our nuclear
arsenals are
Pointed at the Soviets instead
of the Polynesians COCOM
will
continue to function" (Interview,
London,
October,

1990).

Despite the extensive changes
over the past year and the
transformation in overall East-West
relations, officials in
the West continue to perceive
the Soviet Union correctly
as
potentially posing the greatest
threat to Western alliance
security.
British MOD and United States
DOD officials
on

occasion point to what they say
are extensive technology
acquisition networks that the Soviet
Union continues to
maintain (Interview, London, October,
1990).
it is proving
hard to dislodge the image of the Soviet
Union as the major
source of rivalry with the United States
in Western
Defense

and intelligence agencies.

Even in light of the evident

reality of economic catastrophe in many Republics,

a

NATO

official stated that "it is difficult to swallow this
idea
of trade promotion particularly with the Soviet
Union.

No

one is interested in paying for or supplying the technology

that would result in an economic recovery that would benefit
the Communist party" (Interview, Brussels, September, 1990).
The second factor working to hold the multilateral

export control program together is the inertia of the

bureaucratic system as well as the size and nature of the

.

.
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bureaucratic systems set up to
maintain the East-West export
control program.
A11 of the
C0C0M states

^

non-COCOM Western states have
established agencies or
branches of agencies charged
with maintaining and enforcing
the export control program.
Responsibility for export
controls, as was pointed out in
earlier chapters, is usually
spread out among several agencies
including the Ministries
of Economics, Defense, Foreign
Affairs, and the Customs
Service.
Where greater or lesser responsibility
and power
resides depends on each state's distinct
administrative and
legal tradition and in some cases on
the perceived function
of controls by political leaders.

The United States maintains its own
extensive

unilateral export control system.

The system involves

numerous personnel in the Defense and Intelligence
community,

in the Commerce Department,

Department, and in the Customs Service.

in the State

All of these

agencies charged for forty years with the responsibility of

vigilance on and controlling the diffusion of Western
nuclear, arms, and dual-use technology, represent a

formidable force (see Long, 1989; Interview, Brussels,
September, 1990)
Inertia and standard operating procedures mean that

adjustment to

a

transformation in the international system

and East-West relations is a difficult task (Long, 1989)

.

.
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There has been

a

de.cnstrated shift at the
highest political
levels in an attest to
bring the centre! prcgran,
in line

Wth

changed cenditiens.

This shift in attitude,
hewever,
has yet te seep de„n
te the lewer levels
ef the bureaucracy
(interview, Brussels,
September, 19 90; Interview,
Lenden,
October, 1990)

A Multidirectional Mnlfn a f.
n1
Export Cont rol Prnq r^

The final and perhaps the
most intriguing factor that
will help hold the collaborative
framework on export
controls in COCOM together is
the emergence of support for
broadening the gaze of the organization
from East-West to
include vigilance on North-South
transfers of strategically
significant technologies (Interview,
Brussels, September,
1990)

.

COCOM, however, has been specifically
designed to

prevent diffusions of particular technologies
to Communist
ruled states based on assessments of their
technological,

industrial, and military capability (Interview,
London,

October,

1990)

.

Expanding the role of COCOM to include

destinations outside of the former "target states" would
necessitate similar intelligence evaluations for each

controlled destination added to the list (Interview, London,
October,
level

1990)

.

So the first problem occurs at a technical
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The second drawback
to
u this
in.
tnis idea
occurs at the
logistical levpl
c^k
level.
such a multidirectional
control program
would be undefined by
the fact that non-COCOM
states and
firms could presumably
have the capability to
supply
controlled destinations with
items on the multidirectional
COCOM lists. The question
would be how to alleviate
this
foreign availability. The
answer might be in resorting
to
the compliance rent and
surveillance instruments used
by the
United States in the past.
Compliance could
-,

.

be

theoretically ensured by setting
up

a

network of bilateral

arrangements with Eastern European
states and the Soviet
Union for example. Compliance
rents could then be offered,
threats of their withdrawal for
non-compliance could be
made, and monitoring for compliance
through some agreed upon
surveillance mechanism could be carried
out.
Rents
could

take the form of some kind of aid.

While in a different

category of goods, bilateral talks have
been underway for
some time with Czechoslovakia on establishing

tight controls

on the export of symtex.

It appears that headway in part

resulted from the West offering what might be
called rents,
credits, and special consideration in COCOM, for
compliance
(Interview, Europe, October 1990).

it would require a

multilateral effort to establish such

a

system.

The third and more complicated issue occurs at the

political level.

Even in times of extreme East-West tension

.
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full agreement on what
destinations should be subject
to
control and what items
should be controlled has
been fragil,
in COCOM.
This has had to do with
divergences in the
perceived interests of
member states in terms of
which
"target state" posed what
type of threat to whom and
what
type of controls on trade
were necessary to guard
Western
security.
The problem of resolving
this issue, once COCOM
was broadened in a
multidirectional way, would be massive.
The image of the Soviet Union
as "the other" in the height
of the Cold War provided an
image around which Western

states could legitimate export
controls on dual-use
industrial items; but in a period
of growing fragmentation
of perceived interest in the
international system, forging
consensus on which states to target
would be near
to

impossible (barring some event similar to
the Gulf
situation)
In addition,

if the list destinations subject to

control is expanded in

a

multidirectional way then the

possibility of such a two tier system within the European
Community increases.

This is due to the divergence in EC

states' positions over which destinations should be
subject
to what type of control.

In the post Cold War world,

once

the coherence provided by the common enemy is removed,

working this issue out becomes very complicated.
British,

The

for example, have expressed a concern over seeing

.
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—

classes of dual . use
goods transferre(j
Spam, however, would be
unwiilin, to see Argenfcina
to such controls.
Thi s co

^

uld lead to

_^

^.^

conflicts between the U.K.
and Spain over the
re-export of
so,e classes of British
hi g h technology ite
m s (EC Brussels,
September. 1990)
Snr-h a
a ^
Such
difference in perception
might
lead to conflicts that
would adversely affect
the 1992
goals
,

•

Despite all of these drawbacks
there is apparently
support in Ambassador Allen
Wendt s office for shifting
the
gaze of COCOM (Interview,
Washington, July, 1990; Interview,
London, October, 1990).
Some European members of COCOM
have
also expressed an interest in
seeing the organization used
as a blueprint for the
construction of an entirely new
export control regime (Interview,
Bonn, September, 1990).
These officials argue that
agreements on controls on the
transfer of missile delivery system
technology, chemical and
biological weapons technology, nuclear
technology, and

dual-use technology should be brought
under one
organization (Interview, Brussels, September,
1

1990;

W

Missile

Technology Control Regime
(MCTR)
was
1987
The nenbers are the Uni * ed States?
Canada^nt
;
.
Canada,
the n"
United Kingdom,
France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Japan, Australia, Belgium,
Luxenbourg, the
Netherlands, and Spain.
"Australia Group" established in 1984 is
the EC countries, the United States, the European made up of
neutrals
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Canada. It is designed
to
control chemical weapons technology diffusion.
Targets

.o^l^t

,

.

„
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London, October,

1990

That organization they
claim should
mirror COCOM in the sense
that it should not be a
formal
treaty organization.
it should also incorporate
the
,

.

organizational structure and
administrative procedures used
in COCOM.
This type of umbrella
organization, according to
these officials, should include
all advanced industrialized
states from the East and the West.
This would
solve the

issue of obtaining compliance
from the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European states. The
creation of such a regime,
however, would result in some fairly
strange arrangements.
The Soviet Union would be, for example,
cooperating in an

institution to control the diffusion of
certain technologies
South with states that were members of
COCOM.
Aside from
these types of puzzles, the key issue or drawback
once again

would be in reaching agreement on what destinations
should
be subject to what types of control.

For these reasons many

members of the Western alliance would prefer to see
directional system evolve at first as

a

a

multi-

network of bilateral

agreements (Interview, London, October 1990; Interview,

Washington D.C., April 1990).
Finally, there has been some support for dismantling

the COCOM industrial list and creating a new organization

primarily designed to assist in the transfer and diffusion
of Western technology that could speed the process of

include:

Iran,

Iraq,

Libya,

and Syria
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Political and economic reform
in Central Europe
and
Soviet Union (Interview,
Brussels,
September,

Bertsch and Elliott-Gower

1990)

1990

;

th,
le

see

According to
who support this option,
the Key threat to Western
security
is not the technological
and military capability
of these
states, but the potential for
chaos and economic
catastrophe.
Political reform according to
these officials
could be undermined by the inability
of progressive
governments to supply and effectively
produce goods due to
inefficient technology. "Our security
is threatened
,

.

now,"

stated one officials in Bonn, "by
their instability"
(Interview, Bonn, September, 1990).
Conclusions
This chapter has detailed the interaction
of the
complex factors that lead to a shift in
the United States'

policy stand on export controls.
factors that lead to

a

It has also examined the

restructuring of the COCOM program.

Despite the rapid and radical transformations in
the Soviet
bloc the Bush Administration was at first reluctant
to alter
the United States policy stand or agree to a
significant

restructuring of COCOM.

Amid continued Western European

pressure on the United States over the issue of
liberalizations on controls there emerged

a

compromise

agreement in June 1990 for the reorganization of COCOM.
four theoretical perspecitves set out in chapter one have

The
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informed this narrative-hi^nr^^
1Ve historical account
of the 1989-1991
period.
How do thev
hpln us
^ney nelp
nc to account
for the shift in the
United States position and
the outcome of the June 1990
COCOM talks?
First, multiple-factors
came together to produce this
outcome.
The change in the East bloc
made it obvious to

members of the United States
foreign policy community that
the perceptual framework of
the absolutist discourse was
implausible.
Continuing to adhere to that discourse
came to
be regraded by most as
counterproductive.
Contending
discourse camps that had opposed the
economic warfare policy
during the Reagan Administration gained
greater power then
as their vision of the appropriate
rationale of East-West
trade gained greater plausibility. High
technology business
interests drawing on a neo-Kantian discourse
pushed for

extensive liberalizations on controls.

Their redoubled

pressure on the Bush Administration in 1989 resulted from
the perceived market possibilities in the East.

This camp,

supported by the Commerce Department and some members of
Congress, had argued throughout the 1980s that the

extensiveness United States controls was detrimental to

United States interests.

As it appeared that Western

European firms were going to gain the advantage in market
entry into the East this camp became even more vocal.
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The plausibility
of their vision
had not only be en
enhanced by events in
the East, but their
position in the

intergovernmental power game
had been improved.

At the

institutional le vel the
power of the Gaining
absolutists
was significantly
undermined when Stephen
Bryant

left the
ho one was brought in
to head up DTSA until
the su«r
of 1991.
This gave the Commerce
and State Departments an
DOD.

opportunity to improve their
positions.
Both of these
Departments were closely allied
with domestic commercial
interests and were in agreement
with Western European
officials who favored more
immediate liberalization.
Western European officials,
under heavy pressure at
home, signaled to the United
States with words and deeds
that they were prepared to take
unilateral steps toward
liberalizations on East-West export
controls.
The United
States share of high technology
production continued to
erode in the late 1980s. The Bush
Administration's more
cautious approach to liberalizations was
thus undermined by
Western Europeans willingness to sale.
The United States
could have still used recourse to rents
and surveillance to

attempt to slow the process down.

Rents available were

declining or were becomming more costly, however,
and

moreover no one in the Administration seemed prepared
to
take such action.

The Bush Administration instead tried to

embarrass the Europeans through public display and
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^
condemnation
un of
or ^
Violations of
or thp
M
rne pnrn
COCOM
agreements.
Bush
thus attempted to
persuade
west£rn
to slow liberalizations
on E ast-West trade
controls.
As the Commerce and
State Departments regained
some
Power in the intergovernmental
balance the NSC was able
to
put together a compromise
policy proposal in early
1990
western European states
rejected the proposal.
The United
States, net wanting to
further strain alliance
relations
began working with British
representatives to formulate a
workable proposal for the
June 1990 COCOM talks. The
outcome was a reorganization
that reduced to a considerable
degree the United states power
in COCOM.
In additon the
negotiation process of the early
1990 period was much less
United States dominated.
-i

-> +.

•

^

So the 1989-1991 period can
be assessed from the

vantage point of the four theoretical
perspectives in the
following ways. At the structural
level during this period
the rents available to the United
States continued to
decline.
There was some discussion of strengthening
the
extraterritoriality provisions of the EAA.

This, however,

would not change the fact that the capability
of hightechnology production is now more diffused among
advanced
industralized countries.

Unless patriot missile systems and

other such technology are unusually fungible the United
States will continue to have difficulty in the future if it
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turns to rents and surv
eillance instruments tQ
extract compliance on
export controls.
The transformations in
the East bloc created
the
perception of expanded market
possibilities.
Most United
States firms came to see
the extensiveness of the
export
control program as extremely
damaging to their commercial
interests.
During this period they saw
controls

^

as

constraning entrance into Eastern
European markets.
European firms, however, argued

Western

that the Bush

Administrations- refusal to take action
on liberalization
was intended to slow down the
process so that United States
firms could catch-up with European
firms that were posed to
take immediate advantage of the
opening in the East. The
pressure of market competition ultimately
helped to shift
the United States position toward
support for greater

liberalization.
From the institutionalist perspective
there was

a

significant shift in the United States
inter-governmental
power balance in the 1989-1990 period. The
Commerce

Department and the State Department, traditionally
more open
to the views of domestic commercial interests and
to

compromising with the allies, gained ground over the DOD.
This made it that much easier to achieve

a

compromise

solution as State Department officials worked closely with
the British to solve the impasse of 1989.
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The changes in the
East bloc discredited
the
absolutist vision and
created
tea a strata
strategic opening into
which
contending discourse camps
rushed.
The neo-kantian and
instrumentalist rationales
f or East-West
trade policy gained
greater plausibility.
The absolutist camp
retreated into
the DOD and intelligence
community, but continued
to issue
warnings about the danger
of placing to much
faith in
Gorbachev.
Their voice has again
gained some ground as
crack downs have occurred
in the Soviet Union.
There is at
this point a highly contested
environment in the United
States where the various
discourse camps continue to
push
their visions of the appropriate
rationale for East-West
trade policy.
it is unlikely in this
environment and in the
context of the disorder and pace
of the new world order that
any coherent long term vision
for the purpose of East-West
trade policy can be worked out at
the domestic or the
alliance level.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

Accounting for the Dynamic,
pf ^ oii aboraMion
This project began with two
problems and a set of
questions.
First j wanted to assess the
degree to which
export control programs in
general and administrative
,

systems for the enforcement of
such controls in particular,
had a linage in the Western state
system.
To address this
issue I examined past attempts
by states to control exports
and analyzed in detail the 19th
century British export

control system.

The second problem had two parts,

(a)

to

account for the construction of the
post-1945 United States
and multilateral export control system,
and (b) to account
for periods of discord and consensus
over the terms of the
Western alliance multilateral export control
system.

order to address this problem,

I

In

analyzed within four

distinct periods (1949-1964, 1965-1979, 1979-1989,
19891991),

(a)

How the structural distribution of power and the

nature of United States policy and leadership affected

collaboration on the form, the nature, and the enforcement
of controls;

(b)

How the nature of global economic

competition affected Western alliance states' collaboration
on in COCOM and Western firms' compliance with multilateral
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control,,.

How the nature and the
distribution of power
in domestic
intra-governmental politics on
this issue
affected United states policy
and multilateral
(c)

collaboration; and

(d)

How the nature of changing

representations-of security and
threats to security
affected United States policy
and the nature of multilateral
collaboration.
A goal of this study was
to refine theoretical

perspectives by assessing the
strength of a variety of
approaches to account for the
dynamics of United StatesWestern European collaboration on
multilateral export
controls.
My thesis is, however, that a
multi-factor
analysis provides a full and appropriate
understanding of
the complex dynamics of alliance
collaboration

in this area.

In order to conduct such an analysis

I

drew on all four of

the theoretical frameworks set out in
chapter

structural realism,

a

modified

market explanation, institutionalism,

and discourse analysis.
a

I;

Thus this project does not end with

simple solution or an univocal answer to the problems

posed at the beginning.

reconsideration of what

I
I

conclude, however, with a

found regarding both the issue of

the genealogy of this practice in the state system.
I

Second,

reconsider what each theoretical framework allows us to

explain about the dynamics of collaboration within each

period (1949-1964, 1964-1979, 1979-1989, 1989-1991).
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Tn.rd,

^

show how modifigd
structurai reausm
-ket explanation, institutionalism,
discourse
taken together enrich
our understanding
of the history of
United States-western
E uropean collaboration
in this area
These theoretical
perspectives are in fact
nodes of
interpretation that allow us
to tell different
stories about
why and how collaboration
occurred at this point of
I

_

^^^^

intersection between economic
and security policy.
These four modes of
interpretation conflict, in
epistomological and ontclogical
terms, in a number o£ ways
I recognize these
conflicts, but believe little
is to be
gained from adjudicating between
these theoretical
perspectives; to leave silence
on one side and on the other
a definitive voice of
explanation.
.

Past work on multilateral
export control collaboration
has tended to focus on a single
factor and thus has lacked a
fully systematic multidimentional
assessment.
In this
project I have provided a theoretically
informed narrativehistorical reconstruction of the dynamics
of collaboration.
In that sense then the project is
an example of what
Clifford Geertz once called "thick
description." John
Ruggie has argued that "thick description
is an essential
tool of all interpretive sciences"
(Ruggie, p.

2,

1990).

Thick description provides a more comprehensive
picture of
the multiple dimensions of collaboration in
this
case of

.
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state interaction in
a coordinate policy
endeavor.
This is
not to deny that there
may b e more parsimonious
paths to
Partial explanation.
Such paths might focus
on fewef
variables. The
parsimonious

^

^ ^

^

pass b y the multiple
dimensions that fflake
collaboration. Trying to
find the most parsimonious
path to
explanation can also reinforce
a vision of the
enterprise of
international relations theory
as a process of establishing
see perspective as having an
"infinite versatility

^

of

apparent applications" (Ruggie

,

p

.

2>

199Q; alsQ

^

^

Geertz, 1973 and Der Derian
and Shapiro, 1989 on this
issue,
This view of international
relations theory can
remove us from the terrain of
international relations by
allowing us to believe that we
can have more than simply
"partial guides to an essentially
intractable subject"
(Bull, p. 31, 1966).
Thick description serves to ground
our
feet in the complexity and dynamic
history of international
1966,

.

relations

Reading E xport Control Prog rams
The attempt to control the diffusion of
material,

instruments or technology perceived to give one
state

strategic or economic advantage over another is not
new in
the Western state system. While states have attempted,
in

various ways to control the diffusion of such items,

"
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systematic export contro!
and enforcement pro
g ra ms did not
exist until the modern
era.
The 19th century British
control system, including
its
administrative structure and
enforcement instruments,
resembles the post-1945
United states and multilateral
control programs.
The British export control
system was
designed to ensure ongoing
economic advantage by maintaining
monopoly control of certain
classes of machines and certain
types of know-how.
that sense one could argue
that the
British system based on mercantilist
considerations, was
different in terms of rationale,
goals, and function from
the post-1945 Western alliance
strategic export control
system.
The post-1945 system, particularly
since the
economic warfare period of the 1950's,
has been designed to
regulate the diffusion of "strategically
significant

m

technology" in order to maintain "lead-time
advantages over
the Soviet bloc.
My analysis showed, however, that the most
revealing

element in the comparison of these systems is
the symbolic
value of the categories of items that are controlled
or

considered subject to control:

what they represent within

the context of competition and rivalry between states.

order to demonstrate this

I

in

employed a semiotic reading of

the texts of debates in the House of Commons in the early
19th century over the rationale of the British control
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system.

By reading these
texts in
ln *terms of the
language
used to defend the
programs and -Ln
in terms of *the
h
symbols and
images evoked in debates
over tne
the types
tvn 6c of„ goods
subject to
control, it was possible
P ssible to assess
* ee!
conceptualizations of
Power and advantage at
fchis

^^^^^

Based on this analysis

,

argued

historicai

^_^^

the formation of iRt-h
18th century export
prohibitions can be
explained by a utilization
o f the notion of
the Machine
This sign s signification
politically, culturally,
and

^
.

.

advantage over rivals.
technology,"

i

"strategically significant

maintain, has

ha(J g

^

^

^

propelling the formation of
post-1945 export control
policy
and in legitimating
arguments for constructing and
ceding
authority to enforcement
bureaucracies.
Debates over the
function, rationale, and
maintenance of export control
systems, in both the 19th century
British case and the post1945 case, can be read then as
essentially clashes of

conceptualizations held by policy elites
of the source of
power and advantage over rivals in
the international system.
Explaining the n y namics of Post-1945 Alliance
Collaboration on Export Control anrt
Control Enforcement

Following World War II, United States policy
on East-

West trade became dominated by
warfare.

a

strategy of economic

This strategy was designed to inflict damage on
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-et

bloc economic develo

„

and

_

policy Kas legitimated
by ianguag
^
that X defined as an
absolutist discourse
was represented,
for example
,

as

^

^ ^
^
^d

.

The

^^

Other intent on disrupting
international harmony and on
destroying "western
civilian. order to isoiate and
weaken this perceived
threat the United states
adopted rui es
and established institutional
structures to carry out a
broad export control program.
United states officials
sought western European
support in this

m

endeavor, both to
ensure its effectiveness and
for the broader moral
crusade
legitimated by the terms of the
absolutist discourse.
Western European officials
were reluctant to follow
the united states lead.
They were suspicious

of Stalin, but

they did not share the image
of the Soviet Union articulated
by Kennan or the view of
communism held by many members of
the Truman Administration.
I have explained this
divergence
in terms of the way Western
European outlooks were inherited
from and informed by cultural-historical
experiences. Most
groups within Western Europe wanted
to re-establish

traditional trading ties with the Soviet
Union and Eastern
European states. Some Western European
officials argued
that East-West trade could have an
instrumental value in
manipulating Soviet policy and dividing the Soviet
bloc.

explained this view in reference to an instrumentalist

I
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discourse because
beranco the poss
ibl lity or accepting
such a view
was contingent on
certain i ma ges ana
representations of the
soviet union; that is,
seeing it as a traaitionai
Croat
power with an interp^t«,
n
interest in
maintaining the status quo
and as
a state that would rparti« a
react in
predicable fashion to economic
carrots and sticks.
i

•

.

•

.

->

On the other hand
there were Western European
officials who argued that
renewed trade ties held
mutual
economic benefits and that
political and security issues
should be decoupled from
questions of trade or commercial
ties.
This policy vision was
supported in terms of the neokantian discourse.
Discourse analysis allowed me
to account
for the lack of alliance
consensus because it provided the
framework for assessing factors
that resulted
in a

divergence in the alliance over
the purpose that was to
guide East-West trade policy.
Clearly, there were
divergences in economic interest as
well.

Discord, however,

did not arise simply from divergences
in readily apparent
economic interests, but these discourses
served as the grids

through which officials perceived and
understood the
relationship between their economic and security

interests.

Despite these divergences Western European officials

agreed to follow the United States lead from 1951-1953
in an
economic warfare program. I accounted for this shift with
three inter-related factors.

First, Stalin's aggres:;sive
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-ves

in the years
immediateiy

fonowing

^^

^

outbreak of the Korean
war weakened the
immediate
Plaus ibil it y of symbols
and images Q£ the
instrumentalist
and neo-kantian discourses
in Europe,
western European
officials became iess
sanguine about the potentia!
poli tical
or economic benefits
of trade with the
East.

Secondly, the United States
expressed its willingness
to use preponderant
economic capability to attempt
to bring
western European states and
firms in line with its more
restrictive position. United
states instruments for
leverage to ensure compliance
took several forms.
I
demonstrated the relationship
between these instruments
through a micro-economic model
of contested exchange.
At
one level the United states
used rents in the form of
Marshall Plan and economic aid,
military assistance, and

government procurement contracts to
obtain compliance. The
threat of the withdrawal of these
rents was embodied in
legislation requiring the executive to
cut off all

assistance to states that violated the
United states'
restrictive position. At another level
the United States,
through the ECA and Battle Act, instituted
an export

licensing system with extraterritorial
application.

This

allowed the United States to use access to specific
items
and technologies that it controlled as rents for
Western
firms' compliance with controls.

The United States could
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w.thdraw these rents by
denying

^ ^^^^

exp

^t

^

applications, thus impeding
access to relatively
scarce
goods and technology.
This system alsQ
elaborate surveillance
program for vigil ance on
West-West
and East-West transactions
and trade flows to gauge
compliance and to establish
blacklists of f irms and
individuals that violated
controls.
The micro-economic
contested exchange model
allowed me to explain the
relationship between these
instruments in United States
compliance and enforcement
efforts.

^

The third factor that helped
to enlist Western
European collaboration was the
way in which State Department
officials worked to accommodate
some of the concerns of
alliance officials in COCOM. state
Department officials
helped to ensure that some exception
mechanism would be
built into the COCOM structure so that
particular Western
European states would not be cut off from
access to Eastern
bloc raw materials. At the inter-governmental
level in the

United States there were then divergences between
the States
Department, the Commerce Department, and the Department
of

Defense positions' over the appropriate strategy to
ensure

Western European states' and firms' compliance.

The inter-

governmental conflict that emerged in this period was to

characterize the next forty years of United States policy in
COCOM.
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After 1953 the nature
of Western alii,
.ance
collaboration on multilateral
export oontrols shifted
western European demands
f or a less
restrictive multilateral
export oontrol strate
gy re-emerged. At the int
ra-allie d
level the United states
concede, to these d eman
ds resulting
in a series of
relaxations in COCOM in the
late 1950' s

j

explained this transformation
by showing how the
death of
Stalin and the end of the
Korean war resulted in the
resurgence of instrumentalist
and neo-kantian discourses
in
Western Europe.
the United

m

states, however, the

absolutist discourse was still
preponderant in debates over
East-West policy and thus the
United States continued an
economic warfare strategy through
its own export control
program.
The Western European demands
for relaxations arose
in the context of declines
in Marshall Plan aid and in
the
context of a global recession.
Thus I showed how structural
level factors also helped produce
the shift in the Western
Europeans' position.
The united states' willingness to
concede to Western
European demands was a result of two
factors.
First,

American officials expressed a belief that
it was not in the
interest of the United States to risk an open
diplomatic
rift with the allies over this issue. This
appeared to be
based, in part, on the second factor:

The United States,

through controls on access to its technology and goods,
via
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the export

^
^
^
™ ™nue

Uce„ sing program

SUrVSillanCe

,

^

to impose its more
restrictive position on
Western firms regardless
of
relaxations in COCOM.
After 1954
imj n.
the rationale for
alliance
-Iteration in COCOM shifted
a„a y from economic
warfare to
maintaining a forum for
coordinating efforts to

control the
of strategic goods
and strategically
significant
technology to tne Soviet
Moo. The micro-economic
contested
exchange model, however,
helps identify the
instruments
through which the United
States attempted to
maintain
enforcement on a more
restrictive control program.
in the 1965-1979
period I showed how the
United
States- shift, beginning
in the late 1950-s, away
from
economic warfare to economic
diplomacy in East-West trade
policy was bound up in the
erosion of the authority of
the
symbols and images of the
absolutist discourse. This shift
was initiated by officials
in the executive who came
to
believe that the United States
could use access to its
economic and technological advantages
as carrots and sticks
in extracting concessions from
the Soviet Union.
This

now

policy stand was legitimated and made
possible by the rise
of an instrumentalist discourse based
on a shift
in

representations and perceptions of the nature
of the Soviet
threat.
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intensified West-West
economic

petition

^

an d an

^

the west, resulted
in a rapid expansion .„
Western and Unitpd
^
qf afoc fl
united states
rms „ lth interests in
deveioping
Eastern markets. Attempts
by the executive during
this
Period to oontrol and
coordinate trade linkage
program were
underlined either by members
of Congress who adhered
to a
less refined notion of
economic diplomacy as a series
of
sticks to bludgeon the
Soviets into altering domestic
policies while others, voicing
competitive commercial
concerns, wanted to forego
linkage and institute and EastWest trade policy based on
more neo-kantian considerations.
The united states executive's
instrumentalist position,
whether in the form of Nixon-Kissinger
or Carter-Huntington
linkage, was also undermined by
allied officials' reluctance
to play linkage with the Soviets
on the United states terms.
•

,

^

United states policy during this
period became confused.
The increased number of domestic
commercial groups with
interests in East-West trade policy and
the contending
discourses that emerged resulted in
unpredictable policy
outcomes.
In COCOM the United States used exception
requests liberally and restrictiveness in the
export

licensing program abated.

This state of affairs was a

direct consequence of intensified West-West economic

competition and the erosion of

a

common understanding of the
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^

appropriate relationship
bet ween East .„ est
security in the united
states foreign poacy

^

estabushment

^

_

Following the invasion
of Afghanistan
States policy on East-West
trade sMfted
period I explained this ahift
shift, away from
economic diplomacy
and trade expansion
and hack toward economic
warfare, as a
result of the re-emergence
of the absolutist
discourse as
the guidepost for
East-West trade policy
strategy.
! used
the four interpretative
frameworks to account for
the United
States attempts to
reinvergerate domestic and
multilateral
controls and to account -Forfor the complex dynamics
of alliance
collaboration.
_

First,

^
^

^

demonstrated how officials within
the Reagan
Administration articulated a
conceptualization of the nature
of the Soviet Union and
the nature of the Soviet
threat that
was clearly expressive of the
absolutist discourse. This
conceptualization legitimated an economic
warfare program.
It also reinforced these
officials' determination
I

to roll

back detente and to silence other
discourses and
conceptualizations of the appropriate
relationship between
East-West trade and Western security.
These hard-line

unilateralist officials in the Administration
believed that
allied officials could be persuaded to collaborate
in a
reinvegeration of the multilateral export control
program.
If persuasion failed, however, they were willing
to turn to
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er

£ ° rms of

le

—

officios embarked on

a

•

«

~ ««

t his reason that
these

massive expansiQn

strengtheni ng
of the instruments
that the United states
had used in th e
past to ensure compliance
with its .ore restrictive
position.
Secondly,

I

showed how these officials,

in the DOD

under Richard Perle and
in the Commerce Department
under
Lawrence Brady, were able to
gain the upper hand in intragovernmental struggles for control
of not only United states
Policy on East-West trade, but
over strategy to be used to
bring the allies along. The
consequence of this intergovernmental power shift was
intensified pressure on
alliance states and firms.
Third, through the contested
exchange model

I

demonstrated the relationship between
the instruments that
the Reagan Administration used
to attempt to ensure Western
firms' compliance with restrictive
controls and in an
attempt to extract concessions from
allied states in COCOM
negotiations.
Some Executive officials believed that
a

combination of rents, compliance surveillance,
and the
threat of rent withdrawal for non-compliance
could be used
to achieve their policy ends.

This strategy not only

failed, but it had some extremely negative
consequences.
I

showed that at the level of issue specific

capability the United States relative economic power and its
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are o f gl obal high
technology

^

»7....

United states
disproportionate
Qf
edge technologic.!
production was eroded in
. number of
areas.
rents are defined

„

^

^^

^

^

^

^

ana states relative^
free access to United
states lading
edge tec h noiog considered
y
to have strategic
significance
then we can say that
the rents available to
the United
States declined.
In addition the CQst
q£ offering
rent,

such as economic aid
rose.

showed that in this context
Reagan Administration
officials strengthened
surveillance systems for both
EastWest and West-West technology
transfers.
This increased
surveillance included a closer
monitoring of export license
applications and an increase DOD
role in the review of
license applications.
it also involved greater
resource
outlays for data collection and
special intelligence
operations to map technology transfers.
This increased
vigilance enhanced the United States
capability to detect
violators of the COCOM and its unilateral
export control
program.
In addition to this step the Executive
branch also
increased its ability to withdraw rents by
reaffirming
I

extraterritoriality in the EAA and by gaining more
authority
to impose sanctions for violations.
The Reagan

Administration hoped that this threat of rent withdrawal and
the higher risk of detection would result in compliance
from
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Astern firms

and states.

This Was
WM not, a c °st minizing
The x
desire compliance
desxred
was
upon endogenously
from
trom
»•
an assessment
y
of an optimal
combination of available
rents and surveillance,
but was set
exogenousiy under the
the absolutist
discours
<™e r the terms of the
absolutist apprQach as
available declined th6
budgetary outlays
and the intensity
X of simmin,
surveillance increased.
This strategy
had two conscience,
(a) Western firffls
cost for compliance
and thus where possible
beg an to try to
design around United
states technology.
This accelerated
the fan of rents
availafcle tQ

strate
strategy.

,

—

«

;

^

^

^

^

firms turned to next
best alternative suppliers.,
(b) This
strategy also began to
entail high diplomatic
costs as
western European leaders
puhlicly reacted to the
ieverage
strategy.
The fourth part of the
analysis of this period
showed that the lesson of
the potential competitive
costs of
such an extensive surveillance
and export control program
was not lost on domestic
interest groups.
The Reagan
Administration helieved that the
terms of the absolutist
discourse would be able to
silence domestic opposition to
economic warfare. This, however,
proved not to b e the case
as business interest groups
proved unwilling and perhaps
unable to absorb the potential
cost to West-West trade of
such a restrictive stand on East-West
trade.
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In the 1989-1991
nerioH
Peri
°d
.

r
1

.

lead to

a

Messed

the dynamics that

shift in the United

controls and to a
restructuring of, COCOM.
restructurin
The four
theoretical perspectives
set out in chapter
: informed this
narrative-historical account.
Despite the rapid and
radical transforations
in the
soviet b loc the Bush
Ministration was at first
reluctant
to alter the United
states policy stand
sta nH or to agree
to a
significant restructuring
of COCOM.
Amid continued Kestern
European pressure over
the issue of liberalizations
there
emerged a compromise
agreement in June !990.
Several
factors came together to
produce this outcome.
First, the changes in
the East bloc made it
obvious to
members of the United States
foreign policy community that
the perceptual framework
of the absolutist discourse
was
implausible. Continuing to
adhere to that discourse camp
came to be regarded by most as
counterproductive.

Contending discourse camps that
had opposed the economic
warfare policy during the Reagan
Administration gained
greater power as their vision of the
appropriate rationale
for East-West trade policy gained
greater plausibility.

Changes in the East bloc reacted

a

strategic opening into

which contending discourse camps rushed to
try and gain
control of United States East-West trade policy.
High

technology business interests drawing on a neo-kantian
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course pushed for
extensive llberaiizations
Other groups, in the
state

P-hed

for a slouer

continued reformsS

^^^^^
deUberate ^^^^^

mi,«j
Th61r
po11
-,

.

fche

^ ^^^^
^^^^^^"

^

^

vis i°" was legitimated
in
terms of the instrumentalist
discourse.
During the 1989-199!
period the plausibility
of the
neo-kantian and instrumentalist
discourses had not only been
enhanced by events in the
East, hut their positions
in the
inter-governmental power game had
been improved.
-

At the

institutional level the power
of the remaining
absolutists
in the DOD was weakened
with personnel changes in
1989.
No
one was brought in to
head up DTSA until the late
spring of
1989.
This gave the Commerce and
state Department an
cpportunity to improve their
positions in the inter-agency
power struggle. As these
Departments gained greater power
ever the formulation of policy,
the NSC, working with the
British representatives, was able
to produce a workable
proposal for the June 1990 COCOM
meeting.
The DOD, however,
was critical of the reorganization,
particularly the
agreement to renegotiate the COCOM
list from scratch.

At the alliance level Western European
officials,

under heavy pressure at home signaled
to the United States
with words and deeds that they were prepared
to take

unilateral steps toward liberalizations if the
Bush

Administration would not alter its position.

The
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Administration's more caiHH
was thus undermined
h

aPPr ° aCh t0 lib
-^i-tions

bv the growlng
by
willingness
European states to allow »-k
l0W thSlr flrms
to sell.
The united
States could have
turned
d t-o
t0 leVera e
9
instruments to attempt
to slow liberalizations.
The rents
rent, tk
the Administration
oould
have used, however,
were tBW
few
In addition,
ad(3 ^.
no one in the
Bush Administration
was Willi™
willing *to advocate
such a clearly
counter-productive strategy.
Inst ead
.

i

.

-

^

tried to pressure the
Europeans through public
displays and
condemnations of export
control violations.
At the market level
United states high
technology
business interest groups
redoubled their pressure
on the
Bush Administration as
they perceived market
possibilities
xn the East.
This camp was supported
by the Commerce
Department and some members
of Congress.
These interest
groups had argued throughout
the 1980 -s that the
extensiveness of the United
States controls harmed
commercial interests in West-West
trade.
As it appeared
that western European firms
were going to gain the market
entry advantage in the East,
due to their governments

willingness to liberalize with or
without the United States,
domestic interests pressure on the
Bush Administration
increased.
The present state of allied and
United States
policy on East-West trade is thus rather
divided as these
discourse camps continue to try and gain control
over policy

398

by establishing
th e most plausible
concentn.i
p
conceptual framework
for
policy purpose.

This case study has
alloued me
explanatory strength

^

^

of fouf

accounting for the
dynamics Qf
Taken together, these
perspectives provide
^ Viae us
sufficient detail to
account for the
tne creation
xn alliance
collaboration.

a

oict
picture with

of. and shifts

The factors that these

perspectives focus on
interacted with each other
to make
collaboration possible and
to alter the terms
of
collaboration in various
periods.
The historical narrative
of the 1949 - 1964
1964 .
.
,

1979(

19?9 i989

^

i989 _ ig9i

»as made possible by the
edified structural realist,
market, institutional ist
and discourse frameworks.
used the micro-economic
contested exchange model to
account for the role of the
distribution of issue specific
capability as a factor in the
dynamics of alliance
collaboration. At this level I
showed how the erosion of
United States capability
preponderance over time altered its
ability to extract compliance
from alliance states and
Western firms for its preferred
policy position. Using this
model I showed in a systematic
fashion the relationship
between United States compliance
extraction instruments.
These instruments are embedded in the
United States export
I
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control institution
1949.

f ramework thafc

_

h e contested
exchange model is an
effective
aUOWing US t0 eX lai
P
"
„eans

by which the United
States attested to
ensure compli an ce
with economic warfare
in the 1949 - 1964
period and during fche
f rst Rea
.

Ministration.

^

In order to establish
the COCOM program and
to ensure the integrity
of controls the United

States drew
°n a combination of
enforcement rents, co mpl
iance

surveillance and the threat
of rent withdrawal for
noncompliance. ftt the outset
of the COCOM program
the United
States had access to an
extensive mix of rents such
as aid,
access to leading edge
technology and government
procurement
contracts.
the 1949-1953 period,
compliance with the
United States policy vision
was relatively easy to
obtain
because United States rents
were more attractive to Western
States than recreating economic
ties with the East.
The

m

threat of rent withdrawal was
also effective because Western
firms did not have alternative
suppliers.
In 1953 as Marshall Plan aid
declined, as the global

economy contracted, and as the Soviet
Union moved into the
post-Stalinist period the United States ability
to use the

aid rent was constrained or became more
costly.
States,

The United

in the face of strong Western European
pressure,

agreed to some liberalization in COCOM, but resorted
to

.
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^

strengthening its unii^.v

Rents,

•

n

to

—

co mp i iance

.

orms, however, the
united states
strengthened
to Wlth d rawal
free access to ieading

^^^^ ^

,

strategically significant
technology
yythrough extraterritoriality

This
lnis was
wa s »accomplished

claims and the expansion
of

licensing systems and
other surveillance
systems to gauge
compliance
in the early 1980 .s
when members of the
Reagan

Administration wanted to
establish policy coordination
with
its economic warfare
policy they turned to
strengthen these
instruments. While these
instruments were embedded in
the
administrative and legal framework
of the United states
export control system they
had been neglected during
the
trade linkage 1964-1979
period.
The attempt
to revive

economic warfare, legitimated
through the absolutist
discourse, and to obtain alliance
compliance failed in part
as a result of the shift
in the distribution of issue
specific capability. The rents
that were available to the
United States for leverage had
declined and those available
were less attractive because of
next best alternative
suppliers.

The attempt to strengthen this leverage
system

by increased surveillance and more
extensive monitoring and
by expanding Executive authority to
withdrawal rents was

counterproductive with the Western Europeans.

It had the

—
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three following
consequencesnces.
4
resource allocation
cost" cost,

competitiveness of united

BeSter

" fi

™S

*.
if «
it
entailed
costs for the

*™ - —

dipiomatic

rr

it increased
lt
in
government

°° sts as

-less patriot missUe
P-ves to be extremely

u

high . technoiogy

—^—^

interests

rnative suppliers; and
it
s

^

other

fungible as rents

^

united
oo„ tinue to incur
such costs
to these instruments
in an atte.pt to
extract Western
European compliance with
a preferred polio
y position on
export controls determined
exogenously.

wUl

^

Through

a

market explanation

I

^

^ ^

^

was able to account for

west trade and that shaped
the nature of collaboration
on
multilateral export controls.
During the 1949-1964 period
business interest groups in
the United States, for a
number
of reasons, were not
inclined to challenge the
restrictive
export control program. The
incentive to pursue market
possibilities in the East was minimal
and thus most domestic
groups did not see the United States
program as imposing
significant costs. In addition, because
Western firms did
not have next best alternative
suppliers for leading edge
technology United States firms did not see
the licensing and
surveillance systems as a hindrance to West-West
trade or as
a

factor that could damage commercial competitiveness.

.
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^
^
^^^^

Significant domestic
inters
interest groups in
Western
Europe, however, did
see

^

P-gra,

as imposing costs
by closing

Eastern European market.

Opposition
^position tn
to the economic
warfare
policy became P
particularly
c h->rricularly strong
as Marshall Plan
aid

end of the Korean war
created an opportunity
for interest
groups in Europe
to pressure
vreimro *-v,
v
their governments for
liberalization. Support for
the movement away from
economic
warfare came from both the
right and the left in
Western
Europe
•

The market perspective
provides a particularly
effective framework for
explaining policy shifts and
the
dynamics of collaboration in
the 1964-1969 and 1989-1991
periods.
During these periods business
interest groups in
the united States, with
allies in the Commerce Department
and Congress, were able to
pressure the Executive to move
toward liberalizations.
In both the 1964-1979 period
and
the 1989-1991 period the
Executive sought to maintain

control over East-West trade policy.

In the case of the

1964-1979 period the Executive's
preferred trade linkage
policy was undermined by commercial
pressures.
As global
economic competition increased, Western
European states were
more inclined to sell East on their own
terms rather than
play linkage on the United states' terms.
Business
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s and gover

them

:

_

oin then," policy

i

officiais beiieved

ine

.

in the 1989 - 1991
period changes

,

n

^

the possibility and
intense economic
competition
-entive for ln tensifi e d
domestic

^

to alter East-West- t-r-=>^ ~
trade poUcy.
-,

•

^

In the United States
hightechnology business
interest groups
extensive pressure on
the Bush Administration
to Unerase
controls.
Throughout
ut tne
the 1980
I9sn'=s fthese
k
y
groups had opposed
the extensive United
states surveillance
systems and
intensified monitoring of
West-West and East-West
trade.
High-technology interest groups
saw that these extensive
programs hurt their commercial
competitiveness as Western
firms, rather than bear
increased costs, turned

^

to

alternative suppliers.

m

the face of a situation
were

Western European officials, due
in part to domestic pressure
by commercial groups,
indicated a willingness to liberalize
without the United States these
groups intensified pressure
on the Executive through Congress
and the Commerce
Department.

The institutional perspective allows
us to understand
how the nature of inter-governmental
power games affected
United States policy and the dynamics of
collaboration.
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Western European
officials from „
Foreign Affair, k

" WayS

state

P0Slti0nS

co t i
controls.

-.mate
-COCO..

"

—
^

reSP ° nSible

neg0tiati0 " S

The state

"tries of Economics
and

-

^

«*
ral export

in setting the
terms of the United
states p0 si tion

Kesponsibility for United
states export controi
Policy, however, h as
always b een spread
out among tne
commerce, the state
and the Defense
Departments.
The
Commerce Department has
as oy
bv and large
l,™ supported a minimalist
Position on controls
while DOD has advocated
strict
controls.
ln sorae instances>

^

^

alliance between Defense
officials and Commerce
officials
has been forged. This
was the case in 1949-1953
and in the

-rly

1980 ...

The c

_

ce Department s

^

,

DOD in such an alliance
has been based in part
on the idea
that if a restrictive
control system is to guide
policy then
the Europeans should be
brought into line. The
reasoning
for this position being
that United states firms
should not
experience lost sells as a
result of Western firms noncompliance with controls.
Competition between the DOD, the
Commerce Department and the state
Department to define the
purpose, the nature and the scope
of export control policy
has been constant since 1949.
The dynamic context
of

shifting Soviet-United States relations
has been the
background for this competition. Soviet
foreign policy
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e DOD

export control policv
P Hey.

Thic
This was the case
in the 1949-1953
period and after iQ7a
1979.
soviet moderation
has provided the
opening f or the
Commerce or state
tate De
n.n,
Partment to push their
policy vision.
c-

<-

The state Department
nas otten
has
oft^n been
k0
more inclined to
try and find
pragmatic workable
solutions
uuons on the
th. nature
,
and
extent of export control
coooer.Hnn
^
cooperation by
agreeing to
c
ses with their
erparts in the western
European
Ministries of For ei n A
g
airs
The
been, in so me instances,
willi ng to strike compromises
Western European
officials f>,
af ran
P n otucials
that
counter to the position
advocated by Congress or
other United states
government
Departments.
This was particularly the
case in the 19491964 period.
During the early 1980-s
the State Department's
position in the COCOM negotiation
process was undermined as
the DOD gained the upper
hand in the inter-governmental
power struggle over defining
the terms of East-West trade
policy.
The consequence was that DOD
officials in bilateral
and multilateral talks intensified
pressure on Western

™

~
«

.

^

^

European Ministry of Economics and
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs officials.
cases where the DOD was unable to
persuade these officials of necessity of
economic warfare
DOD officials were less inclined to
compromise and more

m

—
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likely to advocate
e or m,,
th reaten leveraqe
inter-governmental
lead to discord
at the all iance
xcvex.
level

IT r "™

non d
h„
°m

C ° ntr01

—
•

has

This discord

——

-

«"

result-*?

-

relationship between
East-West
west tr,^
„
trade and
Western security
diverges from the DOD.
Discourse analysis allowed
me to show how policy
choices are legitimated
through constructed
understandings
of interests.
Discourses simultaneously
these understandings
making possible some
policies and
precluding others. In this
case ! showed how
particular
-ages of the Soviet Union,
representations of technology
and trade in relation
to security, and the
image of the
nature of threats to
security constituted
particular
policies as legitimate.
Economic warfare, trade
linkage,
and trade liberalization
are all East-West trade
policy
options.
Each of these options is
made plausible by a
vision of purpose that is
constructed and given meaning
through a particular discourse.
I showed here how the
terms
of the absolutist discourse
legitimated economic warfare,
how the instrumentalist discourse
legitimated trade linkage,
and how the neo-kantian discourse
legitimated

^^

liberalization.
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A

H

of these discourses
h»„= u

^ ^

PrSSent th "U9hout
the hi
history
of post-1945
debates on United Stat
"*
-port control Policy.
pol icy
Tnes
These ,
discourse camps, both
in the
states and in Western
E uro P e, have
coated to
establish the purpose
of their states.
E ast-West trade
and
e^ort control P o licy
Soviet
experiences, auu
and tne
qh,f 0 of* overall
the state
Western
western ainalliance-East
>1°= relations affects the
persuasive power of the
images
and representations
of these discourses.
Collaboration on
export controls has
taken place within a
dynamic context
where discourse congruence
between alliance officials
has
Produced greater cooperation
while incongruence has
produced
greater discord.

—

.

.

^^

/

By reconstructing a
theoretically informed narrativehistorical account of alliance
interaction in this policy
area I have shown how
collaboration is made possible
by
multiple factors. Accounting
for the dynamics of discord
and cooperation in this case
requires that we draw

simultaneously on several different
theoretical frameworks.
Thus I do not claim that discourse
analysis surpasses other
perspectives in its ability to account
for policy formation
or alliance collaboration.
Its main function in this

case
has been to help us to understand
how policies are made
possible by particular visions of purpose
(see Der Dervan,

1990; Klein,

1990; Shapiro,

1990; Chaloupka,

1990; Weber,
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199 °)

•

The institutionalist
St fram
frain .
„
ework
allows us to exol^n

to explain whose
vision can hold sway
swav at any given
time
among the allies
ues
t*w>„
Taken together
*
ner rhoo«
y
these frameworks
help us
to un derstand the
mulUple factors
d yn amics of western
aluance coUaboration
expQrt
policy.
4.
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